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Abstract 
Research on environmental behavior continues not to answer the question: why don’t people 
behave the way we want them to? Or differently, what are the barriers and constraints to 
proenvironmental behaviors? For this a model is proposed and from this, habit is studied as a 
barrier, being defined as goal-directed automatic behavior that is mentally represented and 
can be triggered by environmental cues (e.g. Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Accordingly, it 
shares some characteristics with other types of mental representations such as stereotypes and 
attitudes for example, namely its dynamism which results from the interaction between the 
situation and cognitive processes. Based on the Theory of Systems Goals (Kruglanski et al., 
2002) and the mental constructs activation rules (Higgins & Brendl, 1995), habits can also be 
considered to result from the interaction between 2 sources of activation: context applicability 
(in our studies defined as perceived applicability of habit to the means to attain the goal 
present in the decision context) and cognitive accessibility (through goal priming or 
chronicity). We manipulated these in a number of online shopping simulations organic vs. 
non-biological products buying or habitual vs. non-habitual products buying. Results 
demonstrate a perceived applicability effect with more habitual (studies 2 and 3) or non-
biological (study 1) products chosen in a familiar than in a new context and greater 
consistency in non-organic choice within 3 choices in the same list (study 1). Strong habit 
participants (high chronic accessibility) consistently choose the habitual product even when 
context changes (study 2). The goal priming does not show the expected effect (study 2 and 
3) and may indicate the presence of goal activation suppression effects (Study 2). Finally, 
results indicate that habit can resist the effect of implementation intentions (study 4) or be 
"broken" for certain context changes (studies 5a + 5 b). 
 
Key words: Environmental behavior; Consumption; Barriers and constraints; Habits. 
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Resumo alargado 
Apesar da premente necessidade de desenvolvimento de condutas protectoras do ambiente, 
dos elevados níveis de preocupação a este nível e positividade das atitudes em vários países 
(Ferreira Marques, Palma-Oliveira, Marques, & Ferreira 1995), o número de pessoas que age 
de forma ambientalmente positiva permanece muito baixa, demonstrando uma inconsistência 
entre atitudes e comportamentos ambientais. Apesar de este problema ser conhecido há 
muitos anos e de se ter tornado clássico ao nível da Psicologia Social, ao nível da Psicologia 
Ambiental e ao nível da Psicologia do Consumidor continua a gerar debate e a não ser 
respondido eficazmente. De facto, no que concerne à investigação do comportamento pro-
ambiental e consumo ecológico no âmbito destas disciplinas, há muitos anos que se tenta 
encontrar “factores de inconsistência” – factores que podem influenciar negativamente o 
comportamento ambientalmente positivo, ao torná-lo inconsistente com as atitudes 
ambientalmente positivas. O que se verifica é que, quer em investigação quer mesmo ao nível 
dos programas de mudança comportamental e educação ambiental, procuram-se identificar 
todos os factores possíveis que podem estar na base de um comportamento. Isto tem 
implicado a tentativa de juntar vários níveis de explicação - económicos, políticos, 
estruturais, demográficos, etc. - num mesmo modelo explicativo do comportamento 
ambiental ou de consumo (e.g. água ou energia), o que é criticável, pois tem tido como 
consequência um frequente esquecimento de um nível de explicação psicológico. Um 
segundo aspecto a criticar, refere-se ao facto de que os modelos que integram os factores 
psicológicos, são na sua maioria de carácter descritivo e não explicativo e restringem-se a 
uma “análise positiva” dos factores de consistência (e.g.: Teoria do Comportamento Planeado 
de Ajzen (1991); Modelo Normas-Crenças-Valores de Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagno & Kalof 
(1999)). Um terceiro e último aspecto criticável, advém do facto de estes mesmos modelos de 
comportamento darem em geral demasiado ênfase ao aspecto deliberativo/intencional e 
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subestimarem o poder dos processos automáticos que não envolvam mediação consciente 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Estas três razões globais poderão explicar em grande parte 
porque é que a investigação em Psicologia do Ambiente e do Consumo, continua a não 
responder à pergunta: porque é que as pessoas falham em agir da forma que seria desejado 
socialmente? Ou de outra forma: quais as barreiras e constrangimentos à realização de 
comportamentos pro-ambientais? 
Neste âmbito, o objectivo das investigações realizadas foi procurar responder às três críticas 
identificadas e à pergunta de quais as barreiras e constrangimentos à realização de 
comportamentos pro-ambientais. Para isso, foi estudada uma das barreiras psicológicas à 
consistência atitude-comportamento e à promoção do consumo de produtos ecológicos, em 
particular ou de novos produtos, em geral: o hábito. Este factor de inconsistência pode ser 
definido como: comportamento automático guiado por objectivos, sendo representado 
mentalmente por uma associação cognitiva “objectivo comportamental-acção”, que pode ser 
activada a partir de pistas contextuais (e.g. Aarts, Verplanken & van Knippenberg 1998; 
Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Outras concepções de hábito (e.g. Wood & Neal, 2007) 
consideram que o efeito da activação destes não se realiza com mediação de objectivos 
comportamentais. No entanto, ambas as perspectivas consideram a importância destes 
objectivos na sua activação e caracterizam os hábitos como representações mentais. Sendo os 
hábitos representações mentais, alguns autores consideram-nos como equivalentes a outros 
tipos de representações mentais como os estereótipos e atitudes por exemplo, envolvendo 
processos cognitivos semelhantes (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). Neste sentido, também 
partilham algumas das características destes, nomeadamente o facto de serem representações 
dinâmicas cujos efeitos resultam da interacção entre o contexto e os processos cognitivos. 
Tendo em conta isto, pretendemos ir para além de conceptualizações clássicas dos hábitos, 
enquanto simples respostas S-R, que não conseguem resistir a mudanças do contexto. Estas 
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levam frequentemente a que o seu efeito enquanto barreira à promoção da compra de novos 
produtos e especificamente de produtos ecológicos (e.g. produtos de produção biológica) seja 
subestimado. Para isso, baseámo-nos nos pressupostos da Teoria dos Sistemas de Objectivos 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002) e nas regras de activação de constructos mentais (Higgins, 1996; 
Higgins & Brendl, 1995), ao considerar que as decisões podem ser influenciadas pelos 
hábitos com base numa interacção entre 2 fontes de activação: aplicabilidade ao contexto - 
manipulada em termos da familiaridade dos meios para alcançar o objectivo comportamental 
mentalmente representado - e acessibilidade cognitiva do objectivo comportamental 
associado - quer por primação supraliminal, quer por cronicidade. Esta demonstração foi feita 
com base na manipulação destes aspectos num conjunto de estudos experimentais pela 
internet envolvendo a escolha de produtos em simulações de compra de produtos biológicos 
vs. não biológicos - na mesma categoria de produto habitual (leite; fruta) - e habituais vs. não 
habituais - em categorias de produto diferentes (leite vs. sumo de laranja). Os resultados 
demonstram um efeito de aplicabilidade percebida - percepção da aplicabilidade do hábito 
aos meios existentes - com mais produtos habituais (estudos 2 e 3), ou mais produtos não 
biológicos (estudo 1), escolhidos num contexto familiar comparado com um novo. Mais 
ainda, verifica-se uma maior consistência na escolha de produtos não biológicos perante 3 
escolhas de produtos na mesma lista (estudo 1). No que se refere à acessibilidade, verifica-se 
que participantes com hábito forte – i.e., com elevada acessibilidade “natural” ou cronicidade 
do objectivo de compra habitual - escolheram consistentemente o produto habitual mesmo em 
situação de mudança de contexto, isto é, perante um contexto familiar vs. novo (estudo 2). No 
que se refere à primação supraliminal do objectivo comportamental, foi realizada uma tarefa 
de simulação e descrição comportamental numa certa situação de compra com um objectivo 
comportamental associado a ela (e.g. comprar leite para os pequenos-almoços da semana, 
numa condição de activação do objectivo alvo, correspondente à tarefa de tomada de decisão 
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posterior). Esta manipulação anterior à decisão na tarefa de escolha dos produtos pela 
internet, não apresenta o efeito esperado (estudo 2) mesmo quando esta manipulação 
supraliminal ocorre de forma visual (estudo 3), podendo num caso indicar a presença de 
efeitos de contraste e/ou de supressão da activação do objectivo (estudo 2), e noutro uma 
falha na metodologia usada (estudo 3).  
Por último, foram também realizados estudos (estudo 4 e 5a+5b) em que se procurou avaliar 
o efeito do desenvolvimento de intenções de implementação (Gollwitzer, 1999). Segundo a 
literatura, o desenvolvimento de “intenções de implementação” associadas a um certo 
objectivo X, são eficazes em mudar comportamentos desempenhados habitualmente com um 
objectivo Y (Aarts, Dijksterhuis & Midden, 1999). Estas intenções envolvem um 
planeamento comportamental em termos de: “quando a situação Z surgir, vou desempenhar a 
resposta X”, especificando o “quando”, “onde” e “como” essa resposta vai permitir alcançar 
o objectivo (Gollwitzer, 1999). No entanto, enquanto a mudança de comportamento com base 
no desenvolvimento destas não se torna estável, a sua eficácia continua dependente da 
estabilidade do contexto entre outras condições (Verplanken & Faes, 1999). Tendo em conta 
a ausência de estudos a este nível, procurámos avaliar o efeito do hábito enquanto promotor 
de instabilidade no processo mediado pela consciência, reduzindo o sucesso das intenções de 
implementação. No caso dos nossos estudos, o desenvolvimento de intenções de 
implementação referiu-se ao planeamento da compra de produtos biológicos em geral 
(objectivo comportamental abstracto) ou especificamente para a compra de fruta de 
agricultura biológica (objectivo comportamental concreto), em ambos os casos referente à 
compra na semana seguinte. Neste sentido, os resultados demonstraram que os hábitos podem 
“quebrar” as intenções de implementação, mesmo num contexto novo e menos facilitador 
(menos familiar) dos hábitos (estudo 4). Por outro lado, também demonstraram que enquanto 
em certas condições os hábitos conseguem resistir ao efeito de intenções de implementação, 
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noutras podem ser “quebrados” consoante as alterações ao contexto e as alterações cognitivas 
induzidas pelo desenvolvimento destas (estudo 5a e 5b). 
Concluindo, os estudos apresentados nesta tese levantam algumas questões importantes 
acerca das pré-condições para que um hábito influencie a tomada de decisão face à escolha de 
produtos biológicos vs. não biológicos, ou habituais vs. não habituais, com base na interacção 
de factores internos e características situacionais. Como tal, de forma a modificar um hábito 
bem estabelecido e impedir que ele influencie negativamente as decisões e comportamentos 
e/ou desenvolver “bons hábitos”, as pessoas necessitam de investir num esforço de auto-
regulação elevado, de forma a resistir às tentações de se tornarem “presas” de hábitos 
indesejados. Neste âmbito, a literatura parece exageradamente optimista relativamente ao 
sucesso das intenções de implementação e ao efeito negativo dos hábitos. No entanto, ao 
identificar os factores que podem influenciar negativamente os comportamentos e decisões, 
os estudos aqui apresentados, apesar de parecerem dar uma visão pessimista são na realidade 
optimistas. 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Comportamento ambiental; Consumo; Barreiras e constrangimentos; hábitos. 
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Chapter 1 
 
WHY DO PEOPLE FAIL TO ACT? BARRIERS AND CONSTRAINTS 
ON PROENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIORS 
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THE POSITIVITY FALACY 
 
Being “positive” in life is not always a good thing, especially if you work in the field of 
Environmental Education and Behavior Change. Many projects in this area are biased by a 
“positivity fallacy”, i.e., the belief that as long as people develop the right attitudes, 
intentions, skills, information, etc., the right proenvironmental behavior should follow. 
However, as informed by the social sciences literature, an inconsistency exists between 
attitudes and behaviors, with cross-country studies showing high levels of environmental 
concern but, at the same time, low levels of environmental action (see e.g. Ferreira Marques, 
Palma-Oliveira, Marques, & Ferreira 1995). A classical example of this in the environmental 
domain was given in Geller’s study (1981), in which householders changed significantly their 
attitudes and increased their knowledge regarding residential energy conservation measures 
following participation in an intensive workshop (three hours) about this subject; but not their 
behaviors, as the results of visits by technicians to their houses demonstrated.  
This attitude-behavior inconsistency is not a new subject, having been studied in Social 
Psychology for more than 50 years although being scarcely applied to environmental 
behavior analysis in general and Environmental Psychology in particular. In our view, one of 
the causes of such inconsistency is an underestimation of the factors working as barriers and 
constraints to environmental behavior change and to the promotion of proenvironmental 
behavioral goals (i.e., factors which increase the attitude-behavior inconsistency). Hence, the 
“right” factors do not seem to be enough to promote behaviors consistent with one’s positive 
attitudes, beliefs, etc. In the field of environmental behavior this inconsistency reflects a 
conflict between proenvironmental behavioral goals (e.g. associated with the intention to buy 
organic food) based on positive attitudes, intentions, etc. and anti-environmental behavioral 
goals (e.g., associated with non-organic food buying habits).  
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Although this conflict sometimes appears to be won in the short-run through behavioral 
and attitude change programs, it is actually being lost in the long-run (Gaspar de Carvalho & 
Palma-Oliveira, 2007). This occurs because many of these programs underestimate the 
factors that can work as barriers and constraints to environmental behavior change and the 
promotion of proenvironmental behavioral goals, i.e., factors which increase the 
environmental attitude-behavior inconsistency. Thus, the “right” factors don’t seem to be 
enough to promote behaviors consistent with one’s positive attitudes, beliefs, etc. if we do not 
take into account the former. This is also related with the fact that, independently of the way 
we conceptualize proenvironmental behavior (Corral-Verdugo & Pinheiro, 2004) this 
behavior is usually defined as involving intention, planning and deliberation. One example is 
given by Corral-Verdugo (2001; p. 37) who defines it as “a set of deliberate and effective 
actions which respond to social and individual requirements and result in protection of the 
environment”. Although we agree with this definition, it should be taken into consideration 
that there can be various factors that can inhibit or interfere with this intention, planning and 
deliberation and thus, promote a behavior that is inconsistent with these. We will get back to 
these factors later on. 
This “positivity fallacy” is also evident in research on environmental behavior regarding 
models that intend to identify the “positive determinants” of action (i.e., factors that when 
present can promote a new behavior or increase the strength of an existing one.) 
Consequently, the barriers and constraints to proenvironmental behaviors are seen as lacking 
factors, i.e., factors that influence proenvironmental behavior in a negative way, due to 
absence or weak influence of a positive determinant or “right” factor. These factors influence 
proenvironmental behavior in a negative way (and thus increase the attitude-behavior 
inconsistency), due to the absence or weak influence of a positive determinant or “right” 
factor. For example, imagine someone who does not have the skill and behavioral 
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information on how to assemble energy or water efficient equipment and/or his family and 
relevant peers are not supportive of that behavior. In this case, the likelihood of development 
and maintenance of conservation behavior will be low.  
One example comes from the Value-Belief-Norm Model (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagno & 
Kalof, 1999) as shown in a simplified version in Figure 1. This model considers that 
environmental behavior is caused by a chain of 5 types of variables: personal values (most 
importantly the altruistic ones); ecocentric orientation towards nature (NEP); awareness of 
the behavioral consequences over the environment (AC); attribution of responsibility to self 
(AR; based on beliefs regarding environmental conditions); and personal norms (in the sense 
of a personal responsibility to behave in a certain way). From this model it is implicit that, if 
people lack altruistic personal values or an ecocentric orientation towards nature, 
proenvironmental behavior should not occur.  
 
Figure 1. Value-Belief-Norm Model (adapted from Stern et al., 1999). 
 
 
Other models are more explicit regarding these negative factors, as it is the case of 
Kollmuss and Agyeman’s model (2002), shown in Figure 2, which is also based on a 
“positivity fallacy” with the majority of the factors that can influence behavior in a negative 
way being what we call lacking factors: lack of internal incentives, lack of environmental 
consciousness, lack of external possibilities and incentives and negative or insufficient 
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feedback about behavior. One exception to this is the factor that the authors call “old 
behavior patterns” (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002).~ 
 
Figure 2. Proenvironmental behavior model (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). 
 
 
These types of models are based on a view of behavior determined mainly by 
dispositional factors, disregarding the effect of context in it, viewed in a psychological level 
of explanation (i.e., context is viewed in terms of a political, social, economical, etc., level of 
explanation). This represents a fundamental attribution error, given that behavior is 
considered to be caused by individual characteristics and dispositions, when it can also be 
caused by aspects of the situation or context where behavior is supposed to take place 
(Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar-Carvalho, 2004). Unfortunately, despite of research in other areas 
showing the influence of context (e.g. Social Psychology), this view is still disseminated 
nowadays in research on environmental behavior. One example is the work done in Europe 
on Environmental Psychology and specifically in Spain. Accordingly, a meta-analysis 
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performed by Amérigo (2006), showed that most of the work done in the last fifteen years 
regarding environmental behavior identified mainly attitudinal variables - general and 
specific attitudes, beliefs and values – as predictors of environmental behavior, and more 
frequently, as predictors of intention to perform proenvironmental behaviors. Also, most of 
the methodology tries to establish relations between the various predictors and intention and 
behavior, and rarely try to present a process view of this, or include contextual factors in a 
psychological level of explanation.  
This tendency in research has also manifested itself in other regions of the world (see 
e.g. Pinheiro & Corral-Verdugo, 2007), and it still reinforces a problem which is failing in 
acknowledging the fact that people’s behavior is influenced by situations and thus, prevents 
research being done regarding this. In fact, even if people have a strong intention to behave in 
a proenvironmental way, the situation can be perceived as inhibitive (Corraliza & Berenguer, 
2000), leading to inaction, which can cause a conflict between proenvironmental and anti-
environmental behavioral goals. Also, even if a certain person is altruistic, this altruism can 
be constrained if this person is in a situation where the egoistic/competitive behavioral 
options are more accessible and there is an environmental and social uncertainty, regarding 
the amount of resource available and the number of people behaving in a competitive or 
cooperative way, respectively (Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004). In this sense, 
models and projects based on a “positivity fallacy” only identify “what people are supposed 
to do” given the right factors – prescriptive view - but not “what people actually do” when 
they are in a certain situation – descriptive view.  Therefore, we are interested in the reasons 
why Environmental Education and Behavior Change projects aren’t being successful in 
promoting proenvironmental behaviors (which are expected to be consistent with people’s 
positive environmental attitudes) and in changing anti-environmental behaviors; we are also 
interested in knowing the situation’s role in this. Identifying “what people actually do” 
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implies identifying the reasons why people fail to act proenvironmentally, being this the aim 
of this chapter.  
 
THE NEED FOR A MORE INTEGRAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR 
 
A number of behavioral models in the literature on environmental behavior try to 
explain why people fail to act. However, most of the negative factors analyzed so far are non-
psychological in nature (e.g. socio-economic). These factors are seen as having their 
influence outside the person’s intention or will and are represented as a direct effect of 
situations on people’s behavior. Thus, no matter how strong the commitment to perform a 
behavior is, how positive the environmental attitude is, or how responsible a person feels in 
its performance, the situation can directly inhibit behavior.  
One example, presented in the literature as a situational barrier to recycling behavior, is 
garbage-containers spatial accessibility (Schultz, Oskamp & Mainieri, 1995). The less 
spatially accessible (i.e., the more distant) the waste disposal facilities are, the lower the 
probability that people will separate at home and dispose the waste in the right recycling bins. 
This problem appears to be more related to design and urban planning issues than to people’s 
“fault” and can be labeled as a “blame it on the situation” effect, as manifested in the 
literature regarding environmental behavior. In addition, this approach does not explain why 
when people’s personal dispositions and the situation are both facilitative (e.g. spatially 
accessible containers + positive attitudes and intentions; etc.), people still do not behave in 
the “right way.” Also, it also doesn’t explain proenvironmental behavior performance even 
when the context is difficult and inhibitive. Thus, the approach provides an incomplete 
account of the interaction between situations and psychological processes. 
Additional examples pertaining the negative effect of situations on proenvironmental 
behavior are the influence of exterior temperature on domestic energy consumption levels 
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(Olsen, 1981); the inadequacy of infra-structures, like ergonomic features and transportation 
network planning, on different environmental behaviors (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002); the 
influence of place of residence and other demographic variables on driving behavior (e.g. 
Tanner, 1999); and the absence of income on purchasing energy-efficient devices 
(Constanzo, Archer, Aronson & Pettigrew, 1986). These factors correspond to levels of 
explanation from disciplines other than psychology (economy, sociology, architecture, etc.) 
and thus the situation’s effect on behavior is not assessed within a psychological level of 
explanation. Our criticism is not intended to imply that non-psychological factors and 
psychological variables should not be assessed together when an attitude-and-behavior-
change intervention is designed. In fact, we consider that models with various levels of 
explanation can be important in certain behavior change interventions and in some areas of 
research. What we alert is that by assessing only these non-psychological factors, researchers 
and practitioners are often prevented from seeing them through a “psychological lens” (as lay 
people usually do) and implicitly dismiss their importance and explanatory power. This has 
prevented the development of psychological models given that when a factor is identified in a 
certain level of explanation, it won’t be identified again within a psychological explanatory 
view. Therefore, identifying the reason for not separating for recycling as due to the waste 
disposal facilities distance, prevents for example of being seem as due to a perception of 
incommodity, time spent and metal effort in acting or even a “less visible” explanation 
regarding a low cognitive accessibility of the behavioral options, associated with the visual 
absence of the facilities (see e.g.: Biel & Garling, 1995, for a related example). 
One illustration of this mixed explanation levels models comes from Gardner and 
Stern’s (2002; Stern & Oskamp, 1987) Model of Resource Consumption Behavior. These 
authors identify internal and external psychological and non-psychological “limiting factors” 
which prevent people from acting based on their proenvironmental attitudes. Such factors are 
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classified ranging from the highest level of causality (variables with the strongest influence 
on behavior) to the lowest, respectively: 1) resource-use or resource-saving behavior; 2) 
attention, and behavioral commitment; 3) knowledge; 4) attitudes and beliefs; 5) values and 
worldviews; 6) external incentives and constraints; and 7) household background. External 
and internal barriers can be found within these levels, with their influence being higher for 
high-cost or difficult actions (i.e., stronger influence as attitude-behavior inconsistency 
factors). Thus, for example, an inconsistency between attitudes (level 4) and behavior (level 
1) could be due to internal barriers like absence of the necessary behavioral knowledge (level 
3) or the absence of either attention or behavioral commitment (level 2). In opposition, the 
influence of external barriers is higher on household background (7) and external incentives 
and constraints (6) levels, which can inhibit the development of positive values and 
worldviews (level 5), and both attitudes and beliefs (level 4). According to Gardner and Stern 
(2002), these external barriers can be associated with people’s socioeconomic background, 
available technology, economic forces, inconvenience, etc.  
The problem with this “blame it on the situation” effect is evident in these models that 
try to integrate non-psychological factors into psychological models and into projects that 
take them into consideration. As we said, by including non-psychological factors, their effect 
over the psychological processes is not explained since it is inferred that they have a direct 
effect on behavior. Thus, more than identifying all the possible psychological and non-
psychological explanatory factors and how they independently affect behavior (what could be 
called the “big bag” models), we psychological researchers should consider their effect as 
operating in a synergistic way and develop more psychological models within environmental 
behavior research. In other words, we should analyze how situations and psychological 
processes interact with each other to influence behaviors, in order to increase the models’ 
explanatory power. Some examples of this are provided next. 
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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
 
Consider again the garbage containers accessibility example given before. Often, the 
low percentage of separation for recycling in a certain neighborhood is attributed to design 
and urban planning issues like for example the garbage containers low spatial accessibility, 
either by people who live there (“it is too far away from my house”) or by the local 
authorities (“we need to increase the number of waste disposal facilities”). However, 
frequently this works more as a post-hoc justification given by people for not behaving in the 
way they are supposed to (and according to their own positive attitudes) than actually as the 
real cause of their proenvironmental behavior absence. There can be many explanations for 
this misattribution of the causes of their behaviors, such as for example: people “have limited 
introspective access to the causes and processes of their habits” (Aarts & Custers, 2009; p. 
24) and attribute behavior to the “visible” causes (in this case, spatial accessibility); people 
attribute socially undesirable behavior to external causes (external locus of control) instead to 
their dispositions, in order to maintain cognitive consonance; or other reasons. Still, this 
would be a subject for a chapter on its own and we won’t develop it here. 
The main idea here is that these “visible” non-psychological factors are often seen as 
the causes of behavior and thus, a direct link between the former and the latter is 
acknowledge, without the mediation of psychological processes. Beyond the scientific 
reasons to argue against or in favor of psychologically mediated or unmediated processes, 
this discussion goes deeper into a more philosophical discussion, between ecological realism 
– the “unmediated detection of information” - and cognitive constructivism – “perceptual 
processing which involves inductive inference or intelligent problem solving” (Kubovy, 
Epstein & Gepshtein, 2003; p. 87, 88).  
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Accordingly, most of the reasons given in the literature and the findings from attitude-
behavior change programs, consider that the reasons why people don’t behave the way they 
are supposed to, come from the so-called objective and tangible factors such as: climate’s 
influence over conservation behaviors (energy and water, for example); income’s influence 
over transportation behavior, installation of energy and water saving devices, organic 
products buying, etc.; lack of availability of waste disposal facilities; and others. 
As we said before, these factors can sometimes work as post-hoc (perceived) 
justifications for behaving in a certain way. Other times, they only have an effect over 
behavior when mediated by perception. An example of this was given by Talarowsky (1982) 
in a study on water conservation during a drought situation. This study showed that when 
residents considered that the drought was due to environmental reasons, they tended to 
conserve water within the limits proposed by the authorities. However, when they thought 
that individual consumption was the cause of water scarcity, the limits on consumption 
average were exceeded. This probably implied a belief such as: "(...) if the crisis is due to 
other people’s behavior, then my behavior will not alter much the situation and it is better to 
continue using water because if I don’t, others will do it in my place” (Palma-Oliveira & 
Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004, p.5; Palma-Oliveira & Correia dos Santos, 1998). On the other 
hand, the perception of water abundance (as opposed to draught) inhibits water consumption 
reduction behaviors (Corral-Verdugo, 2002), which can imply a biased perception of 
environmental behavior consequences such as: “if water is abundant then there’s no need to 
reduce my consumption because it won’t have consequences on its depletion”. 
Following from this, our argument is that the non-psychological behavioral barriers and 
constraints identified in the literature and in many projects (see e.g. McKenzie-Mohr & 
Smith, 1999) can also be seen in a psychological level of explanation, because most of them 
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involve a perceptual component1
 
. Accordingly, one of the main principles of psychology 
explaining how people interact with their environment is that we are the “builders” of our 
own reality (Smith & Mackie, 1995). People can construct their own reality through social 
and cognitive processes, which means that many of the factors that are considered to be non-
psychological can be reanalyzed as psychological. Thus, some aspects of people’s 
environment can work as a behavioral barrier if people perceived them in that way. In other 
words, the limiting non-psychological factors (Gardner & Stern, 2002) present in the situation 
can have their effect on behavior mediated by perceptually-based processes, translated into an 
interaction between psychological factors (e.g. attitudes and beliefs) and the situation. Thus, 
the existence of the object is not only important (ecological realism) but also how we 
perceive it (cognitive constructivism), whit this latter view still lacking importance in 
ecological behavior research. 
BARRIERS AND CONSTRAINTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR 
 
PERCEPTION BASED FACTORS 
Situational factors negatively affecting behavior through the mediation of perceptual 
processes are called perceived barriers and constraints (Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004). They can 
be considered “true” negative determinants of action, since they do not correspond to an 
absence or weak influence of a positive determinant.  
In the example given, regarding the garbage containers accessibility, the psychological 
barrier in this case can be for example the perceived cost and difficulty in performing the 
behavior. In fact, performing or not behavior in this situation might depend more on the 
                                                 
1 By this we don’t mean that every barrier and constraint should involve a perceptual component given that, as 
we will show later on, some of them don’t. 
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person’s assessment of the costs and benefits that might result from it (in terms of the mental 
effort, time, motivation level and degree of incommodity in the performance of behavior; 
Gaspar de Carvalho & Palma-Oliveira, 2004; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002), with the spatial 
inaccessibility working more as a post-hoc justification for not behaving. A study by 
Diekmann and Preisendörfer (1992; as cited in Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) supports this 
idea, showing that small-effort behaviors like recycling are performed more frequently than 
large-effort behaviors like car use reduction, with this difference being attributed to the 
perceived costs vs. benefits.  
Another example comes from the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), which 
apart from analyzing two positive behavioral determinants (attitude and subjective norm), 
identifies a process which is similar to the costs/benefits analysis, named “perceived 
behavioral control” (PBC; Ajzen, 1991). The idea is that since there are many behavioral 
constraints that may limit volitional control, it is useful to analyze people’s perception of 
these constraints, which serves as a “proxy” for actual control of their behavior, to the extent 
that these perceptions are close to reality (Ajzen, 2002). Hence, a low PBC functions as a 
negative determinant because the individual can perceive that behavior is not under her/his 
control and that there are strong external constraints impeding its performance, decreasing the 
intention to perform it. Other studies in Environmental Psychology use similar concepts, like 
for example, perceived behavioral barriers (Mckenzie-Mohr, 2000), perceived behavioral 
costs (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) or perceived difficulty (De Young, 1988-1989). These 
perceptions can be seen as a product of expectancy or perceived likelihood of reaching a goal 
(e.g. “How likely is that I separate residues at home?”) and goal value (e.g. “How important 
is for me to separate residues at home?”) (Förster, Liberman & Friedman, 2007). 
Apart from the expectancy/value assessments, other types of perceptions of the situation 
can also exist, which can be considered perceived barriers and constraints. Accordingly, this 
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category can also include what some authors call subjective barriers (Tanner, 1999) given 
that although they are based on objective situational characteristics, they can be biased 
perceptions of them, due for example to the influence of beliefs. Thus, imagine someone who 
has a belief that the water scarcity problem resolution depends on technology and that 
someday a successful and non-expensive way to use water from glaciers, atmosphere or 
another source will be found. Beliefs like this, that according to Thompson and Barton (1994) 
are based on an anthropocentric orientation, will function as limiting factors to save water 
because these individuals will expect environmental problems to be solved through 
technological improvements and not through individual and societal behavioral change. If 
you add to this a belief that, in spite of what is said everywhere on the news about the world 
situation, water is an abundant resource (overestimation of the resource level due to the 
uncertainty in this regard; Biel & Garling, 1995) because at least you have no problem in 
your city due to a dam that provides more than enough water for personal and public use, the 
necessity of water conservation will be minimized and underestimated (see Corral-Verdugo, 
2002). 
Another type of perceived barriers and constraints refers to perceptions about the self 
and one’s own behaviors. In this regard, research has shown that the tendency to break social 
norms, or antisocial behavior (conceptualized in terms of the perception of how frequently 
people engage in antisocial actions), can inhibit water conservation. Anti-environmental 
behavior can be seen as an instance of more general antisocial behavior (Corral-Verdugo & 
Frías-Armenta, 2006; Corral-Verdugo, Frias-Amenta, Gonzalez-Lomelí, 2003). Also, we can 
include the perceptions regarding other people, translated into the influence of explicit 
cognitive representations working as perceived barriers and constraints, such as: stereotypes 
regarding environmentalists (Stoll-Kleemann, 2001), attitudinal ambivalence (Costarelli & 
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Colloca, 2004), anti-environmental subjective norms (Schultz et al., 1995) or anti-
environmental attitudes (Palma-Oliveira & Garcia-Marques, 1988).  
As a conclusion, we can see that perception-based factors are important because by 
analyzing them we can identify the underlying factors characterizing a certain context and 
behavior (Suárez, 1998). Moreover, there is idiosyncrasy in these factors, since what might 
be a barrier for one person might not be for another. Consequently, different perceptions 
might imply different interventions to change attitudes and behaviors and they should be 
assessed.  
These perceptions do not occur in a situational void and even when they are biased in 
some way, they are still associated with one or more situationally perceived characteristics 
(e.g. recycling behaviors of relevant people; availability and price of organic products in a 
supermarket shelve; location of a garbage disposal facility; amount of litter in a public space, 
etc.). We perceive these situational characteristics in a broad way from the most concrete to 
the most abstract levels, including not only the perception of context’s physical features and 
tangible aspects but also those characteristics associated with social environments and events 
happening in there, like other people’s behaviors and attitudes. By identifying these perceived 
barriers and constraints, we try to bring the situation back to the study of barriers and 
constraints on environmental behavior, yet within a psychological level of explanation. Thus, 
by identifying these perceived barriers and constraints, we try to “bring back” the situation to 
the study of the barriers and constraints on environmental behavior, but within a 
psychological level of explanation. This view can be seen as close to an ecological 
perspective of behavior (Barker, 1968), which we also follow given that we consider that 
different contexts imply different behaviors. Differently, we also consider that these 
perceptions can vary from person to person and from groups to groups (Smith & Mackie, 
1995). 
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Still, there is a problem in considering only these types of perception based factors since 
the context can also inhibit or constrain people’s behavior, outside their awareness and 
conscious control. This effect is inaccessible to traditional perception based measurement 
techniques (e.g. questionnaires) and thus, the associated barriers and constraints are not 
identified and dealt with in attitude and behavior change programs. This is a subject to which 
we will get back later on. 
 
MODELS OF BARRIERS AND CONSTRAINTS ON ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR 
Before, we presented models that try to identify the lacking factors and the non-
psychological factors which might limit proenvironmental behavior (e.g. Gardner & Stern, 
2002; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). The literature also presents models that, although still 
including some non-psychological factors without redefining them as psychological 
(considering them independent from human perception), nonetheless they represent an 
evolution compared to the ones presented before. This is because they explicitly consider the 
influence of the perceived barriers and constraints and can therefore be included in a 
behavioral analysis that considers the negative determinants. Accordingly, they go beyond 
the “positivity fallacy” based on lacking factors and present a situational-individual approach 
of factors that have a negative influence on environmental behavior, independent from the 
former. 
An example of a model that acknowledges the influence of the situation as mentioned, 
is provided by Tanner (1999) based on the Ipsative Theory of Behavior (e.g. Frey, 1989; cited 
by Tanner (1999)). Although still including some non-psychological factors (the “objective 
constraints”) it represents an evolution compared to the previous examples, because it goes 
beyond the “positivity fallacy” and explicitly considers an analysis of proenvironmental 
behavior negative determinants based on the situation. According to this author, there are 
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three classes of constraints, which are conceived as internal and external conditions inhibiting 
the performance of an action: 1) Ipsative constraints – internal factors that prevent the 
activation of a particular behavioral alternative from occurring, i.e., the action can only be 
performed if the individual remembers to perform it, implying the assessment of a limited 
number of alternatives and without considering the proenvironmental option in them; 2) 
Subjective constraints – perceived factors that inhibit preference for a particular behavioral 
alternative or willingness to act; these constraints entail beliefs of what is possible or not, 
desired or not, or allowed or not, so that they can eliminate behavioral options based on that 
assessment; 3) Objective constraints – external factors that prevent the performance of a 
particular behavior alternative from occurring, which are independent from individuals’ 
perception (lack of opportunities, mental and physical disabilities; low income; influence of 
legal and political institutions; etc.).  
To support this perspective, Tanner (1999) analyzed the influence on driving behavior 
of two subjective constraints namely “sense of responsibility” and “perceived behavioral 
barriers” along with a set of objective constraints, based on socio-demographic and 
contextual characteristics like “availability of an automobile” and “place of residence” 
(viewed as non-psychological or “objective” factors). It was shown that these factors can 
work as barriers and contributed to the explained variance in the behavioral reports of driving 
behavior frequency. However, as we argued before, what they call “objective” barriers can be 
viewed as psychological in nature, since some behavioral barriers only exist if people 
perceive then as barriers. For a certain person, not owing a car might be perceived as a barrier 
to use a car to go to work but for another person, this is not a barrier since he or she can 
engage in “car pooling” or even rent a car when he or she needs one. 
Models like the Ipsative Theory of behavior are good in the sense that, instead of trying 
to present all the possible factors that might influence behavior (“big bag” models) they 
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actually try to explain the different types of factors affecting behavior (subjective, objective 
and ipsative constraints). As a result, they are closer to a process analysis of behavior, which 
is lacking in the literature and consequently, is also not being used in practice. Nonetheless, 
they commit the same mistake as the other examples presented before, because by trying to 
integrate the objective (i.e., non-psychological) and perceived (i.e., psychological) factors 
they are considering factors in different levels of explanation (socio-economic, architectural, 
demographic, etc.) and not taking into consideration the social construction of reality (Smith 
& Mackie, 1995). 
A good example of an interactionist situational-based approach that tried to overcome 
this critic was put forward by Kaiser and Keller (2001). They used a confirmatory application 
of the Mixed Rasch Model, a statistical model used in this case to assess the behavioral 
consequences of exposure to certain environments. For this they included a measure of 
behavior difficulty not based on self-reports but as function of the number of people who 
perform the environmental behavior in a certain way. Thus, the fewer the people who 
perform the behavior, the more difficult the behavior is and the lower the probability that a 
person will behave in accordance to those people, independently of her own general 
environmental behavior. Given this, they used a systematic analysis of the differential 
behavior difficulties by applying a Mixed Rasch Model to compare similar “latent” groups of 
people on endorsement probabilities associated with environmental behavior (for an extended 
explanation of the method see Kaiser & Keller, 2001). Thus, differences across similar 
samples representing different environments should be attributed to those environments. 
Accordingly, they found that different living contexts, i.e., rural and urban, yielded different 
endorsement probabilities associated with environmental behavior that in this study’s case 
could be due to consequences of the environment on peoples transport behavior associated 
with different modes of transportation, particular opportunities and social climates.  
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The problem with this approach is that it represents a descriptive approach and as the 
authors recognized, the primary goal was to “detect and validate the significance of the 
environment (…) in effectively constraining and facilitating certain ecological behaviors” 
(Kaiser & Keller, 2001; pg. 213), which still does not explain how the situation can affect 
behavior, through the mediation of psychological processes. Moreover, although this 
methodological approach is adequate in the sense that goes beyond the problems and 
measurement error introduced by behavioral measures through self-reports, it only allows the 
analysis of perceived barriers and constraints, i.e., differences in the environments that are 
related to how people perceive differences in their characteristics (e.g. modes of 
transportation, particular opportunities and social climates).  
These two examples are mainly descriptive and do not explain how the situation can 
affect behavior through the mediation of psychological processes. Nevertheless, they consider 
some “invisible” factors scarcely identified in research (ipsative constraints; Tanner, 1999; 
implicit situational factors; Kaiser & Keller, 2001), which should be more profoundly 
studied. This study should be complemented with a process view, to understand how contexts 
can inhibit or constrain people’s behavior, outside their awareness and conscious control. 
 
THE “INVISIBLE” FACTORS 
Studying only the perceived barriers and constraints is not enough. While the study of 
these “visible” factors is important, other psychological factors that can be as powerful as or 
stronger than them, remain unconscious and inaccessible to traditional measurement 
techniques (e.g. questionnaire), working as “invisible” factors. Accordingly, the situations 
effect on behavior can be mediated not only by perception based processes but also by 
cognitive processes of which people are not aware of, which can work as unconscious 
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barriers and constraints. Moreover, the perceived barriers and constraints can be influenced 
by these, which is a subject we will get back to later on.  
Not including these “invisible” psychological factors might be one of the reasons why 
many behavioral change projects are not successful, since these “invisible” factors remain 
that way and are not analyzed and dealt with. The problem is that, as Gardner and Stern 
(2002; p. 160) stated: “the limiting factors for behavior change need to be diagnosed, not 
presumed” and a more integral behavioral analysis of barriers and constraints to 
environmental behavior should therefore include them.  
Although many models and projects take into consideration perception based factors 
(resulting from processes of which people are aware of), there is still not enough evidence to 
support the widespread view that conscious mediation “is the rule rather than the exception” 
(Bargh, 1997, p.5). Accordingly, since the 1960s research in social psychology has 
increasingly demonstrated the relative automaticity of social behavior and the influence of 
cognitive and motivational factors outside people’s awareness on behavior (Bargh, 1997). 
These factors are rarely considered in Environmental Education and Behavior Change 
projects and in models of barriers and constraints on environmental behavior and when they 
are, they are not explicitly identified as such. Therefore, we will now analyze the cognitive 
processes that underlie the development of unconscious barriers and constraints. 
To be clear on how the automatic processes can have their effect, it is important to 
understand first what we mean by automatic (spontaneous) and conscious (deliberative) 
processes and the differences in the way they are initiated and can influence social behavior. 
Conscious processes are mental acts of which we are aware, that are intentional, effortful and 
controllable (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). In a different way, for a process to be automatic, it 
has to be effortless and happen when a set of preconditions are in place (conditional 
automaticity), without any conscious choice or guidance from that point on (Bargh, 1997). 
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Regarding this, we specifically consider the goal-dependent automaticity and its influence on 
social behavior, with goal being defined as “an internal representation of a desired state, such 
as a behavior or outcome (Aarts & Custers, 2009). This type of automaticity requires an 
initial past or present intention or act of will for a goal to be activated (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999). Therefore, it corresponds to the type of behavioral goals that Environmental Education 
and Behavior Change projects try to promote (e.g. to activate the goal to “separate residues at 
home” we need first to “intend” to do it, i.e., develop a goal-intention). 
Hence, the category of unconscious barriers and constraints can include cognitive 
representations of the world (e.g. attitudes), which can increase the probability of anti-
environmental behaviors to occur in an automatic and unintended way, given the presence of 
certain environmental cues. These barriers/constraints produce their effect without people 
being aware of them and can influence across different contexts and behaviors (i.e., they are 
“universal”), as long as the activating cues are stable across those contexts and behaviors. 
The same does not happen with perceived barriers and constraints, which often are behavior 
or domain specific and idiosyncratic (e.g. Black, Stern & Elworth, 1985; McKenzie-Mohr & 
Smith, 1999).  
One example of unconscious barriers and constraints refers to the influence of implicit 
anti-environmental attitudes over environmental behaviors, with research showing that they 
can be more predictive of environmental behavior than explicit attitudes (e.g. Vantomme, 
Geuens, De Houwer & De Pelsmacker, 2005), and more prone to social desirability effects. 
When these implicit attitudes are positive, they have a positive effect over environmental 
behaviors, by increasing their occurrence’s probability (Vantomme et al., 2005). However, 
when attitudes are anti-environmental they have a detrimental effect over environmental 
behavior and can influence behaviors in an anti-environmental direction.  
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Research shows that a behavior can be associated to various attitudes supporting it, 
depending on the individual or the situation; and yet the attitude that appears to support a 
behavior (explicit attitude) is not always the one most related to it (Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar 
de Carvalho, 2004). The attitude with the highest impact on behavior will be the one with 
highest cognitive accessibility (as demonstrated in the MODE model; Fazio, 1990). 
Accordingly, Kallgren and Wood (1986) consider that attitude strength, measured in terms of 
its accessibility, mediates the relationship between attitude and behavior (in the same level of 
specificity) in the environmental activism domain. Therefore, if an implicit anti-
environmental attitude exists and is stronger (i.e., more accessible) than other attitudes 
influencing a certain behavior, it will affect behavior in accordance with its cognitive 
accessibility. 
Apart from attitudes, other cognitive representations can have an automatic effect over 
behavior, such as stereotypes, norms and habits. However, there is a gap in environmental 
behavior research regarding these, given that most studies report the influence of explicit 
factors (Costarelli & Colloca, 2004; Schultz et al., 1995; Stoll-Kleemann, 2001) and only a 
few have demonstrated the effect of implicit factors over behaviors (e.g. Vantomme et al., 
2005). Later on we will get back to this point and present our own research regarding this 
implicit effect over environmental behaviors and specifically to what concerns the effect of 
habit activation from situational cues. 
Another example of unconscious barriers and constraints refers to the biased 
perceptions of the behavioral consequences on the environment, along with their social and 
personal consequences. In most situations, this perception distances from reality, which 
results from the existence of three possible reasons (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002): 1) the 
majority of environmental problems manifest in the long-term and are not immediately 
observed when changes in the environment occur (e.g., greenhouse effect); 2) the 
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environmental destruction is in general slow and gradual and we often pay more attention to 
sudden and drastic environmental changes (e.g., the Prestige oil-tanker leakage in North-
western Spain in 2002) than to slower changes (e.g., ozone layer destruction); 3) 
environmental problems are mainly complex. Given the fact that we tend to simplify our 
worldview and economize cognitive resources (complexity vs. superficiality of cognitive 
processing; Smith & Mackie, 1995), this prevents us from having a global and clear 
understanding of these problems, which leads to an underestimation of their consequences.  
Thus, these biased perceptions in particular and unconscious barriers and constraints in 
general follow the motivational and processing principles that guide human social behavior 
(Smith & Mackie, 1995) and take place without people being consciously aware of them. By 
influencing people’s perception of the surrounding environment, these processes can lead to a 
perceived constraint like an unrealistic optimism regarding environmental problems (Hatfield 
& Job, 2001), since we are not able to process all the information that is presented to us but 
only a limited part of it. 
Following from this, we argue in favor of the unconscious barriers and constraints 
inclusion in environmental behavior research and attitude and behavior change projects, 
given that they can have their effect without people being aware and thus can’t be analyzed 
through traditional perception based measures. It should be noted that in the last few decades, 
implicit perception based measures have been used in ecological behavior research, as is the 
case of the Implicit Association Test (see Vantomme et al., 2005). Nevertheless, this is still 
not enough to tap into the processes involved in the development of attitude-behavior 
inconsistency and other methodological tools are still needed to provide a more complete 
“picture”. Moreover, in order for their relevance to be more explicit, we need to place them 
within the “full picture” by showing how they relate to perceived barriers and constraints, in 
order to influence environmental behavior. Moreover, we should demonstrate how these 
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types of barriers and constraints relate to behavioral goals. We will refer to these aspects 
next. 
 
WHY DO PEOPLE FAIL TO ACT? - A MODEL PROPOSAL 
 
In order to get a coherent view from the literature on barriers and constraints on 
proenvironmental behavior and to make clear the argument in favor of a “negative”2
The research field of negative barriers and constraints can be also loosely defined as the 
study of the “I don’t understand why it didn’t work” factors, which are considered among the 
main causes of unsuccessful Environmental Education and Behavioral Change projects 
(Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004). These factors can be included in what we call 
the DN-Work model (“didn’t work”), which we will present here. This model has three main 
principles: 1) barriers and constraints are not defined in terms of the “lack” of strength or 
absence of positive factors -what we call the “lack factors”- but as independent psychological 
factors from these; 2) their influence depends on psychological processes interacting in 
 
behavioral analysis, we will next propose a socio-cognitive model in this regard. In this, we 
will not include the category of lacking factors (which result from the absence or weak 
influence of a positive determinant or “right” factor), since that they are more or less 
explicitly included in models of positive determinants of proenvironmental behavior. In 
opposition, the psychological factors as defined by us in terms of perceived barriers and 
constraints and unconscious barriers and constraints are victims of some “gaps” in the 
literature and attitude-behavior change projects, either because they have received very little 
attention (as is the case of the latter) or were wrongly conceptualized in a non-psychological 
level of explanation (as is the case of the former).  
                                                 
2 By negative, we mean the factors that can work as barriers and constraints to proenvironmental behaviour and 
thus, oppose to the positive, which promote their development and maintenance. 
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different levels and ways with situational features, and is mediated by the activation of 
behavioral goals (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999); and 3) their influence can occur in different 
degrees of awareness and conscious mediation.  This model proposal will try to fill the gaps 
identified, first of all by operationalizing the concepts to use from now on.  
In the first part of the model (see Figure 3) the situation is considered as having an 
effect on behavior given the presence of limiting factors, with this category including either 
path: 1) the situational characteristics that activate psychological barriers and constraints, 
through the mediation of conscious/intentional processes or 2) the situational cues that 
activate psychological barriers and constraints, with reduced consciousness and through 
unintentional and automatic processes. Consequently, we call the psychological barriers and 
constraints, which are activated through the first “path”, perceived barriers and constraints; 
while the psychological barriers and constraints which are activated through the second 
“path” are the unconscious barriers and constraints.  
 
Figure 3. DN-Work model of barriers and constraints on ecological behavior 
 
We make a distinction between the two types of situational limiting factors, for the 
purpose of making clear our explanation of the different psychological processes involved in 
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each path. However, there is some overlap between “characteristics” and “cues”, given that 
the same limiting factor can sometimes work as one or another, or as both. For example, 
watching a neighbor watering the front lawn works as a situational characteristic by eliciting 
the belief that there is water abundance and therefore, conservation is not an urgent matter 
(thus, constraining the behavioral goal of water conservation). At the same time, this event 
can work as a situational cue to activate the implicit norm of spending as much water as we 
want in watering the lawn, given that it is the behavior that most people engage in at that 
neighborhood (thus, facilitating the anti-behavioral goal of spending water).  
Additionally, there are situations in which different processes are elicited not by the 
same limiting factor but by different limiting factors. One example regards the behavior of 
buying non-organic products such as non-organic milk. On one side, the organic milk high 
price can work as a perceived barrier/constraint to not buy organic, eliciting a high perceived 
cost and incommodity in performing that behavior. On the other side, the presence of non-
organic milk familiar brands can activate the non-organic milk buying habit, which can 
inhibit an intentional organic milk buying goal and increase the probability of performing in 
accordance with a non-organic milk buying goal. We will get back to this example later on in 
the next chapter. 
Regarding the concept of psychological barriers and constraints on proenvironmental 
behavior, we define them as factors that can: 1) lower the activation strength of 
proenvironmental goals and/or increase the activation strength of anti-environmental goals – 
behavioral constraints; 2) elicit the activation of an anti-environmental goal and inhibit the 
activation of proenvironmental goals – behavioral barriers. This distinction refers to the 
magnitude of the effect. If a factor has a weak-to-moderate effect, it works as a behavioral 
constraint by means of a goal interference effect - hampering with proenvironmental 
behavioral goals (i.e., proenvironmental actions can still occur, although with reduced 
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frequency or effectiveness). If this factor has a strong effect, it works as a behavioral barrier 
by means of a goal inhibition effect - inhibiting proenvironmental behavioral goals (i.e., 
facilitating anti-environmental behavioral goals, meaning that proenvironmental actions 
cannot occur). 
We make this distinction between barriers and constraints and in terms of the effect’s 
magnitude since that, as our model acknowledges and as is it happens most of the times in 
real world, environmental decisions are associated with a state of goal conflict between 
proenvironmental and anti-environmental behavioral goals (e.g. decision between having a 
cooperative or competitive behavior, i.e., saving vs. spending much water while taking a 
shower; Garcia-Marques & Palma-Oliveira, 1989). Which goal “wins” this conflict3
                                                 
3 When there are multiple goals competing, only the “winning” goal will be translated into behavior, i.e. will 
reach the goal operation phase (Kruglanski et al., 2002). 
 depends 
on the situation where the behavior is expected to occur but also on how barriers and 
constraints interact. Accordingly, anti-environmental goals are expected to be stronger when 
there is a conflict effect adding to an interference effect, i.e., when barriers and constraints 
“work” together. This is supported by the Goal Systems Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002), 
which claims that accessible goal alternatives or “background” goals (e.g. anti-
environmental) can either pull away resources from a focal goal by reducing its activation 
strength and goal commitment or facilitate its activation, depending on what is activated and 
the context in which it happens. The negative effect can happen even when the activation of 
alternative goals is subliminal (priming) by: undermining the commitment to the focal goal, 
hampering progress toward the goal, hindering the development of effective means for goal 
pursuit and dampening participant’s emotional responses to positive and negative feedback 
about their goal striving efforts (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003).  
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Unrealistic optimism about environmental degradation (Hatfield & Job, 2001) or 
uncertainty about resources level of availability and about how many people are cooperating 
in a proenvironmental way (Biel & Garling, 1995; De Young, 1999) can be considered 
behavioral constraints. This is because they reduce the level of goal commitment (Kruglanski 
et al., 2002) and the strength of a proenvironmental goal intention like “I intend to save water 
while taking a shower”, which causes a goal interference effect. In a different way, the high 
accessibility of an anti-environmental habit (see next chapter) or its perceived benefits in 
terms of comfort (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) can work as barriers by facilitating the 
activation of an anti-environmental goal such as “spend much water while taking a shower” 
and inhibition of a proenvironmental goal (“conserve water while taking a shower”), which 
causes a goal inhibition effect. 
Apart from the interaction between competing goals and the barriers and constraints 
role in this, another interaction effect is acknowledged by our model. In fact, the unconscious 
barriers and constraints might have their effect not only directly on behavioral conflict but 
also indirectly, through their influence on the perceived barriers and constraints. An example 
of this is the cognitive inaccessibility of proenvironmental/cooperative behavioral options in 
a social dilemma situation (with the anti-environmental/competitive options being more 
accessible; Biel & Garling, 1995; Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004; Tanner, 
1999). Such a cognitive inaccessibility can affect behavior as an unconscious barrier and/or 
constraint. This can be due to the work of an information-processing heuristic which does not 
take into account all the behavioral options but only some of them, based, for example, on 
some criteria habitually used in similar decisions (Palma-Oliveira, 1995). These cognitive 
options of inaccessibility can promote a perceived lack of opportunities to behave in a 
proenvironmental way, which work as a perceived barrier/constraint. Some Environmental 
Education and Behavioral Change projects and psychological models attribute this to the lack 
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of opportunities presented by the situation where the person is in, when in fact this perceived 
lack of opportunity might result from cognitive processes. Moreover, if the cooperative 
behavioral option (or the small number of them) that comes to mind is seen as involving high 
perceived costs in performing the behavior (Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar de Carvalho, 2004), 
then the probability that the proenvironmental behavior is performed is even lower. 
As in any new theoretical model, although the DN-Work model is based on theories and 
studies supporting its fundamental claims, there is still not enough research on its specific 
predictions. Given this gap, we will present in the following two chapters, research assessing 
the least studied category of the model and the processes involved in its influence on 
environmental behavior: unconscious barriers and constraints. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Most of the Environmental Education and Behavior Change projects and models 
regarding environmental behavior are still biased by a “positivity fallacy”, i.e., the belief that 
as long as people have the right attitudes, intentions, skills, information, etc., the right 
proenvironmental behavior should follow. However, the social sciences literature shows that 
there is an inconsistency between attitudes and behaviors in this regard and that the difficulty 
in changing behaviors is being underestimated. One reason for this to occur is that the factors 
working as barriers and constraints to environmental behavior are not analyzed and dealt 
with. In this regard, a behavioral analysis that includes the “negative” determinants should be 
performed.  
Models studying the negative determinants of proenvironmental behavior consider that 
most barriers and constraints are non-psychological. Even those models acknowledging the 
importance of psychological barriers and constraints only see a part of the big picture. This is 
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because they do not consider the effect of automatic processes occurring outside people’s 
awareness and consciousness, which mediate the effect of situations on behavior. 
We aimed to fill these identified gaps through the DN-Work model, concerning the 
effect of barriers and constraints on proenvironmental behavior. This model specifies some 
conditions for their influence to take place, presenting psychological processes as mediators 
of situational influences on behavior, and transcending the incomplete and sometimes 
erroneous consideration of a direct influence of the former on the latter. Moreover, it suggests 
that the investigation of proenvironmental behaviors should be conducted not only by 
considering the different levels of individuals’ analysis  (person, group, society, world) but 
also by considering the different levels of the situation where behavior occurs (Pinheiro, 
2009). This means that the situation should be approached from the most concrete level of 
analysis regarding physical features and tangible aspects, up to the most abstract level 
considering those characteristics and events associated with social environments, like other 
people’s behaviors, attitudes, etc. One common error in this regard is the assessment of 
people’s habits (at the individual level) as only determined by the social environment (e.g. 
neighbors; family living in the same house) and/or the city environment (e.g. urban planning). 
Often, this implies missing the influence of psychological processes in a more concrete level 
of the situation (the “psychological context”), in terms of the elicitation of automatic 
behaviors from certain situational cues. Only by matching these different levels of 
environmental behavior analysis and considering the different influences associated with 
them, we can “bring back” the situation to the psychological study of barriers and constraints 
impinging on environmental behavior. 
Although the viewpoint presented in this chapter (i.e., the study of negative 
determinants) seems like a pessimistic approach to the study of environmental behavior, we 
think this is actually an optimistic perspective. In fact, by identifying factors increasing the 
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inconsistency between positive attitudes and environmental behaviors, we will be able to 
design interventions focusing on these factors and increase the success and efficacy of 
attitude behavior change programs. On the contrary, it is the design of interventions including 
only positive determinants and involving an incomplete explanatory level of the 
psychological processes involved that makes us pessimistic regarding the promotion of 
environmental behaviors and their maintenance in the long run. 
As Corral-Verdugo (2001; pg. 149) states: “Given the complexity of ecological 
problems, it is better to respond in a plastic than in a rigid way”. This plasticity can be 
developed by increasing people’s environmental competency (Corral-Verdugo, 2002; see also 
Fraijo-Sing et al., in press) in a way that individuals are enabled to resist the influence of 
barriers and constraints on environmental behavior. Whenever they are or are not able to 
perceive/identify those barriers and constraints by themselves, strategies aimed to increase 
people’s competence in dealing with them should be developed (Gaspar de Carvalho & 
Coutinho de Faria, 2003). 
Other negative determinants still need to be identified and the processes involved 
should be assessed with various methodologies. Nevertheless, the model here described and 
its associated research can be a starting point to answer, from a psychological perspective, an 
unfortunately understudied question in proenvironmental behavior research: why do people 
fail to act? 
 
48 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aarts, H. & Custers, R. (2009). Habit, action and consciousness. In W. P. Banks (Ed.), 
Encyclopedia of consciousness. Oxford: Elsevier Ltd. 
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 50, 179-211. 
Ajzen, I. (2002). Residual effects of past on later behavior: habituation and reasoned action 
perspectives. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 107-122. 
Amérigo , M. (2006). La investigación en España sobre actitudes proambientales y 
comportamiento ecológico. Medio Ambiente y Comportamiento Humano, 7 (2), 45-71.  
Bargh, J. (1997). The automaticity of everyday life. In R.S. Wyer Jr. (Ed.), The automaticity 
of everyday life: Advances in social cognition (vol.10, pp. 1-61). Mahwah: Erlbaum. 
Bargh, J. & Chartrand, T. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American 
Psychologist, 54, 462-479. 
Barker, R.G. (1968). Ecological psychology. California: Stanford University Press Stanford. 
Biel, A. & Gärling, T. (1995). The role of uncertainty in resource dilemmas. Journal of 
Environmental Psychology, 15, 221-233.  
Black, J., Stern, P. & Elworth, J. (1985). Personal and contextual influences on household 
energy adaptations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 3-21. 
Constanzo, M., Archer, D., Aronson, E. & Pettigrew, T. (1986). Energy conservation 
behavior: the difficult path from information to action. American Psychologist, 41, 521-
528. 
Corral-Verdugo, V. (2001). Comportamiento proambiental: Una introducción al estudio de 
las conductas protectoras del ambiente [Proenvironmental behavior: An introduction to 
the study of environmentally protective behaviors]. Santa Cruz de Tenerife: Editorial 
Resma. 
49 
 
Corral-Verdugo, V. (2002). A structural model of proenvironmental competency. 
Environment & Behavior, 34, 531-549. 
Corral-Verdugo, V. & Frías-Armenta, M. (2006). Personal normative beliefs, antisocial 
behavior, and residential water conservation. Environment & Behavior, 38 (3), 406-421. 
Corral-Verdugo, V., Frias-Amenta, M. & Gonzalez-Lomelí, D. (2003). On the relationship 
between antisocial and anti-environmental behaviors: An empirical study. Population 
and Environment, 24, 273-286. 
Corral-Verdugo, V. & Pinheiro, J. (2004). Aproximaciones al estudio de la conducta 
sustentable [Approaches to the study of sustainable behavior.]. Medio Ambiente y 
Comportamiento Humano, 5(1-2), 1-26. 
Corraliza, J.A. & Berenguer, J. (2000). Environmental values, beliefs and actions: A 
situational approach. Environment & Behavior, 32, 832-848. 
Costarelli, S. & Colloca, P. (2004). The effects of attitudinal ambivalence on pro-
environmental behavioral intentions. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 24, 279-
288. 
De Young, R. (1988-1989). Exploring the difference between recyclers and non-recyclers: 
The role of information. Journal of Environmental Systems, 18 (4), 341-351. 
De Young, R. (1999). Tragedy of the commons. In D. E. Alexander and R. W. Fairbridge 
(Eds.). Encyclopedia of Environmental Science. Hingham: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Fazio, R. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The MODE model as 
an integrative framework. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 75-109. 
Ferreira Marques, J., Palma-Oliveira, J.M., Marques, J.F. & Ferreira, M.B. (1995). Subgroup 
comparisons. In C. Levy-Leboyer, M. Bonnes, K. Pawlik, J. Ferreira Marques and J. 
50 
 
Chase (Eds.), The Psychological and Social Determinants of Environmental Attitudes 
and Behaviors: International comparison. Brussels: EU Project Report. 
Förster, J., Liberman, N. & Friedman, R. (2009). Seven principles of goal activation: A 
systematic approach to distinguishing goal priming from priming of non-goal 
constructs. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11 (3), 211-233. 
Fraijo-Sing, B., Corral-Verdugo, V., Tapia-Fonllem, C. & González-Lomelí, D. (In press). 
Promoting pro-environmental competency. In V. Corral-Verdugo, C. García-Cadena, & 
M. Frías-Armenta (Eds.), Psychological Approaches to Sustainability. New York: Nova 
Science Publishers. 
Garcia-Marques, L. & Palma-Oliveira, J. (1989). A exaustão de recursos e a acção colectiva: 
a psicologia desnecessária e a necessidade da psicologia. [Resources exhaustion and the 
collective action: the unnecessary psychology and the necessity of psychology.] Terra 
Solidária, 20, 23-26. 
Gardner, G.T. & Stern, P.C. (2002). Environmental problems and human behavior (2nd ed.). 
Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing. 
Gaspar de Carvalho, R. (2004). Concepção de projectos de Educação Ambiental 
[Environmental Education Projects Conception]. In Escola Profissional do Montijo 
(Ed.), Manual do curso de “Animadores de Educação Ambiental”. Montijo: EPM-IEFP. 
Gaspar de Carvalho, R. & Coutinho de Faria, J. (2003). Say hello to E.T.!: Beyond 
Environmental Education towards Environmental Training. In T. Craig (Ed.), Crossing 
boundaries- The value of interdisciplinary research. Aberdeen: The Robert Gordon 
University. 
Gaspar de Carvalho, R. & Palma-Oliveira, J.M. (2007). Caras felizes não fazem sucesso! 
Avaliação do impacte comportamental de projectos de Educação Ambiental. Actas da 
9ª Conferência Nacional de Ambiente, Universidade de Aveiro. 
51 
 
Geller, E. (1981). Evaluating energy conservation programs: Is verbal report enough? Journal 
of Consumer Research, 8, 331-335. 
Hatfield, J. & Job, R.F. (2001). Optimism bias about environmental degradation: The role of 
the range of impact of precautions. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 21, 17-30. 
Kaiser, F. & Keller, C. (2001). Disclosing situational constraints to ecological behavior: A 
confirmatory application of the mixed Rasch model. European Journal of 
Psychological Assessment, 17, 212-221. 
Kallgren, C.A. & Wood W. (1986). Access to attitude-relevant information in memory as a 
determinant of attitude-behavior consistency. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 22, 328-338. 
Kollmuss, A. & Agyeman, J. (2002). Mind the gap: why do people act environmentally and 
what are the barriers to proenvironmental behavior? Environmental Education 
Research, 8, 239-260. 
Kruglanski, A., Shah, J., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. & Sleeth-Keppler, D. (2002). 
A theory of goal systems. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 34, 331-376. New York: Academic Press.  
Kubovy, M., Epstein, W. & Gepshtein, S. (2003). Foundations of visual perception. In I. B. 
Weiner, D. K. Freedheim, A. F. Healy, J. A. Schinka, R. W. Proctor and W. F. Velicer 
(Eds.), Handbook of Psychology (pp. 87-121). New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. 
McKenzie-Mohr, D. (2000). Fostering sustainable behavior through community-based social 
marketing. American Psychologist, 55, 531-537. 
McKenzie-Mohr, D. & Smith, W. (1999). Fostering sustainable behavior: An introduction to 
community-based social marketing. Gabriola Island B.C.: New Society Publishers. 
Olsen, M.E. (1981). Consumer’s attitudes toward energy conservation. Journal of Social 
Issues, 37, 108-131. 
52 
 
Palma-Oliveira, J. M. (1995). The differences and similarities between a person and a 
walkman: experiments in person and a consumer memory. PhD dissertation in 
Psychology. Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, University of Lisbon, 
Lisbon. 
Palma-Oliveira, J.M. & Correia dos Santos, S. (1998). Análise do consumo doméstico de 
água em Portugal- Uma experiência de campo para promoção da conservação da 
água. [Analysis of water domestic consumption in Portugal - A field study to promote 
water conservation]. Lisbon: Quercus-Inag (MA). 
Palma-Oliveira, J.M. & Garcia-Marques, L. (1988). Os dilemas sociais e as atitudes na 
promoção de estratégias de conservação de energia [Social dillemas and attitudes in 
the promotion of energy conservation strategies]. Paper presented at the “Seminar on 
Environmental Conservation”, Sevilla, Spain. 
Palma-Oliveira, J.M. & Gaspar de Carvalho, R. (2004). Environmental education programs 
construction: some conceptual and evaluation guidelines. Discursos: Língua, Cultura e 
Sociedade – Número especial: Global Trends on Environmental Education (pp. 19-35). 
In U.M. Azeiteiro, M.J. Pereira, W. Leal-Filho, S. Caeiro, P. Bacelar-Nicolau, F. 
Morgado, & F. Gonçalves (Eds.). Lisbon: Universidade Aberta. 
Pinheiro, J. (2009). Terræ Incognitæ, tempo e sustentabilidade: fronteiras abertas para uma 
psicologia do global. [Terræ Incognitæ, time and sustainability: open frontiers towards 
a psychology of the global] Paper presented at the “X Environmental Psychology 
Congress”, January 2009, Lisbon, Portugal. 
Pinheiro, J. & Corral-Verdugo, V. (2007). Environmental Psychology in Latin America: 
1996-2006 . Medio Ambiente y Comportamiento Humano, 8 (1-2), 29-48. 
Schultz, P.W., Oskamp, S. & Mainieri T. (1995). Who recycles and when?: a review of 
personal and situational factors. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 15, 105-121. 
53 
 
Shah, J. & Kruglanski, A. (2003). When opportunity knocks: Bottom-up priming of goals by 
means and its effects on self-regulation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
84 (6), 1109-1122. 
Smith, E. & Mackie, D. (1995). Social psychology. New York: Worth.  
Stern, P., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagno, G. & Kalof, L. (1999). A Value, Belief, Norm Theory 
of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism, Human Ecology 
Review, 6, 81-97. 
Stern, P. & Oskamp, S. (1987). Managing scarce environmental resources. In D. Stokols & I. 
Altman (Eds.), Handbook of Environmental Psychology (pp. 1043-1088). New York: 
Wiley. 
Stoll-Kleemann, S. (2001). Barriers to nature conservation in Germany: A model explaining 
opposition to protected areas. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 21, 369-385. 
Suárez, E. (1998). Problemas ambientales e soluciones conductuales [Environmental 
problems and behavioral solutions]. In Aragonés J.I., Amérigo M. (Eds.), Psicologia 
Ambiental (pp. 303-327). Madrid: Ediciones Pirámide. 
Talarowsky, F. (1982). Attitudes toward and perceptions of water conservation in a Southern 
California community. Unpublished study. 
Tanner, C. (1999). Constraints on environmental behavior. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, 19, 145-157. 
Thompson, S.C.G. & Barton, M. (1994). Ecocentric and anthropocentric attitudes toward the 
environment. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 14, 149-157. 
Vantomme, D., Geuens, M., De Houwer, J. & De Pelsmacker, P. (2005). Implicit attitudes 
toward green consumer behavior. Psychologica Belgica, Vlerick Leuven Gent Working 
Paper Series 2005/31. 
 
54 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
HABITS AS DYNAMIC MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 
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There is a widespread  lack of success and efficacy in dealing with the inconsistency 
between positive environmental attitudes and the low frequency of the expected associated 
behaviors (Ferreira Marques, Palma-Oliveira, Marques & Ferreira, 1995), i.e., in explaining 
“why do people fail to act”, either for not doing what we want them to do, or by doing the 
opposite of it. This is seen in many areas from research in Environmental and Consumer 
Psychology, or in attitude and behavior change programs development. In our view, this has 
to do with three main reasons (see chapter 1): 
1) Positivity fallacy - the belief shared by many researchers and practitioners that as 
long as people have the right attitudes, intentions, skills, information, etc., the right behavior 
should follow. By falling prey to this fallacy, they consider only the factors that can promote 
or increase the consistency between attitudes and behaviors (positive determinants). At the 
same time they disregard the importance of the negative factors that can explain the attitude-
behavior inconsistency (negative determinants), which can be studied through a negative 
behavioral analysis. 
2) Lack of a psychological level of explanation – Even when the negative factors are 
taken into consideration, the psychological level of explanation is often disregarded or 
incompletely identified. Thus, most of the factors identified are socio-economical, urban 
planning and architectural for example, but not psychological. However, they can also be 
viewed within a psychological level of explanation. In our view, this implies an interactionist 
approach, with behavior considered to be the result of an interaction between the context and 
psychological processes. 
3) Underestimation of the unconscious processes influence - The context effect on 
behavior can be mediated not only by conscious perception but also by cognitive processes of 
which people are not aware of that can work as unconscious barriers and constraints. 
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Given these three reasons for the lack of success and efficacy in dealing with factors 
that can explain the attitude-behavior inconsistency, we will present studies aimed at 
providing an example of this by showing the effect of habit as a negative factor (i.e., attitude-
behavior inconsistency factor). In other words, to demonstrate it as a factor that by being 
present leads people to act in a way different from what we want them to, thus trying to 
overcome the first problem identified. A second general aim of this chapter will be to show 
habit as a dynamic mental representation (which makes attitude-behavior consistency more 
difficult to be promoted). In this sense, habit is considered to be a psychological factor which 
can have its effect outside people’s awareness and conscious control, given the interaction 
between the situation and psychological processes, therefore responding to the other two 
reasons.  
Hence, we intend to present a contribution to Environmental and Consumer Psychology 
given that the mentioned aspects have largely been ignored in research and practice. 
Specifically, we are interested in how habits can be activated and how the context or situation 
can influence their activation. Moreover, we can contribute to attitude and behavior change 
programs in the ecological and consumer domain, by showing the influence of barriers and 
constraints of which the target people (and project planners) might not be consciously aware. 
These barriers and constraints and the role of habits will refer specifically to the choice of 
ecological products and of non-habitual products. Finally, we can also contribute to extending 
the Social Psychology literature in general regarding the situational features and processes 
that can activate habits. 
Before doing this, we will first define in the following sections what a habit is, within a 
psychological level of explanation and the processes and contextual influences involved in its 
activation. 
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HABITS AS MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 
 
Classic views of habit consider it to be a behavior that frequently occurred in the past 
and for that reason tends to be more probable to occur in the present, than other alternative 
behaviors. Therefore, one classical defining characteristic of habit is its frequency of 
occurrence (Verplanken, 2006) or frequent pairing of a stimulus and a response (Aarts & 
Custers, 2009). This represents a rigid view of habit in which if we are in a context where a 
habitual behavior is performed and the behavior is reinforced in some way, we won’t have 
much choice (free will) and thus we will be obliged to perform it. This classic view is based 
on behaviorist theories (classical and operant conditioning; Aarts & Custers, 2009) and sees 
habits as a “response”, more than a “psychological process” resulting from the interaction of 
the context with cognitive and motivational factors other than reinforcement. 
In the last decade, one line of research on habits has shown that they might not be so 
rigidly determined and distinguishes them from other forms of repeated automatic behavior 
(e.g., body reflexes). This view sees them as depending on the interaction of goals and 
context, defining habits as goal-directed automatic behaviors that are mentally represented (as 
knowledge structures; Higgins, 1989) and can be triggered by environmental cues (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000; Aarts, Verplanken & van Knippenberg, 1998; Verplanken, Aarts & van 
Knippenberg, 1997). In other words, a pre-condition for habitual behavior to be performed 
automatically (e.g. travel by bicycle) is the existence of an active goal (e.g. having to attend a 
lecture) due to the presence of relevant environmental cues (e.g. travel locations), with goal 
being defined as “an internal representation of a desired state, such as a behavior or an 
outcome” (Aarts & Custers, 2009; p. 2). In opposition to the traditional views that define 
habit in terms of frequency of past behavior, the literature based on these ideas considers 
frequency to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of habit, since 
there are cognitive and motivational processes that mediate the development of a habit.  
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In this sense Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000) claim that the mental representation of 
frequently pursued goals or habits is comparable to other knowledge structures that are also 
frequently used and automatically activated, such as stereotypes and attitudes. The 
particularity of habits is that they are considered mental representations of links between 
goals and actions that become automatically activated in the presence of environmental cues, 
with sufficient repetition of behavior. This activation can occur outside people’s awareness, 
even when that behavior is not actually performed (Aarts et al. 1998), which follows from the 
idea that social behavior is usually “triggered automatically on the mere presence of the 
relevant situational features”, without mediation of conscious processes (Bargh, Chen & 
Burrows, 1996; p. 231). Accordingly, some authors consider that there is still not enough 
evidence to support the widespread view that conscious mediation “is the rule rather than the 
exception” (Bargh, 1997; p.5). In fact, since the 1960s research in social psychology has 
increasingly demonstrated the relative automaticity of social behavior and the influence of 
cognitive and motivational factors outside people’s awareness on behavior (Bargh, 1997). 
First, to be clear on how the automatic processes can have their effect, it is important to 
understand what we mean by automatic and conscious processes and the differences in the 
way they are initiated and can influence social behavior. Conscious processes are mental acts 
of which we are aware, that are intentional, effortful and controllable (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999). In a different way, for a process to be automatic, it has to be effortless and happen 
when a set of preconditions are in place (conditional automaticity), without any conscious 
choice or guidance from that point on (Bargh, 1997). Regarding this, we specifically consider 
the goal-dependent automaticity and its influence on social behavior, as this type of 
automaticity requires an initial past or present intention or act of will for the goal to be 
activated (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), which corresponds in this initial phase to the 
intentional behaviors usually studied in Environmental and Consumer Psychology. 
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Many studies in the last decades showed the automaticity effect on behavior. For 
example, in an experiment by Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996; Exp.1), participants whose 
concept of rudeness was primed interrupted the experimenter more quickly and frequently 
than did participants primed with the polite-related stimuli. In another study, participants for 
whom an elderly stereotype was primed walked more slowly down the hallway when leaving 
the experiment than did control participants, consistent with the content of that stereotype 
(Bargh et al., 1996; Exp.2).  
This line of research shows that the cognitive activation of a certain knowledge 
structure by means of the relevant situational characteristic or context cues, can automatically 
elicit the associated behavior. In another line of research, some authors consider that 
automatic behaviors are goal-dependent and therefore, this automatic “triggering” of behavior 
also occurs in the presence of relevant cues but with the mediation of goal activation. An 
example regarding this line will be presented later on. 
The latter line of research is supported by Bargh and Chartrand’s (1999) dual model of 
goal activation, which considers that the cognitive and motivational processes that take place 
prior to goal operation and the way in which this behavioral  goal is activated can vary in two 
ways (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; as seen in Figure 4): 1) Triggered by a conscious and 
intentional mediation or an act of will (e.g., as in the case of athletic skills), which 
corresponds to an intended goal-dependent automaticity; 2) Triggered automatically by 
environmental features, unintentionally and without awareness (e.g. stopping the car after a 
red sign without a conscious decision to do it), which corresponds to an unintended goal-
dependent automaticity.  
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Figure 4. Dual process model of behavioral goal activation (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). 
 
 
 
Based on this model, the authors consider that with a frequent implementation of the 
same intentions and decisions in the same contexts (i.e., the more familiar and stable they 
are), the operation of the goal becomes automatic, as represented by the first type of 
activation. However, a reduction of consciousness can take place, which means that control is 
passed from the individual onto the environment (conferring a higher relative weight to the 
environment’s influence), as represented by the second type of activation (Gollwitzer, 1999). 
In other words, the first type of activation can lead to the second, depending on the frequency 
and consistency of the activation and operation of the same goals in the same contexts (Bargh 
& Chartrand, 1999).  
One example of the automatic activation of goals from situational cues is the case of 
habits, which was demonstrated in a study by Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000; experiment 1) 
using independent measures of the cognitive strength of the goal-action associations 
regarding high opportunity behaviors (behaviors that can be performed frequently). They 
tested the assumption that the activation of travel goals through contextual priming can 
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automatically activate the habitual action (travelling behavior), due to their mental 
association. Their prediction was that this only happens for people with strong habits and this 
influence occurs outside conscious awareness4
Summarizing, in this line of research (e.g. Aarts et al., 1998; Verplanken et al., 1997) 
habits are seen as goal-directed automatic behaviors that are mentally represented, with their 
operation depending on the existence of an active goal and the presence of the relevant 
environmental cues to activate that goal. This view is very important since it goes beyond 
classical reductions of habit to simple S-R associations between environment (stimulus) and 
behavior (response). Thus, it acknowledges the mediation of cognitive processes (and 
specifically of behavioral goals activation) which research in social psychology in general 
and social cognition in particular has shown, since the 1960’s. 
. The results showed the predicted two-way 
interaction of habit strength and goal priming: the habitual bicycle users that were primed 
with the relevant travel goal showed faster responses in the following word association task 
compared to the nonhabitual participants. This effect was not present in the non-goal 
condition, which supported the assumption that the activation of travel goals was a pre-
condition for the mental accessibility of the habitual travel behavior. 
Although this mediation of cognitive processes is acknowledged by many, the 
behavioral goals mediation is not so peacefully acknowledged. In fact, another recent line of 
research partly disagrees with the line of Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000), seeing habits as 
automated (learned) dispositions to repeat past performance, that are cued by aspects of the 
performance context (the physical setting; preceding actions; a person that is typically 
present, etc.), without the mediation of goals (Neal, Wood & Quinn, 2006; Wood & Neal, 
2007). Accordingly, Wood and Neal’s Habit Model (2007) views habits as goal-independent 
                                                 
4 Since that the participants weren’t in a context where their chronic construct could be naturally activated, this 
had to be done through a more artificial means, using contextual priming (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). 
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automatic behaviors, which are automatically formed through a slow process of association 
between responses and contexts cues, i.e., behaving frequently in the same way, in the same 
situations. For example, buckling the seatbelt (behavior) always after entering the car 
(context) gradually forms a link between the two, which is represented in procedural 
memory. The cuing of habits based on the context, given the existence of this mental 
representation, can occur in two ways: 1) direct context cuing and 2) motivated cuing. 
The first type of cuing implies that after the representation is created through 
associative learning, “merely perceiving a context triggers associated responses” (Neal et al., 
2006; p. 198). In this sense, they are closer to a theoretical view which considers a direct 
perception-behavior link (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Prinz, 1997), as exemplified by the 
experiment from Chartrand and Bargh (1996), in which merely perceiving other people’s 
movements resulted in non-conscious and unintentional mimicry of their behaviors. 
However, this particular experiment showed that this direct perception-behavior effect 
evident in the mimicry effect, might be the basis of social bonding, communication and 
influence for example (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996), without any evidence that this effect might 
be present in habit formation and activation. 
Other areas of research present some evidence that might support the direct habit cuing 
idea, as for example, cognitive neuroscience. In this area, some studies showed that when 
behaviors are under the control of habits, the goal-related neural structures (pre-frontal 
cortex) aren’t activated (e.g. Daw, Niv & Dayan, 2005; Neal et al., 2006). However, this was 
studied only for explicit-goals and there is still no evidence that the same neural structures are 
used for explicit and implicit non-conscious goals5
                                                 
5 The only neuroimaging study that affirmed this used only monetary incentives (Pessiglione et al, 2007; cited 
by Wood & Neal, 2007), which is a type of cue that, to our knowledge, is not used in habit-goal research and 
therefore, is not related to the type of goals that mediate habits identified in research. 
 (the latter, being the one’s usually 
64 
 
associated with habits, given their automatic and unintended characteristics; Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000). In spite of this, research on direct cuing effects is still limited and needs 
further development (Neal et al., 2006) and the few examples demonstrating its effect are not 
from habit research. 
Another type of habit cuing identified by Wood and Neal’s Habit Model (2007) is the 
motivated cuing. According to this, context can gain a certain motivational value when they 
have preceded rewards in the past (Neal et al., 2006). Thus a certain context cue (e.g. movie 
theatre) elicits a habitual behavior (e.g. eating popcorn), given that a reward is associated 
with being in that context (positive affect associated with eating popcorn) (Wood & Neal, 
2007). The authors differentiate this type of cuing from direct cuing because they consider 
the latter to be a “cold effect” (cognitive based) and the former to be a “hot effect” 
(motivation based), although the processes involved are expected to be the same.  
Evidence of this comes from animal-learning research, which shows that when a habit 
is present, despite of not giving a reward that was initially associated with the behavior 
(pressing a bar to receive food), habits are not changed (i.e., they continue pressing the bar 
despite of not receiving the reward). In opposition, when a habit is not present, not giving a 
reward stops the behavior. However, there is no evidence that this result might be due to a 
cuing of a context-response cognitive representation (as argued in the direct habit cuing 
viewpoint) and that the same happens in humans (Wood & Neal, 2007). Nevertheless, as for 
direct cuing, the evidence comes from animal studies and it is not clear that this result might 
be due to a cuing of a context-response cognitive representation. Moreover, there is no proof 
that a goal doesn’t mediate habits when rewards are present (e.g. the behavior of eating 
popcorn might occur because a goal to eat popcorn was activated by being inside the movie 
theatre). In fact, there is evidence that goals and positive affect (considered a reward, in the 
motivated cuing viewpoint) can actually co-occur and (if they are not incompatible) that 
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positive affect allows for goal pursuit to continue (Aarts, Custers & Holland, 2007). Thus, 
although a reward is present in a certain context that doesn’t prove that habitual behavior is 
cued by it and not by a goal, since both can co-occur. 
In spite of all the specific differences between the two lines of research presented: goal-
independent (Neal, Wood & Quinn, 2006; Wood & Neal, 2007) and goal-dependent (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000; Aarts et al., 1998; Verplanken et al., 1997), we are mostly interested in 
another one: flexibility in habits activation from context and the consequent response. Both 
perspectives see context cues as determinants of habit activation, by means of mental 
representation activation. However, for the goal-independent view, the context-behavior 
association is seemingly more rigid because if the specific context cue is present then the 
habitual behavior follows (i.e., the same contexts elicit the same behaviors over and over). 
Differently, in the goal mediation perspective, habits are implicitly seen as dynamic and 
flexible mental representations, since that their presence is dependent on goal activation by 
contextual cues. In accordance, for the same context, the habitual behavior might or might 
not occur depending on the activated goal (e.g. hearing the sound of the alarm clock may 
elicit the habitual behavior of taking a shower and preparing to go to work, only if a work 
goal is activated; if a leisure goal is activated - e.g. because it is Saturday -, this specific cue 
doesn’t elicit the habitual behaviors of preparing to go to work; Aarts & Custers, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the goal independent perspective replies to this critic, given that although they 
don’t acknowledge the goals mediational role, they still consider goals to be important since 
they can interface with habits to produce behavior in certain contexts (Wood & Neal, 2007). 
In spite of considering ourselves as closer to the goal-dependent perspective (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000), we don’t aim to support one perspective over the other with our studies. 
Our argument is that goals, regardless of their mediational roles, are important in responding 
to the following question: Do habits involve a rigid mental representation dependent only on 
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the context or do they involve a flexible and dynamic mental representation resulting from an 
interaction between the context and behavioral goals? 
 
HABITS ACTIVATION RULES 
 
Despite of the identified differences between conceptualizations of habits, both 
perspectives agree that habits involve a mental representation, either in terms of goal-
response or context-response cognitive associations, going beyond traditional views of habits 
as simples S-R associations. Thus, independently of the mental representations content, given 
the fact that they involve cognitive knowledge structures, they should therefore share some 
characteristics of this type of structures (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000) and involve similar rules 
in order for the representation to be activated and translated into action, based on the 
surrounding context. It is these characteristics and rules that we will refer to next. 
According to the “synapse model” (Higgins, 1989; Higgins, Bargh & Lombardi, 1985), 
mental constructs (knowledge structures) need to be activated, in order to be translated into 
action. This works in an analogous way to synapses in human body, in which their excitation 
leads to the muscle movement. In accordance, as for synapses, the “decay over time of the 
excitation level of a construct following its last activation is slower when the construct has 
been frequently activated than when it was activated only once” (Higgins, 1989, p. 86). In 
this regard, given that habits are considered to involve a mental representation (similar to 
attitudes, stereotypes, …), they fit into this description since that they can be seen as chronic 
constructs, with high probability of activation in the present and future, given the fact that 
they were frequently activated in the past (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). 
To what concerns this activation, the basic assumption of the synapse model is that the 
mental constructs level of excitation can vary prior to stimulus exposure: if the construct’s 
level of excitation is high, the more likely is that the construct will be activated by exposure 
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to the stimulus. Moreover, a higher activation potential implies a higher likelihood that it will 
be translated into behavior, judgment or other relevant output (Higgins, 1989). 
This excitation is achieved given a high cognitive accessibility of the construct or high 
readiness to be used at output (i.e., behavior). However, this readiness doesn’t mean that the 
stored knowledge will actually be used at output. Accordingly, this actual use probability can 
be increased given a high applicability of the construct, i.e., the greater the overlap between 
the features of a knowledge structure and the features of a stimulus or the context that is 
presented to us, the greater that construct’s applicability to that stimulus or context. 
Therefore, for a cognitive knowledge structure like a habit to be used, its activation potential 
(i.e., excitation) should be high and this can be achieved either by applicability and 
accessibility, independently or in interaction (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). 
 
HABITS APPLICABILITY 
Research on decision making has for many decades tried to identify the role of the 
decisional context characteristics in cognitive knowledge structures activation and their 
influence over behavior (e.g. attitudes, stereotypes), identifying which environmental features 
can facilitate or inhibit them (e.g. Eagly & Chaiken 1993). In this regard, literature shows that 
in stable contexts and in heavy load situations (exhaustion, time pressure, distraction or 
information overload), deliberate intentions lose their predictive value and habits become 
more predictive of behavior (Aarts et al., 1998; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Verplanken et al., 
1997; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). In situations in which non-routine behavior is executed or 
when the context changes or is novel, intentions have more predictive value (Ouellette & 
Wood, 1998). In agreement with this, Verplanken et al. (1997) showed that participants with 
a strong (automatic) habit follow a more heuristic processing using less information and more 
superficial and non-compensatory information search strategies (leaving information relevant 
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to alternatives to their habitual behavior uninspected), comparing to weak habit participants. 
In their study, the latter used more elaborated information search and inspected equal 
amounts of information for each option.  
From this, we can see that different types of information processing can be elicited in 
different contexts and thus be more facilitative of habits or intentions depending on their 
characteristics. These variations are also associated with applicability given that habits might 
be more applicable to some contexts than to others. So far, evidence of applicability effects in 
an automatic and unconscious way (see Higgins, 1996) hasn’t been shown in habit research, 
although there are a few examples involving a more conscious judgment. Following from 
Higgins (1989; 1996) these can be considered as perceived applicability or judged usability 
effects, which refer to the perceived relevance and appropriateness of the stored knowledge 
for use in a given context. This judgment can determine choice independently of the 
information being objectively applicable or not. For example, a piece of evidence can be 
relevant for determining the guilt of someone being judged but the jury or judge decide that is 
inapplicable or inappropriate (Higgins, 1989) given some subjective criteria (e.g. being 
perceived as a potential bias) or some legal impediment (e.g. illegal obtainment of the 
evidence by the police). This perceived applicability is very important because it influences if 
an activated mental construct will actually be used or not, i.e., even if there is high cognitive 
accessibility, this might not have an influence over behavior (Higgins, 1996). 
Evidence of the importance of this perceived applicability in order for habitual 
behaviors to occur comes from a study from Wood, Witt and Tam (2005). Although they 
don’t explicitly acknowledge their results as a demonstration of a perceived applicability 
effect, in our view it can be conceptualized in that way given that it matches the definition 
given by Higgins (1996), based on their idea that “performance of everyday action is tied to 
the circumstances in which the actions typically occur” (Wood et al., 2005; p. 920). 
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Accordingly, they performed a study on how changes in particular features of the context can 
disrupt or maintain habits, following from natural occurring changes, regardless of changes in 
intentions. Thus, they studied students that were relocating to a new university and assessed 
their exercising, newspaper reading and TV watching behaviors, one month before and one 
month after the change. The specific context features that changed between contexts 
(perceived context changes: e.g. social cues such as the presence or absence of other people) 
and the estimates of location change were assessed (determined from the frequency of past 
behavior and the stability of the performance context in the old university), in order to see if 
they could explain changes in habits strength. Results showed that as long as the context 
maintained its stability (i.e., the perceived applicability didn’t change), strong habits did not 
change. In opposition, changes in the context disrupted habits, showing their dependence on 
supporting cues. Thus, this study shows that if there is a perception of the necessary context 
features being present, the habit will take place. If they are perceived as not being present, the 
probability of automatically activating the habitual behavior will be very low and therefore 
habit will not take place. Following from this, their prediction is that habits will be activated 
in stable contexts (a high perceived applicability is maintained) and will be disrupted if the 
context becomes unstable (i.e., if applicability changes and is perceived as low following 
from this). If the latter happens, behavior is expected to fall into intentional control (Danner, 
Aarts & de Vries, 2008).  
 
HABITS ACCESSIBILITY 
Another determinant of mental constructs activation, apart from applicability, is 
accessibility. It is argued that the more accessible a construct is, the higher the probability of 
its use (Higgins, 1989). This accessibility can be achieved in two ways: 1) chronic 
accessibility and 2) contextual priming. 
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Chronic accessibility occurs when mental constructs have a relatively high accessibility 
due to “natural” processes, given the frequent activation of the construct in the past (Higgins, 
1989; Higgins & Brendl, 1995). In agreement, if a habit is strong, it is expected to be highly 
accessible and ready to be used (i.e., translated into action, choice or judgment) in a certain 
context. Contextual priming, on the other hand, implies a temporary and more “artificial” 
accessibility, which can be achieved through experimental manipulation at the laboratory. 
Independently of the source of accessibility, automaticity research has shown that temporary 
(contextual priming) and chronic constructs both have the same effects over behavior, 
although chronic constructs are more powerful in longer intervals between priming and 
judgment. Thus, after a short period the chronic tendencies tend to dominate (Bargh, 1997; 
Bargh, Lombardi & Higgins, 1988). 
Accessibility is also a characteristic of habits as mental representations (as shown in the 
experiment by Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000)). Regarding habit formation, when people 
frequently pursue certain goals and certain behaviors are performed to achieve those goals, a 
cognitive link between goals and actions (means to achieve the goal) is formed. If this 
happens frequently in the same contexts in response to specific cues, the relevant goal 
becomes more accessible and being in that context increases the probability that habitual 
behavior is performed (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). In other words, when we prime a goal 
associated with a habitual response (make it more accessible) or the goal is already high in 
chronic accessibility, the specific cue-response links become more accessible. Consequently, 
encountering relevant cues (in the habitual context) when a goal is accessible triggers the 
habitual response (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003).  
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HABITS AS DYNAMIC MENTAL CONSTRUCTS 
Conceptions of habit that consider context applicability to be the most important 
determinant of automatic behaviors activation (e.g. Wood et al., 2005) view habits as rigid 
mental constructs, given that if it is not applicable to the context anymore, habitual behavior 
shouldn’t follow. This view is based on the habit discontinuity hypothesis (Verplanken, 
Walker, Davis & Jurasek, 2008), which considers that when context changes (i.e., habit is no 
longer applicable), a “window” opens and behavior is more likely to fall under deliberation. 
Consequently, contextual changes are seen as a good opportunity for behavior change given 
that this can make relevant information related to behavior more salient and thus, lead to new 
decisions and behaviors. Nevertheless, interventions aimed at this should be more successful 
before, during or shortly after a contextual change, given that it is then that habit is more 
“fragile” and unstable and thus, can be changed (Verplanken et al., 2008; Verplanken & 
Wood, 2006). 
Conceptions of habit that consider either goals interaction with it (Wood & Neal, 2007) 
or their meditational role (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000), on the other hand, view habits as 
dynamic cognitive structures in the sense that their activation is less context-dependent. This 
is because activation can be achieved by the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes 
(Aarts & Custers, 2009), which in our view, refers to the interaction between accessibility 
and applicability. Accordingly, people can perform the same habits in different contexts as 
long as the same goal associated with habit is activated. For example, the activation of the 
goal to go to work activates the habitual car driving behavior, even if context changes occur, 
such as bad weather, giving a lift to a colleague, etc. This is in disagreement with the habit 
discontinuity hypothesis, which considers that when a context change disrupts a habit, 
deliberation becomes more likely (Verplanken et al., 2008), because some context changes 
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don’t necessarily disrupt habits and some adaptation to them can take place. Moreover, 
people can sometimes perform a habit and sometimes don’t in the same context, depending 
on the relevant goal being accessible (alarm clock example given before; Aarts & Custers, 
2009). 
This habits flexibility and dynamism can also be demonstrated following from Goal 
Systems Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002), given that habits are goal-dependent automatic 
behaviors (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000) or at least, interact with them in various ways to 
produce behaviors (Wood & Neal, 2007). According to this theory, behavior is determined by 
goal systems, defined as the cognitively interconnected goals and means that constitute 
motivational networks that are mentally represented, with these systems being characterized 
both by cognitive and motivational properties. As for other types of cognitive associative 
networks, this system implies a hierarchy with a super-ordinate knowledge structure – 
abstract goal – that can be associated with different sub-goals and each of these be associated 
with different means. These means can be defined as “any activity, event or circumstance 
perceived as likely to contribute to the attainment of a goal” (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003; 
p.1109). Thus, for example, a goal to be successful in life or to earn much money (abstract 
goals) can be associated with the sub-goal of going to work, which in turn might be 
connected to different means of using the car, using the subway or using the bike to go to 
work. Vertically in this hierarchy, facilitative effects can be found, in the sense that activating 
one nodule activates the others vertically connected with it. Thus, a goal can be activated by a 
mean associated with it (means prime goals; bottom-up process) or a mean can be activated 
given the activation of an associated goal (goals prime means; top-down process). The same 
doesn’t happen horizontally, since inhibitory effects can be found between competing goals 
and/or means (Kruglanski et al., 2002). For example, activating a goal of studying for an 
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exam reduces the activation strength of an alternative goal(s) like the goal of doing a leisure 
activity such as watching TV. 
This relationship between goals and means in this hierarchical structure can be 
translated into two main structural principles (Kruglanski et al., 2002): equifinality – two or 
more means can be associated with the same goal; and multifinality – two or more goals can 
be associated with the same mean. To what concerns the interconnectedness strength, the 
higher the number of means associated with a given goal or vice-versa, the lower the 
cognitive strength of each connection. The exception to this occurs when there is an 
uniqueness in the association - only one goal associated with only one mean - or a repeated 
co-activation of elements (e.g. a goal and a mean, two goals or two means that co-occur 
frequently). This is the case of habits, being them characterized by a frequent co-activation 
between a mean and a goal in the same contexts, which confers to it higher activation 
strength when compared to the other interconnections in the goal system. In this situation, it 
is also expected that the activation of the target or focal goal (in this case the one associated 
with habit) will pull away resources from its alternative goals and means. Consequently, the 
striving to attain the former will weaken the activation of the latter.  
Unlike semantic associations (e.g. nurse-doctor), the association between goals and 
means from frequent co-activation, involves motivational and functional relations that are 
cognitively stored (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003) and therefore confer to habits a higher 
dynamism. One example of this comes from two predictions of goal systems mentioned 
before: 1) means prime goals and 2) goals prime means (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Following 
from this, we can increase habit activation strength and consequently the probability that it is 
translated into action, through a bottom-up process by exposing people to a mean cognitively 
associated with the goal – means prime goals. It is expected when presented with the mean, 
the associated goal is activated which in turn increases the probability of goal attainment, i.e., 
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that people behave or decide according to the activated mental construct (Shah & Kruglanski, 
2003). Given that presenting the mean in a certain context can increase the habit activation 
potential (by priming the goal associated) this can be seen as an increase in accessibility from 
contextual priming.  
A demonstration of priming of goals through means was put forwarded by Shah and 
Kruglanski (2003). In their study they demonstrated that the subliminal presentation of means 
in terms of activities important for goal attainment such as “study” and “run”, increased the 
cognitive accessibility of education and fitness goals respectively, with this being mediated 
by the perceived effectiveness of the means to attain the goals (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003; 
study 1). This happened even for task goals and means in which the association was 
artificially created and therefore, there was no prior semantic association that could be used 
as a justification for the results (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003; study 2). Consequently, it supports 
the idea that this effect was not due to semantic association effects but actually to the 
functional association between the two (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). Moreover, they showed 
that goal priming through its means has implications for goal pursuit in the sense that 
participants persisted significantly longer and performed significantly better on an anagram 
task compared to participants in the control group with this being mediated by increased goal 
accessibility (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003; study 3). Finally, they showed that goal priming by 
its means can have detrimental effects on self-regulation, given that if when we are pursuing 
a certain target goal related to task performance, a situational opportunity to pursue an 
unrelated task goal is primed, our attention is deviated and goal attainment follows the 
primed unrelated goal and not the focal goal. Thus, when primed with an alternative goal, 
participants persisted significantly less and performed significantly worse on an anagram task 
compared to the control group (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003; study 4). To summarize, these 
studies showed not only that we can prime goals through the associated means, but also that 
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this effect doesn’t result from semantic association properties but from functional 
associations. 
In a different way, we can also increase habit activation strength and consequently the 
probability that it is translated into action, through a top-down process by activating a goal 
cognitively associated with the mean – goals prime means. This was demonstrated in a study 
by Kruglanski et al. (2002) in which participants were asked to list three different personality 
attributes it was their goal to possess, one positive personality attribute they weren’t trying to 
possess and one activity (mean) that allowed to attain each of these. Following this, they were 
asked to list all the activities they could remember that allowed them to attain each of the four 
attributes and finally a task in which they had to determine if a presented word was an 
attribute (goal) or an activity (mean), which randomly included the goals and means obtained 
from the first task. The prediction was that reaction times would be faster for judging means 
for which the related goal they were currently pursuing (one of three) was primed, compared 
with the group primed with the attribute they weren’t trying to possess, which was exactly 
what was found.  
This is a demonstration of an accessibility effect (Higgins, 1989), in which the priming 
of a goal increased the activation strength of a mental construct (goal-mean link) and 
therefore increased the probability of its use, evidenced in the increased accessibility of the 
associated mean. Also, the fact that an effect wasn’t found for the prime of the attribute they 
weren’t trying to possess shows that the result isn’t due to a semantic association between 
mean and goal words but to the functional relationship between goals and means (Kruglanski 
et al., 2002). Although the Kruglanski et al. (2002) study didn’t show the behavioral effects 
of this increased accessibility, many studies regarding other types of mental constructs 
activation show that this is expected to occur (see e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Bargh, Gollwitzer, 
Lee-Chai, Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001; Sheeran, Webb & Gollwitzer, 2005). 
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All these are examples of how goal accessibility can affect behavior and the cognitive 
processes. However, to our knowledge, there is no explicit demonstration of the interaction of 
applicability and accessibility (either through goal or mean priming), which to our knowledge 
hasn’t been demonstrated yet in this literature. In our view, by demonstrating these we can 
demonstrate habits dynamic properties. To address this, Higgins and Brendl (1995) mental 
constructs activation rules seem to us particularly important. 
In their view, accessibility and applicability are independent sources of a construct’s 
excitation level. Following from the “synapse model” (Higgins, 1989; Higgins et al., 1985), 
higher construct accessibility yields a higher excitation level. Also, higher construct 
applicability to the context yields a higher excitation level. As a consequence, the greater the 
excitation level, the higher is the probability that the construct will be activated and used. 
From this idea and based on a set of studies (Higgins & Brendl, 1995) they identified three 
rules for mental constructs activation. 
Activation rule 1: Strong accessibility can compensate for weak applicability. Given 
that accessibility and applicability are both independent sources of a construct’s excitation 
level, if there is high accessibility the construct can be activated even if its applicability to the 
context is low (e.g. all the necessary context features for the construct to be activated are not 
present in a sufficient degree).  
This was demonstrated in a study by Higgins and Brendl (1995) in which they primed 
participants with the concept of “conceited”. In this, both accessibility and applicability levels 
contributed independently to increase the degree in which conceited-related spontaneous 
impressions and judgments were made for target people. Moreover, these impressions were 
formed even in a condition of low applicability in which the stimulus description from which 
they had to make an impression was vague (weakly related to conceited) but the accessibility 
was increased. This happened either if participants had a chronic accessibility for conceited 
77 
 
or the conceited concept was contextually primed and when there was a short delay between 
the prime and the stimulus. 
Although these results come primarily from constructs influence on judgments, this is 
still a very important rule to our argument that habits are dynamic mental constructs. We 
infer it also applies to habits given their conceptualization as mental representations 
comparable to other knowledge structures such as stereotypes and attitudes (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000). Based on the view associated with the Wood et al. (2005) study, this rule 
wouldn’t apply because if the context features are weakly associated with the response (low 
context applicability), habitual behavior will not occur. Differently, in Aarts and Dijksterhuis 
(2000) view, although behavioral goals accessibility seems to be sufficient for habits to have 
an influence on judgments and they implicitly acknowledge this rule, they don’t explicitly 
acknowledge applicability’s role. Thus, both perspectives fail in demonstrating the interaction 
between these two sources of mental constructs activation and this rule applied to habits 
maintains the status of untested.  
Activation rule 2: Higher accessibility can yield stronger judgments even if perceivers 
are aware of priming events, if the additional contribution to activation from applicability 
and chronic accessibility is sufficiently great. Regarding this, Higgins and Brendl (1995) 
found that in the presence of an ambiguous stimulus description (strongly related both with 
“conceited” and “self-confident”), participants with chronic accessibility for conceited made 
more conceited-related judgments, even when they remembered (were aware of) the priming 
events (in a contextual priming + recall condition). Moreover, they argue that this might 
happen even if the stimulus is not ambiguous (but moderately vague) or strongly related to 
the target construct. Thus, if the contribution of applicability and chronic accessibility is 
sufficiently high, the priming is not perceived as contributing to the construct activation and 
therefore the construct is not suppressed by this awareness (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). 
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Activation rule 3: The relation between higher accessibility and stronger judgment is 
constrained when the applicability of a competing alternative construct is both strong and 
stronger than the target construct’s applicability. Higgins and Brendl’s (1995) study showed 
that when the stimulus description is contrary (self-confident) to the constructed being primed 
(conceited), neither chronic accessibility nor contextual priming of the target-construct 
(conceited) influence subjects conceited-related judgments. From this we can infer that high 
applicability of an alternative construct to a habit can constrain habit’s accessibility and 
therefore its activation and use. 
Given that recent lines of research consider habit to be a mental construct, in order to 
present our argument of habits as dynamic cognitive structures, we should demonstrate that 
they follow similar activation rules as other cognitive knowledge structures, resulting from an 
interaction between the situation and cognitive processes. In other words, our general aim is 
to show how habits can be activated and influence the subsequent decisions and behaviors, in 
ways that go beyond simple and static S-R associations. Moreover, behavioral goals confer 
them a dynamic character (Kruglanski et al., 2002) not present in traditional views of habit 
defined it in terms of past behavior frequency. In this sense, as we said before, to determine if 
behavioral goals mediate habits activation (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000) or simply interact or 
moderate its effect under certain conditions (Wood & Neal, 2007) is not the purpose of our 
study, since the dynamic characteristics conferred by goals can be demonstrated in both 
views.  
Therefore, our study 1 aims to show these dynamic properties based on the Goal 
Systems Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002), given that this theory doesn’t make an explicit 
argument in favor of either goal mediation or moderation, and shows exactly what we want it 
to show: that mental goal structures confer habits this dynamicity. Additionally, the dynamic 
features of habits can also be shown by demonstrating that habitual behavior can sometimes 
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result not only independently from applicability and accessibility (Higgins & Brendl, 1995) 
but from the interaction of both, which is an effect not yet studied on habits research. 
However, we will assess applicability only in terms of perceived applicability following from 
Higgins (1989; 1996) given that its effect has been shown in habit research (e.g. Wood et al., 
2005), and thus, we want to demonstrate the interaction of an already demonstrated effect 
with accessibility. Thus, this perceived applicability is important for habitual behaviors to 
occur, but it is not sufficient, and its interaction with habits accessibility should also be taken 
into consideration. We aim to achieve this in study 2 and 3 by means of Higgins and Brendl 
(1995) activation rule 1: Strong accessibility can compensate for weak applicability. By 
doing this, habits dynamic properties can be explored. 
 
STUDY 1 – THE PERCEIVED APPLICABILITY EFFECT 
 
Given the widespread perception of health and environmental advantages of organic 
food production (Hughner, McDonagh, Prothero, Shultz II & Stanton, 2007), and the high 
levels of environmental concern in many countries (Ferreira Marques et al., 1995), we would 
expect people to behave consistently with this concern and buy organic products. However, 
in spite of the growing numbers of people that consume organic food, their reduction in price, 
increased availability and the positive attitudes towards this type of food (Bamberg, 2002; 
Hughner et al., 2007), these numbers are still lower than the expected. This mirrors the 
classical finding in Social Psychology regarding attitude-behavior inconsistency (Smith & 
Mackie, 1995), in this case demonstrated for environmental attitudes and behaviors.  
In this regard, habits can be considered psychological barriers to proenvironmental 
decisions to buy organic products and factors that promote attitude-behavior inconsistency, 
since their activation is associated with an increase in the activation strength of unintended 
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anti-environmental goals, which in turn increases the probability of an anti-environmental 
behavior or decision to buy a non-organic product. This is the aim of the present study. 
Based on the principle that means can prime goals acknowledged by Goal Systems 
Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002), we want to asses if in the presence of two categories of 
means - organic and non-organic – all allowing the attainment of the goal to buy the same 
type of product, people will choose significantly more an option from the second category, 
given the existence of a non-organic buying habit associated with that product. However this 
is expected to occur more in a familiar context with familiar brands than in a new context 
with unknown brands, given that there is higher perceived applicability (Higgins, 1989; 1996) 
of habit to the context in the former.  
In our view, a familiar context is one in which the existent means are recognized and 
perceived as frequently pursued means (product brands) to attain the goal to buy a certain 
product. Thus, there is a high probability of at least one or more of them having been bought 
in the past (being part of the choice set) or at least included in the decision (being part of the 
consideration set; see Shocker, Ben-Akiva, Boccara & Nedungadi, 1991) and thus be 
mentally represented. In other words, there is a high probability of a partial or complete 
overlap between the means present in the choice context and the means existent in the goal 
system associated with the habit mental representation. However, given that the context is 
familiar because it is expected to be perceived in that way, decisions in a familiar context will 
be determined by the degree in which habit (i.e., the means in the goal system) is perceived as 
applicable to such a context – perceived applicability. Therefore, habit will be followed more 
- more means chosen if they match or are similar to the ones that exist in the mentally 
represented goal system - if it is perceived as applicable to the context, than when this 
perceived applicability is low (new context). It should be noted that this perceived 
applicability refers to the perception of the context as being appropriate for the decision 
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according to the habit and not because the context is seen as similar to the habitual context6
In accordance, our prediction is that the means both in the familiar and new contexts 
can prime the habitual behavioral goal but that its activation strength will have a greater 
magnitude in a familiar context, because there is a higher perceived applicability of habit to 
that context. This activation strength can be demonstrated by showing a higher choice for 
means associated with habit in the familiar versus the new context. This is not explicitly 
acknowledged in the Goal Systems Theory and hasn’t been demonstrated in habit and goal 
research. Moreover, it should be noted that this is not incompatible with a goal-independent 
view of habits given that the choice situation (including the habitual and alternative brands) 
can be mentally represented and thus, if the decision context is perceived as highly 
applicable, the habitual behavior should follow. 
. 
Moreover, it should also be noted that the differences between these two contexts (familiar 
and new) in terms of perceived applicability, refer to differences in the essential features – 
features of the decision context which are relevant for the decision, such as changes in the 
means to attain the goal. These do not refer to differences in the incidental features - features 
of the decision context which are accessory for the decision and accompany. These are 
features that are not so relevant for the decision such as visual characteristics of the products, 
other people (e.g. family members) usually present during choice in the supermarket; 
characteristics of the web based environment, etc. 
In our view, this perceived applicability doesn’t come only from the fact that the 
habitual mean (habitually bought brand) to attain the goal to buy the product is present. 
                                                 
6 The decision making tasks in the present study were designed to involve the decision in an internet 
environment which is not similar to the habitual supermarket or local shop environment. Therefore, the context 
is not similar to the habitual context but the products can still be perceived as appropriate to goal attainment 
(relevant for the decision making task). 
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Accordingly, even if the habitual mean is not present in the available choices, the non-organic 
milk habit can still be applicable given the existence of other similar means which co-
occurred often in the past with the goal to buy milk or might even have been chosen in its 
absence as an alternative. This involved a repeated pairing of these elements in the goal 
system in a stable context (in similar situations overtime). These habitual and alternative 
means can be not only connected in the goal system with the product buying goal but also 
with each others as acknowledged in Goal Systems Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Thus, 
the context is perceived as applicable as long as the existent means allow for equifinality 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002) in the attainment of the product buying goal.  
However, given the low level of organic products bought in general, we infer that if we 
choose a certain product for which this is the case (e.g. milk), then in order to attain the goal 
to buy the product, people have chosen the non-organic means more often and thus, for that 
product we can consider the existence of a non-organic buying habit. In other words, to what 
concerns the organic milk buying means, they might have co-occurred in the past with non-
organic milk buying. Nonetheless, we infer that their connection with the product buying goal 
is weaker than the non-organic buying means in the goal system, given that the latter might 
have been paired more often with the goal and considered more often as an alternative to the 
habitual product, than the former. This is in accordance with the fact that people in general 
report a higher percentage of non-organic than organic products bought (Hughner et al., 
2007).  
It should be noted that we don’t consider that a general non-organic products buying 
habit exists, given that someone can buy non-organic options for a certain product (fruit) but 
not do the same for a different product (e.g. milk). What we consider is that for certain 
products, given a more frequent pairing of the goal to buy the product with non-organic 
buying means to attain that goal, a non-organic buying habit can be considered to exist for 
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that product. I.e., it is the same to say that there is a product X buying habit or a product X 
non-organic buying habit, given that the non-organic means are the frequently chosen option. 
Since we infer that there is a stronger connection between the product buying goal and 
the non-organic means (given the habit to buy the non-organic option of the product), habit 
will be perceived as more applicable to them in a familiar context and thus there will be a 
higher probability of choosing one of the non-organic familiar means. Accordingly, Aarts and 
Custers (2009; p.5) consider habit as a “tendency to respond in a specific way to a specific 
stimulus as a result of strong associations between the two”. However, this doesn’t mean that 
in the presence of various stimuli, if that specific stimulus is not present, habitual behavior 
won’t occur. In fact, in a given decision context, the product habitually bought can be chosen 
(if it is present in the choice context) given this association but a similar one with an equal or 
lower association can also be chosen as long as it allows for the attainment of the goal. This 
can evidence habits dynamic properties and that more than a cognitive association effect, it 
involves a motivation component based on the principle of equifinality in goal systems 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002). In the new context, there can still be some increase in the product 
buying goal due to mean priming but in this case, the perceived applicability to the options 
available will be lower. This is because we don’t expect an overlap between the milk buying 
goal and the context given that the means present didn’t co-occur in the past with the milk 
buying goal and therefore, the “bias” toward non-organic choice should be lower. 
Following from this, we aim to replicate the perceived applicability effect in an 
ecological products decision making context, with high familiarity being expected to 
facilitate the application of habit to the decision context and low familiarity (or context 
novelty) to constrain its influence. In accordance, in other areas of research, familiarity has 
shown to increase non-analytic processing of person information and subsequent judgments 
(see Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2007). Also, context familiarity can be seen as a 
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characteristic of stable contexts, which are more facilitative of habit activation (Danner et al., 
2008). Although we define familiarity differently from the literature regarding these findings, 
the pattern is expected to be the same and thus it will be assessed as a psychological 
determinant of habit activation. 
Moreover, we will maintain price and organic and non-organic products availability 
constant between contexts, since these usually work as post-hoc justifications for not 
behaving in a proenvironmental way and to maintain non-organic products buying habits. We 
aim to argue against this, by showing means familiarity as a psychological dimension with 
different processes involved from the physical or socio-economic dimensions usually 
considered to be the cause of some anti-environmental behaviors (Palma-Oliveira & Gaspar 
de Carvalho, 2004). By doing this we can demonstrate the habit effect as an unconscious 
barrier to proenvironmental decisions to buy organic products, in a psychological level of 
explanation of the attitude-behavior inconsistency. 
Apart from the prediction regarding the effect of perceived applicability for the first 
choice in a list of organic and non-organic products, we will also assess the choice of two 
additional options - different products from the first but within the same list. This is because 
even though there is a reduction in the perceived applicability (given the reduction in the 
available choices), a certain level of it might still be enough to allow for consistency in the 
choice of a product similar to the habitual product, compared to a new context in which it is 
perceived as much lower. According to research on goal activation and fulfillment, an effect 
should cease to exist after the goal is fulfilled in the first decision, given that upon this 
attainment, a decrease in goal activation follows (Förster, Liberman & Higgins, 2005; 
Förster, Liberman & Friedman, 2009; Liberman, Förster & Higgins, 2007). However, these 
studies are not explicit concerning what happens if other alternative equifinal means are still 
available after the first choice and also allow for goal attainment. Furthermore, even if 
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inhibition of alternative means to the one chosen first occurs, this is not expected to occur 
immediately after the mean choice (Danner et al., 2007) and thus the subsequent choice of 
alternatives is still possible.  
In short, our argument is that in spite of the goal being attained in the first decision, the 
effect can still occur in the following choices even if there is a reduction in the context’s 
perceived applicability, as long as other means are still perceived as allowing for goal 
attainment7
Unlike the first prediction that was compatible both with a goal-independent and goal-
dependent view of habits, this second prediction is more supported by a goal-dependent view 
of habits. This is because for the second and third decisions the perceived applicability is 
 and thus maintaining its activation potential. This is expected to happen in a 
familiar context and not in the new, with the choice of non-organic products being consistent 
from one decision to another. The reason is that in the familiar context these alternative 
means have a higher probability of having co-occurred in the past with the habitually chosen 
mean and thus, although the context becomes less applicable, it is still applicable enough to 
allow for goal attainment. In the new context the non-organic means didn’t co-occur in the 
past with the habitually chosen mean and thus the perceived applicability is lower, compared 
to the familiar context. This can be a demonstration of habits dynamic properties and the role 
of goals in this, given that this consistency is expected as long as the mentally represented 
goal system remains valid and applicable. In other words, despite of the perceived context 
changes, as long as a stable goal structure (i.e., strong habit) is associated with a product, we 
can expect a transfer between decisions and consistency in the choice of non-organic means.  
                                                 
7 We acknowledge that different people might have different goal systems and that this should only happen for 
people with a strong habit and if these means are part of the goal structure. To increase the probability that this 
is the case, a pre-test will allow choosing the most familiar and frequently bought brands, to be used in a 
decision task in the main study. 
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lower and the context becomes unstable. However, this can still be justified in the goal-
independent view as an example that goals don’t mediate the effect of the situation over 
behavior but that habits interact with them in various ways to produce behaviors (Wood & 
Neal, 2007). Thus, although a prediction such as the one we make is not supported in their 
view, it can still be said that within a familiar situation the decrease in the perceived 
applicability might be accompanied by goal activation, which could sustain the habitual 
behavior. Nevertheless, we don’t aim to give support to one perspective over another but to 
demonstrate habit as a dynamic mental representation which can resist to certain changes in 
the decision context (in this case, in the available options) from one decision to another. 
Finally, the presence of this consistency in a familiar context also demonstrates that 
more than a brand effect, we are in the presence of a motivational effect based on goal 
activation and the existence of a mentally represented goal structure. Thus, people also 
choose because there is a non-organic buying habit for a certain product (motivational effect) 
and not only because there is a habit to buy a specific brand of that product, with the first 
choice resulting only from a brand priming effect (cognitive effect), i.e., the existence of the 
habitual brand priming the habit mental representation and biasing the choice towards it. If 
the latter was the case, consistency wouldn’t be expected.  
Summarizing, we expect that the presence of means to attain the goal to buy a certain 
product in a given choice context can increase its accessibility (means prime goals; 
Kruglanski et al., 2002). This in turn can increase the probability of choosing a non-organic 
product buying mean, given its predicted co-occurrence with the goal in the past (having been 
bought or considered for choice) and the existence of an associated mental representation, 
i.e., given the existence of a non-organic product buying habit. This choice of non-organic 
product is predicted to be higher in a familiar context than in a new context due to the higher 
perceived applicability of habit to the former, given an overlap between the means present in 
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the choice context and the means associated with the goal, which are mentally represented. 
Not all the means are expected to be equally associated to the goal and some might have a 
stronger association than the others. Therefore, the probably that they will be chosen is 
greater, comparing to the others (e.g. in eight available means, three of them can be more 
strongly associated with the goal). Therefore, even if the habitual mean is not present in the 
choice context, a similar mean can still be chosen as long it is associated with the habitual 
mean, in the cognitive goal system (equifinality in goal systems; Kruglanski et al., 2002). A 
representation of this prediction can be seen in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Goal-means structure representation for each type of context.8 
 
 
                                                 
8 Following from Goal Systems Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002) we infer that the means can have various 
associations between them. For the sake of simplicity we only represented the associations between pairs of 
means. However, this should be seen more as a network representation, with connections between all of them. 
As we said before, this full structure might not be the case for some people. Nevertheless, we infer that, if not 
all, at least some of the means might be connected. 
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A second prediction is that this can also happen in a second or even third choice of a 
different product from the first, which shows that more than a brand effect, we are in the 
presence of a dynamic mental representation which effects can transfer to other subsequent 
decisions. In this situation even though the context becomes less stable, given the change in 
the features essential for choice, i.e., the decrease in non-organic options available to choose 
from (i.e., less facilitative of a decision associated with habit), the choice of more non-
organic in the familiar context compared to the new context can still occur. This is as long as 
for some participants the existent means still allow for goal attainment i.e., as long 
equifinality is maintained. Although this might not happen for all people, given the individual 
differences in the goal system structure, it is expect to happen for most of the people who 
have a strong habit. 
To test our predictions, participants performed a web based study (experimental field 
study), in which they were asked to choose different products, three times from a list of 4 
organic and 8 non-organic milk products, chosen through a pre-test, being randomly assigned 
to two between-participants conditions: 1) familiar context: high perceived applicability for 
non-organic milk buying habit; 2) new context: low perceived applicability for the non-
organic milk buying habit. 
 
METHOD 
 
PRE-TEST 
The pre-test was designed to choose the organic and non-organic products to be used in 
the choice tasks corresponding to the context’s perceived applicability manipulation: familiar 
context task - national products; new and unfamiliar context task - foreign products unknown 
to the participants. This was performed in three phases. 
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Phase 1 - Consumer purchase habits questionnaire. A questionnaire (see Appendix I) 
was designed in order to assess the food products with stronger habits associated. It was 
responded by 100 students from University of Évora that were given credits for their 
participation and who provided their informed consent to participate. This questionnaire 
portrayed them as frequent shoppers, buying food products on an average of 2.06 times per 
week (SD = 1.06); of all the products bought, there was a reported average percentage of 
24.62% organic products (SD = 24.56). 
This questionnaire consisted of the following items: a) identification of the 5 products 
more often bought by participants (and not by their family, friends or colleagues) in an open-
ended question; b) identification of the most frequently bought (1) to the least bought (5) 
products; c) habit strength assessment for the 2 products bought more often; d) future 
intention to buy the 2 products bought more often; e) socio-demographic and purchase 
behavior items (frequency of shopping, percentage of organic products bought; …). 
The habit strength measure comprised a translation of the Self-Report Habit Index 
(Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) to the Portuguese language. This is a questionnaire created to 
measure habit activation strength, with 12 items in a 7-point Likert type scale (from 1 – 
“Totally disagree” to 7 – “Totally agree”). According to the authors, this was created in the 
view that habit is a psychological construct, representing a reliable and valid measure of habit 
that goes beyond its equation as frequency of behavior and taps into the automaticity features 
of habit. Therefore, it includes features not only associated with history of repetition (items 1 
and 12) but also with how behaviors might reflect a sense of identity or personal style (items 
4, 7 and 11) and the automaticity features of behavior, such as difficulty to control it (items 2 
and 8), lack of awareness of it (items 3, 5 and 10) and mental efficiency in its performance 
(items 6 and 9). This measure was applied to a variety of habits, showing content, 
discriminant and predictive validity in areas such as eating behaviors, physical exercise, 
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dental flossing, social chatting, negative self-thinking, transportation mode choice and leisure 
activities (see Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). Thus, this measure taps into the construct we are 
studying, conceptualizing it in the same way as we. Validity measures regarding our sample, 
show a very good level of reliability (α = .87) and moderate item-total correlations (with the 
lowest being .42) for this habit scale. 
The intention to buy organic products in the future comprised an adaptation of items 
based on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 1991; 2002), with 4 items in a 7-point 
Likert type scale (from 1 – Completely disagree to 7 – Completely agree). Validity measures 
regarding our sample show a very good level of reliability (α = .97) and high item-total 
correlations (with the lowest being .88).  
The main results of the questionnaire can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Main results for the “Consumer purchase habits questionnaire” 
Top 5 Products % of report 
SRHI – 1st product SRHI – 2nd product 
M SD n M SD n 
Bread 55% 4.11 1.13 22 4.39 1.53 14 
Milk 53% 4.91 .96 13 4.61 1.18 18 
Yogurt 44% 4.25 1.04 11 4.54 1.12 9 
Fruit 42% 6.25 .30 3 4.67 .81 8 
Water 33% 4.65 1.09 19 4.33 - 1 
 
Given these results, we chose the milk category for our main study, since that 53% of 
the participants reported it in the top 5 products frequently bought; there was a moderate to 
high level on the SRHI (between M = 4.91, SD = .96 for the participants that chose it as the 
first product and M = 4.61, SD = 1.18 for the ones that chose it in the second place); and a 
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high number of people who chose it in the first (13%) and second place (18%), compared to 
other products chosen in the top 5. 
Phase 2 – Familiar brands questionnaire. A web-based questionnaire was designed in 
order to assess the milk brands most frequently purchased and more familiar. It was answered 
by 100 participants through the internet, who volunteered to participate and provided their 
informed consent. The questionnaire portrayed them as frequent shoppers, buying food 
products on an average of 1.96 times per week (SD = 1.37); of all the products bought, there 
was a reported average of 14.79% organic products (SD = 20.10). 
This questionnaire consisted of the following items: a) socio-demographic and purchase 
behavior items (reported before); b) future intention to buy and other TPB measures 
regarding organic products - Perceived Behavioral  Control; Subjective Norm; Attitude 
(following from Ajzen, 2002); c) 3 main reasons that prevent people from buying organic 
products, from the most important to the least (open-ended question); d) recall measure: 3 
UHT (Ultra-high-temperature processing) semi-skimmed organic milk products that come to 
mind (open-ended question); e) recall measure: 3 UHT semi-skimmed non-organic milk 
products that come to mind (open-ended question); f) brand bought more often from a list of 
national brands; g) habit strength measure for non-organic products bought in general (SRHI; 
Verplanken & Orbell, 2003).  
The choice of national brands was based on a market study performed by visiting the 
top Portuguese supermarkets at the time of the study (Continente; Modelo; Jumbo; Feira 
Nova; Pingo Doce; Lidl; Dia; El Corte Inglés), which allowed us to create a list of the 21 
brands more frequently available in their shelves. Also, we chose semi-skimmed milk as the 
target product for our analysis since it is the reported that in Portugal it has a higher 
frequency of purchase (54%) than skimmed milk (10%) or whole fat milk (36%) (European 
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Comission, 2007). For the same reason, we chose UHT milk since it is more consumed (65%) 
than fresh milk (Associação Nacional dos Industriais dos Lacticínios - Anilact, 2007). 
Given the length of the questionnaire and since online questionnaires are more prone 
to drop-outs for this reason (Birnbaum, 2001), we chose to create two questionnaires, one 
with items a) to f) (see Appendix II)  and another  with items a), b) and g) (see Appendix III). 
The first was responded by 60 and the second by 40 individuals. 
Results regarding the psychometric properties of measures of future intention to buy 
and other TPB variables regarding organic products (n = 100), show a very good level of 
reliability (α = .97) and very high item-total correlations (with the lowest being .93). 
Regarding the other TPB scales, very good levels of reliability are found for the attitude scale 
(α = .88; smaller item-total correlation: .61) and moderate levels of reliability for the 
subjective norm scale (α = .65; smaller item-total correlation: .40) and for the perceived 
behavioral control scale (α = .66; smaller item-total correlation: .34). 
Results regarding the psychometric properties of the habit strength measure for non-
organic products bought in general (SRHI) (n = 40), show a very good level of reliability (α = 
.94) and high item-total correlations (with the lowest being .57). Results regarding it show an 
overall moderate habit strength regarding non-organic products buying (M = 3.98, SD = 
1.63)9
In turn, the TPB measures regarding organic products, showed a moderate intention to 
buy organic products in the future (M = 4.16, SD = 2.02), a moderate to high subjective norm 
. 
                                                 
9 Given that this measure assessed a habit in a high level of abstraction (non-organic products) and not towards a 
specific product (e.g. semi-skimmed UHT milk), it is not surprising that this level is moderate, since in this 
category some products are more habitually bought than others and this might represent an average of that 
heterogeneity in habits strength. 
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(M = 4.90, SD = 1.17) and a high perceived behavioral control (M = 5.27, SD = 1.20) and a 
very positive attitude towards buying organic products (M = 5.67, SD = 1.10). 
To what concerns the 3 main reasons (perceived constraints) that prevent people from 
buying organic products (n = 60), high price (41.80%) and low availability/diversity 
(23.60%) were the most frequently chosen as the first reason,  the second most important 
reason  was again the high price (42.60%) and low availability/diversity (31.50%) and for the 
third reason (the least important of the three),  it was low information available (23.90%) and 
low motivation (23.9%). 
From the recall measure associated with the 3 UHT semi-skimmed organic milk and 3 
UHT semi-skimmed non-organic milk products that came to mind and from the measure of 
the brand bought more often chosen from a list of national brands (n = 60), we chose 12 
products: 8 non-organic products and 4 organic products. We opted to choose 12 products 
(from a list of 21) because it is the standard number of products shown in the homepage of 
HTML pages developed with the use of the Comersus Cart Software (Comersus Open 
Technologies L.C., 2004), which is the software used to create the webpages for the main 
study decision making tasks. Also, this is the minimum number of products shown in the 
Continente Online Shopping webpage (Continente is one of the supermarkets with the highest 
percentage of shoppers in Portugal).  
Since we didn’t want to introduce confound in results by making the choice too difficult 
with too many options available (and therefore, making a higher demand in terms of 
cognitive resources and bias the decision for this reason), we decided that this was an 
acceptable number of options. Moreover, we chose a proportion of .66 for non-organic 
products (8 in 12) and a proportion of .33 for organic products (4 in 12), based on a market 
study performed by searching all the Portuguese supermarkets online shopping web pages 
available, which showed an average proportion of .17 organic products (2/12). To reduce the 
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possible influence of contrast effects from this small proportion (see Higgins, 1996) but at the 
same time to maintain a realistic proportion, we increased it to .33 (4/12) for our decision 
making task in the main study. 
The results (n = 60) for the recall and frequency measures for national semi-skimmed 
UHT milk brands are shown in Table 2, in which the 12 products chosen are the  ones with  
highest results in both measures and therefore, they will be used in the high perceived 
applicability decision task. 
 
Table 2 - Recall and frequency results for the national semi-skimmed UHT milk brands 
Brands 
Recall – 1st 
choice 
Recall – 
2nd choice 
Recall – 
3rd choice 
Frequency 
Mimosa 55% 33.3% 11.1% 45.5% 
Matinal 25% 11.1% 11.1% 9.1% 
Agros 5% 5.6% 22.2% 9.1% 
Terra Nostra <5% <5% <5% 5.5% 
Continente <5% 5.6% <5% 5.5% 
Gresso 5% 11.1% 11.1% <5% 
Vigor 5% 11.1% 11.1% <5% 
Pingo doce <5% 16.7% <5% <5% 
Agros Bio* <5% <5% <5% <5% 
Purnatur* <5% <5% <5% <5% 
Président Bio* <5% <5% <5% <5% 
Andechser Natur* <5% <5% <5% <5% 
* Organic UHT semi-skimmed milk brands 
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Phase 3 – Unfamiliar brands questionnaire. A questionnaire (see Appendix IV) was 
designed to pre-test a list of 18 foreign (English) products (brands+images) in a set of 
consumer related variables, in order to choose 12 semi-skimmed UHT milk products (8 non-
organic and 4 organic) equivalent to the domestic ones.  
This choice was based on a market study performed by consulting English online 
shopping web pages for the top supermarkets at the time of the study (Asda; Waitrose; 
Sainsbury’s; Tesco), which allowed us to create a list of the 18 brands more frequently 
available in their online pages.  
This questionnaire was responded by 21 individuals who volunteered to participate and 
provided their informed consent for this. It consisted of the following items: a) association 
measure for each of the 18 foreign products (first word that came to mind associated with the 
product); b) attitude towards the brand measured with 4 items on a Likert type 5 point scale 
(positive-negative; pleasant-unpleasant; good-bad; beneficial-harmful) for each of the 18 
foreign products; c) choice frequency: product more probable to buy (from the 18) if the 
person was in a supermarket where these products were available. 
Results for the 18 products are shown in Table 3, in which the 12 products chosen - to 
be used in the low perceived applicability decision task - are the ones with higher frequency 
of choice, higher positivity in terms of the attitude towards the brand and with less frequent 
negative attributes in the association measure. From these, we excluded Sainsbury’s to 
prevent any confound to be introduced, since that its organic equivalent - Sainsbury’s 
Organic - was excluded given the high frequency of negative attributes. Also, although 
Drinks Brokers had equivalent results to First Choice and Waitrose, we exclude it since that 
the negative attributes in the association measure were more negative in content (e.g. bleach; 
cleaning products) than for the latter. 
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Table 3 - Pre-test results for the semi-skimmed UHT foreign milk brands 
Brand Mean 
Negative attributes 
frequency 
Choice 
frequency 
Products 
chosen 
Nature’s way 3.49 2 19% √ 
Sainsbury’s 3.71 2 14.3% - 
Tiffany 3.40 1 9.5% √ 
Drinks Brokers 3.34 3 4.8% - 
Asda 3.30 1 4.8% √ 
First Choice 3.30 3 4.8% √ 
Piim 3.25 6 4.8% - 
Ultra 3.48 1 0 √ 
Harvey 3.75 1 0 √ 
Candia 3.36 7 0 - 
Devondale 3.33 1 0 √ 
Waitrose 3.30 3 0 √ 
Heritage* 3.85 1 19% √ 
Sainsbury’s O* 3.59 6 9.5% - 
Moo* 3.60 0 4.8% √ 
Organic Valley* 3.54 3 4.8% √ 
Yeo Valley* 3.30 7 0 - 
Rachel’s* 3.26 4 0 √ 
* Organic brands 
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MAIN STUDY 
Participants and Design. 80 students from the University of Lisbon - given credits for 
their participation, and other participants that volunteered to participate - were offered the 
possibility of entering a draw to receive 50 Euros in CDs and DVDs, for participating. To 
participate they had to fulfill the criteria of buying food products for domestic consumption at 
least once in two weeks. For this reason, the students were requested to bring in their parents 
or friends that fulfilled these criteria, if they didn’t.  
The sample consists mainly on young adults, with an overall mean age of 28.16 years 
old (SD = 10.52; Min = 19; Max = 54) and the majority having a high school degree (60%) or 
a university degree (27.50%). A questionnaire (see description below) portrays them as 
frequent shoppers, shopping for food on an average of twice a week (M = 2.10, SD = 1.28). 
Also, the sample is characterized by a low percentage of reported organic food products 
bought in general (M = 12.33%, SD = 19.85), with 95% of the participants having only 50% 
or less of the total amount of products they buy being organic products and a medium 
intention to buy organic food in the future (M = 3.44, SD = 1.78), portraying them as habitual 
non-organic food buyers. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to take part in two web-based studies, one on 
“Health and Consumption in Portugal” ministered by the research group in Social and 
Environmental Psychology and one on “Real and Virtual Shopping Environments” by the 
research group in Consumer Psychology. These represented two parts of the same study but 
were presented as such in order to reduce the perceived connection between them. Associated 
with the first part  
Upon providing their informed consent, they received a web page link to perform a 
web-based questionnaire (see Appendix V) regarding organic and diet products and were told 
that its aim was to assess the type of decisions people make in web-based environments. This 
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consisted of the following items: a) socio-demographic and purchase behavior items; and b) 
future intention to buy organic and diet products (Ajzen, 1991; 2002). Additionally, they 
were asked to develop implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) to buy diet products. For 
this they had to go to a supermarket webstore, in which they had to choose four products and 
then go back to the questionnaire, inserting them in the provided spaces. Moreover, they had 
to develop a plan to buy each product on the following week, in terms of “how much” 
(quantity/weight), “where” (shop/supermarket), and “when” (day of week & time of 
day/hour) they expected to buy those products.  
The questionnaire aim was to present the concept of organic products equally for every 
participant while making them to believe that this was a general consumer behavior study 
regarding the web based environment and not the specific products. Thus, we expected that 
by doing this, the aim of the subsequent decision making tasks would be less explicit and the 
word organic would be equally accessible to everyone. Moreover, we also wanted to measure 
the intentions to buy organic food before the task, in order to prevent this question from 
increasing social desirability at the time of the decision. Finally, this also allowed them to 
familiarize with the online shopping environment, to be used in the subsequent decision 
making task given that their familiar environment is the local shop or supermarket and only a 
small percentage of people buy food products online. Thus, by the time they performed the 
choice task (see ahead) this environment wouldn’t be so new to them and what would be 
“new” or “familiar” would be related with the products relevant for the decision. 
Context applicability manipulation. Two days after this task, participants received an 
email requesting them to participate in what they thought it was the second study (see 
Appendix VI). They were provided a link for a study aimed to assess the type of decision 
people make in web-based environments. This used WebPages for simulation of online 
shopping, comprising HTML pages developed with the use of the Comersus Cart Software 
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(Comersus Open Technologies L.C. 2004), which is a software package used in the creation 
of online shopping web pages. The construction of the HTML forms for the storage of the 
participants data on a web server used SurveyWiz (see Birnbaum, 2001), a software used for 
the development of online surveys. 
First, participants were asked to make a written description of what they would do in a 
situation in which they had to buy bread, fruit and cookies for their weekly breakfasts. This 
aimed at introducing them to what they thought was the study subject – decisions people 
make in real and virtual environments. This also aimed to introduce a mind-set (Gollwitzer, 
1999) of shopping behavior and thus facilitate the subsequent choices in the following 
decision making tasks, i.e., to work as a practice task and familiarize them with the subject.  
After this, they were given the option to choose one of four different categories of 
products and told to press one of four buttons for that. However, this was only to allow for a 
perceived randomness in the attribution of products, increase their motivation and reduce the 
possible frustration of having only one category of products, with no other available options. 
Thus, every button led to the same product category: milk. After choosing the category, a 
page appeared with the “random” category attributed – milk - and the instructions for the 
decision making task. In these, participants were requested to choose the product they would 
most probably buy from a list and told that the product would be given to them, after 
completion of the study. They were also asked to choose two additional options, just in case 
the first option wasn’t available in stock, i.e., their second and third preferences in case the 
first wasn’t available (choose the product they would most probably as “second” and “third”). 
This procedure involving three choices was based on the one created by Coates, Butler and 
Berry (2004) to study the effect of priming on the choice of familiar brands. 
Following the instruction, the list of products appeared, consisting of 12 UHT Semi-
skimmed milk options with 8 non-organic and 4 organic options (proportion of .66 and .33 
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respectively) showing the price, brand and a picture of the product. Both the familiar and new 
contexts had the same type of matching products and prices in a fixed position, with the only 
difference being the product pictures and brand names – Portuguese brands in the familiar 
context and United Kingdom brands in the new context. The participant’s attribution to the 
familiar or new context tasks (between participant’s tasks) followed from their random 
attribution to the experimental conditions. This derived from a mathematical formula in 
Microsoft Excel (generation of random numbers between 0 and 1) and sorting of participants 
email list by column. 
Final questionnaire. Finally, after choosing three products from the same list available, 
participants responded to a short web questionnaire, with manipulation checks and other 
socio-demographic variables. The first of the manipulation checks asked the level of 
influence (in a 5-point Likert type scale from “no influence at all” to “strong influence”) of a 
list of factors over the participants decision in the previous tasks, namely: color of the 
webpage; sound environment; organization of the products on the webpage; distance from the 
computer; their habitual behavior; price of the products and other factors. The color, sound 
and distance aspects were inserted only to make the others less “visible”. The second check, 
asked how frequently they buy the 3 brands chosen (1 to 5 scale, from “never” to “four times 
or more”) and the future intention to buy organic products (to retest the intention measure 
from two days before). 
Upon completion of the web questionnaire, participants were thanked for their 
participation and provided with an email contact in the case they wanted additional 
information and/or to receive the study results. 
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RESULTS 
 
Questionnaire and Manipulation Checks. Regarding the baseline characteristics of the 
sample, the t-test for independent samples results show that there are no significant 
differences between the familiar and new context conditions, in terms of habits perceived 
influence over the choice, percentage of organic food bought in general, intention to buy 
organic food in the future and frequency of shopping in general. The only difference found 
referred to the perceived price influence over the decision to choose the milk products on the 
decision tasks, with the participants that chose in the familiar context perceiving it as having 
influenced significantly less their decision (M = 2.95, SD = 1.38) compared to participants in 
the new context condition (M = 3.92, SD = 1.12), t(78) = -3.48, p = .001, d = .7810
Also, participants in the familiar context task reported an average frequency of buying 
the first product chosen of twice or three times a month (M = 3.70, SD = 1.49), and the 
second and third on an average of once per month (second product: M = 2.28, SD = 1.13; 
third product: M = 1.70, SD = .94)
.  
11
Concerning the influence of the products price in the webpage used as the decision task 
over the decisions made in them, the analysis of the frequency table shows no clear pattern of 
choosing the products in accordance with their prices (see Table 4).  
. Finally, there were no significant differences between 
the intention measure in the first and second moment of the study (2 days interval). 
To further analyze this possibility regarding the influence of the products price, we 
recoded the data into two categories of products: low price (below .70 Euros) and high price 
(above .70 Euros). Regarding the choice made in the familiar context or the choice made in 
the new context, results with the Binomial test show no significant differences between the 
                                                 
10 Cohen’s d was calculated following from the formula created by Thalheimer and Cook (2002). 
11 On the scale from 1 to 5, the value 1 represented “never” and 5 represented “four times or more”. 
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choice frequencies in the two price categories (high vs. low), in each of the three decisions 
made. 
 
Table 4 - Choice frequencies for the three decisions made by context, price and webpage 
position 
 Milk brand 
Webpage 
position 
Price 
(Euros) 
Frequency of choice 
1st 
choice 
2nd 
choice 
3rd 
choice 
Familiar 
context 
Mimosa 2 0.59 11 8 7 
Agros 10 0.60 0 1 3 
Seleccionado Matinal 6 0.76 8 7 10 
Terra Nostra 12 0.56 2 1 4 
Continente 5 0.44 7 3 1 
Vigor 11 0.70 6 4 4 
Gresso 3 0.52 3 6 4 
Pingo doce 4 0.40 7 1 3 
Agros Bio* 9 1.39 5 3 1 
Purnatur* 7 1.93 0 1 0 
Président Bio* 1 1.69 2 4 1 
Andechser Natur* 8 1.70 0 1 2 
New 
context 
Nature's way 6 0.59 4 0 5 
Tiffany 4 0.60 5 4 6 
Asda 10 0.76 2 3 1 
First choice 12 0.56 0 2 3 
Waitrose 7 0.44 2 3 2 
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Devondale 11 0.70 2 5 3 
Harvey 1 0.52 4 2 6 
Ultra 5 0.40 1 4 2 
Heritage organic* 3 1.39 6 4 6 
Organic Valley* 9 1.93 0 2 2 
Moo’s organic* 8 1.69 2 5 1 
Rachel's organic* 2 1.70 1 6 3 
* Organic products. 
 
Given that the products position in the webpage was fixed between decisions and that 
this could have introduced a bias in the choice participants made, we performed a check in 
order to assess it. The analysis of the frequency table shows no clear pattern of choosing the 
products in accordance with their prices (see Table 4). To further analyze this possibility 
regarding the influence of products position in the webpage, we recoded the data into two 
categories of positions: top (aggregating the choice of the 6 products on the webpage’s top) 
and bottom (aggregating the choice of the 6 products on the webpage’s bottom). Regarding 
the overall choice made, results with the Binomial test show no significant differences 
between the choice frequencies in the two position categories.  
Regarding the comparison of the choice made in the familiar context and the choice 
made in the new context, results with the Chi-square test show no significant differences 
between the choice frequencies in the two position categories, for the first and third decision 
made. To what concerns the second decision, results with the Chi-square test show a 
significantly higher proportion of products chosen in the top in the familiar context (.73) than 
in the bottom χ2 (1, N=80) =4.27, p = .033. For the new context no significant differences are 
found. 
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Decision Making Task. Binomial test results for the first choice in the familiar context 
show a significantly higher proportion of non-organic milk chosen (.95) than an expected 
proportion that would have been obtained by chance (.66) (p = .000; Binomial), with this 
representing the actual proportion existent in the choice list for the first decision. For the new 
context, these differences are non-significant.  
To what concerns the differences in the non-organic milk choice between the familiar 
and new context, Fisher’s Exact test results show that there is a higher proportion of non-
organic products chosen in the familiar context (.95) compared to the new context (.68) (p = 
.002; Fisher’s exact test).  The results concerning Fisher’s Exact test can be seen in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 - Differences between the familiar and new context choice frequencies with Fisher’s 
Exact test 
 Non-organic Organic 
Non-organic 
proportion. 
One-tailed 
(right) 
Familiar context 38 2 .95 
p = .002 
New context 27 13 .68 
 
 
Chi-square test results for the three consecutive choices made in the familiar context 
show that the decisions made are significantly different from the results that would have been 
obtained by chance for the dependent events, either associated with the choice in the first 
decision and then the choice in the second, χ2 (3, N=40) =23.01, p = .000; associated with the 
choice in the second decision and then the choice in the third, χ2 (3, N=40) =23.01, p < .005; 
and associated with the choice in the first decision and then the choice in the third, χ2 (3, 
N=40) =31.00, p = .000.  These results can be seen in Table 6. The Chi-square test was based 
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on the probabilities calculation of choosing by chance in two consecutive choices (e.g., 
organic in the first choice and non-organic in the second), from four possible combinations 
(see Appendix VII), in order to determine the expected frequencies and subsequent 
calculation of the partial chi-squares for each combination. 
 
Table 6 - Differences between choice frequencies for the four combinations of consecutive 
product choices with the Chi-square test – Familiar context (n=40) 
 
  Choice frequency   
  Expected Observed 
Composite 
Chi-square 
(df=3)12 
P 
1st decision vs. 
2nd decision 
NO-NO 16.8 31 
23.01 < .000 
O-O 3.6 2 
NO-O 9.6 7 
O-NO 9.6 0 
2nd decision vs. 
3rd decision 
NO-NO 18.4 29 
14.73 < .005 
O-O 4 2 
NO-O 10.4 2 
O-NO 10.4 7 
1st decision vs. 
3rd decision 
NO-NO 18.4 35 
31.00 < .000 
O-O 4 1 
NO-O 10.4 3 
O-NO 10.4 1 
O = Organic; NO= Non-organic 
 
                                                 
12 This was calculated based on the sum of the partial chi-squares associated with each of the four pairs of 
possible choices. The degrees of freedom were calculated from the number of cells (4) minus 1: df = (N-1). 
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With respect to the three consecutive choices made in the new context,  chi-square test 
results show that the decisions made are significantly different from the results that would 
have been obtained by chance, for the dependent events either associated with the choice in 
the first decision and then the choice in the second, χ2 (3, N=40) =31.11, p < .001; associated 
with the choice in the second decision and then the choice in the third, χ2 (3, N=40) =23.01, p 
< .001; and associated with the choice in the first decision and then the choice in the third, χ2 
(3, N=40) =31.00, p ≈ .05.  These results can be seen in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 - Differences between choice frequencies for the four combinations of consecutive 
product choices with the Chi-square test – New context (n=40) 
 
  Choice frequency   
  Expected Observed 
Composite 
Chi-square 
(df=3) 
P 
1st decision vs. 
2nd decision 
NO-NO 16.8 22 
31.11 < .001 
O-O 3.6 12 
NO-O 9.6 5 
O-NO 9.6 1 
2nd decision vs. 
3rd decision 
NO-NO 18.4 22 
22.31 < .001 
O-O 4 11 
NO-O 10.4 1 
O-NO 10.4 6 
1st decision vs. 
3rd decision 
NO-NO 18.4 22 
7.61 ≈ .05 
O-O 4 7 
NO-O 10.4 5 
O-NO 10.4 6 
O = Organic; NO= Non-organic 
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McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the familiar 
context (see Table 8) show a highly significant non-organic consistency (i.e., choice of non-
organic milk between two decisions) across the three decisions, with the highest consistency 
being between the first and third decisions. Moreover, there are a significantly higher 
percentage of participants which revised their choice between the first and second decisions, 
choosing organic in the second decision after choosing non-organic in the first decision 
(17.5%), than the opposite revision (0%) (p = .023; McNemar).  
For the other combinations of choices this difference is non-significant, although the 
same percentage that chose organic in the second decision (17.5%) chose non-organic in the 
third decision. 
 
Table 8 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the familiar context with 
McNemar’s test 
 
Organic Non-organic Consistency 
McNemar 
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
1st decision (rows) vs. 
2nd decision (columns) 
Organic 2 0 
77.5% p = .000 p = .023 
Non-organic 7 31 
2nd decision (rows) vs. 
3rd decision (columns) 
Organic 2 7 
72.5% p = .000 p = .182 
Non-organic 2 29 
1st decision (rows) vs. 
3rd decision (columns) 
Organic 1 1 
87.5% p = .000 p = .617 
Non-organic 3 35 
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Results regarding the differences between decisions in the new context (see Table 9) 
show a medium consistency in non-organic milk choice between the three decisions (55%), 
being significant only between the first and third choices (p = .009; McNemar). Moreover, 
there are no significant differences in the choice revision between decisions. 
 
Table 9 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the new context with McNemar’s 
test 
 
Organic Non-organic Consistency 
McNemar 
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
1st decision (rows) vs. 
2nd decision (columns) 
Organic 12 1 
55% p = .123 p = .221 
Non-organic 5 22 
2nd decision (rows) vs. 
3rd decision (columns) 
Organic 11 6 
55% p = .082 p = .131 
Non-organic 1 22 
1st decision (rows) vs. 
3rd decision (columns) 
Organic 7 6 
55% p = .009 p = 1.000 
Non-organic 5 22 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We expected that people wouldn’t decide by chance regarding non-organic milk but 
instead would be influenced by psychological factors and thus choose significantly more non-
organic milk in a familiar context as compared to a new context, which wasn’t refuted by the 
results. Also, they show a pattern in which the context’s influence over behavior is not direct 
(S-R responses) but mediated by psychological processes. These go beyond the price and 
availability of organic food, which usually are considered to be the main reasons underlying 
the decision to buy organic food. In fact, given that price and availability were maintained 
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constant between contexts, the differences in results are explained by familiarity (a 
psychological dimension) rather than these socio-economic factors.  
Results regarding the higher choice of non-organic means in the familiar context are in 
our view, on one side explained by an expected stronger means-goal cognitive association 
(given a higher frequency of pairing of them in the past) and on another side explained by the 
fact that in the familiar context there is a higher perceived applicability of the non-organic 
milk buying habit to the choice context. Thus, not only there is an expected perceived overlap 
of all or at least some of the means in the decision context with the mentally represented 
means in the goal system but also some of them - non-organic means - are inferred to have a 
stronger connection with the goal than others - organic means. Differently, in a new context, 
the perceived applicability is reduced because this overlap is not expected and differences in 
the association strength are not expected to exist, given that the non-organic means didn’t co-
occur in the past with the milk buying goal and therefore alternative means and goals can 
“find their space”. This explains why in spite of means being expected to prime goals in both 
contexts (increase in goal activation from an increase in accessibility), the effects magnitude 
is higher in the familiar context, which results from an added source of goal activation: 
perceived applicability. This effect regarding the principle that “means prime goals” can only 
be inferred to have had happen following from Goal Systems Theory (Kruglanski et al., 
2002), given that we didn’t have a goal accessibility measure that could assess the degree of 
goal activation through mean priming alone (new context) vs. mean priming + perceived 
applicability (familiar context). Nevertheless, this was not the aim of the study given that we 
wanted to make this accessibility from mean priming constant between context and study the 
effect of perceived applicability in addition to it. In fact, our procedure didn’t completely rule 
out the brands effect (brands as means instead of products as means in the new context) as an 
added source of goal accessibility. This could be done by using artificial brands (see Coates 
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et al., 2004) instead of real brands but then we wouldn’t be studying the perceived 
applicability effect realistically given that there wouldn’t be differences between the new 
context (English brands) and this artificial context (“artificial” brands), as we conceived 
them. 
Finally, regarding the participants awareness of the processes involved, the decisions 
weren’t attributed directly to habits influence, since a final questionnaire didn’t show 
significant differences in this perception between participants in the two conditions (familiar 
vs. new context). This supports the view that habits can have an effect outside people’s 
conscious awareness even with supraliminal priming such as in the present study (participants 
were aware of the connection between the products and their habits) and the involvement of 
conscious processes based on perceived applicability. Thus, the “visible” aspects like price 
and availability can sometimes work more as post-hoc justifications for behaviors while the 
real cause for their decisions – habits – remains “invisible”. Additionally, as shown in study 
2, for some participant’s choices the automatic effect associated with habit accessibility 
(either for the strong or weak habit participants), interacted with the conscious effect - high 
perceived applicability in the familiar context - to produce an assimilation effect from both 
these sources (Higgins, 1996). This is an interesting result given that organic products are for 
some a socially desirable option, and thus a contrast effect could have been produced from 
this conscious perception component making participants choose more organics and control 
their habit, which wasn’t the case. For other choices (new context), this accessibility effect 
occurred “alone”, given that the perceived applicability was low and thus, only the strong 
habit participants demonstrated assimilation effects. 
Regarding the consistency between sequential non-organic choices in a familiar context, 
there were two possible expectations: 1) it maintains itself overtime following from a stable 
goal system mental representation, which allows for other means to still be available to 
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achieve the same goal after the first choice – equifinality (Kruglanski et al., 2002); 2) the 
effect ceases to exist, given that after the goal is fulfilled in the first choice, a decrease in its 
activation follows (Förster et al., 2005; Förster et al., 2009). Overall, results support the first 
hypothesis given that the choice proportions were significantly different from chance and the 
consistency in the choice of non-organic milk over three decisions was above 72.5% in the 
familiar context and was significantly higher than the consistency in the choice of organic. 
Thus, the majority of participants were consistent in their non-organic choices, even though 
changes in the decisional context occurred (in the available options). On the contrary, to what 
concerns the non-organic choice, although it was also significantly different from chance in 
the three consecutive decisions made in the new context, the consistency between non-
organic choices was lower (55%) and only significant between the first and third choices.  
However, it should be taken into consideration that there was a bias towards the choice 
of non-organic in the three decisions, given that the initial probability of choosing organic 
and non-organic wasn’t the same (see Appendix VII). Also, the probability of revision 
between choices (choosing a different product from the first) was higher than the probability 
of choosing organic between choices. Thus, even though the probability of non-organic 
choice between decisions decreased, in any case it was still higher than the probability of 
choosing organic (see Appendix VII). Nevertheless, these probabilities were the same for 
both contexts, and still there were differences that can be explained not by differences in 
probabilities but by factors associated with the differences between contexts that we 
mentioned before. 
Apart from this, it should also be noted that in the familiar context there are also a small 
percentage of participants (17.5%) which chose organic in the second decision after choosing 
non-organic in the first and then chose the same percentage of non-organic in the third 
decision. One possible explanation for this revision could be that there was some kind of self-
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regulation process present, in which people after choosing in a manner consistent with their 
habit, when confronted with a second choice in the same list, gave more conscious attention 
to the alternative more socially desired decision options, i.e., gave more conscious attention 
to the mean to choose organic milk. However, if this was the case, the social desirability 
effect would also be expected for the decisions in the new context, which is not the case. 
Another plausible explanation seems to be that for these participants the goal activation 
was suppressed after deciding in the first choice (as considered in the second expectation; 
Förster et al., 2005; Förster et al., 2009) and not activated at the time of the second choice. 
This might have happened because for these participants none of the means present in the 
second decision allowed for the non-organic buying goal attainment (no equifinality), i.e., 
there wasn’t an overlap between the means present in the context and the mentally 
represented means. This may have happened for a small percentage of “extremists” (or brand 
loyalists), i.e., people that buy the same brand every time and when confronted with its 
absence, don’t buy anything else and don’t even look for alternatives. One contradiction is 
that if this was the case, they wouldn’t be supposed to choose non-organic again in the third 
decision. However, self-regulation involves focalized attention and effort (Fishbach & Shah, 
2006) and resources can become depleted, therefore decreasing the ability to proceed with 
self-regulation (Coelho do Vale, Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2008). This might explain why on the 
third decision this revision ceased to exist. This is because even though there is the possibility 
that the available means after the first choice weren’t part of their goal system, the resources 
depletion in the second choice might have made them create a “rule” and follow a decision 
process based on their first decision: e.g. “When uncertain, choose the closest mean to the 
one chosen before.” Therefore, in the absence of equifinality, they might have performed a 
means substitution process (Kruglanski et al., 2002), finding means alternative to the habitual 
mean chosen before. Due to the fact that the highest consistency was found between the first 
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and third decisions (87.5%), we infer that for these participants this happened on the third 
decision, while the other participants maintained a choice based on the equifinality structure. 
Although the equifinality process can only be inferred, still there is some evidence of 
this, given that the second and third product were both reported as being bought on an 
average of once per month (while the first was reported to be bought 2-3 times per month). 
Nevertheless, we could only assess this explanation if we measured habit strength in this 
study and an analysis of the revision was done of participants with strong habits. Also, we 
could analyze if the goal was suppressed after each decision by administering an implicit 
measure such as the one used by Liberman, Förster and Higgins (2007). This could allow us 
not only to assess if the revision in some participants was due to goal suppression and at the 
same time to assess if this activation maintained itself for the participants that were consistent 
in their choice. 
In the new context this consistency was disrupted, given the absence of familiar means 
to attain the goal, evidencing an overall lower percentage of non-organic choice compared to 
the familiar context and a choice close to chance in the first decision (which wasn’t the case 
for the familiar context). Nevertheless, consistency was still found for some participants with 
the same percentage being constant for all consecutive decisions (55%), although this being 
significantly higher than the organic choice consistency only between the first and third 
choices. This might be evidence that even in a new context some participants with a chronic 
highly accessible habit might maintain a choice consistent with their habit, but in this case 
following a mean substitution process instead of the decision process based on equifinality 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002), which we infer to have occurred in the familiar context for some 
participants which revised their choice. This would imply the existence of a non-organic milk 
buying habit and not a non-organic milk buying habit. However, this can only be inferred in 
the present study, and our results can’t demonstrate clear evidence regarding this. 
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Lastly, as we said before, we don’t aim to support the goal-dependent over the goal-
independent perspective. Still it should be noted that although non-organic choice consistency 
in the familiar context can still be explained by the latter (as we said in this study’s 
introduction), the demonstration of some consistency in the new context as shown above, is 
more difficult to explain by them. Nevertheless, the demonstration of this is not clear and 
only future studies can assess this. Independently of the habit perspective, what all these 
results show is that this might be evidence that the habit discontinuity hypothesis - when a 
context change disrupts a habit, deliberation becomes more likely (Verplanken et al., 2008) - 
is not true for all context changes and that habit transference between contexts can occur. 
This aspect is the aim of the next study. 
 
STUDY 2 – THE ACESSIBILITY + PERCEIVED APPLICABILITY EFFECT 
 
Behavioral goal accessibility is necessary for a habit to be activated and determine 
behavior under certain conditions (Aarts & Dijksterhuis’s, 2000). In study 1 we 
acknowledged this based on the Goal Systems Theory prediction that means prime goals 
through a bottom-up process (Kruglanski et al., 2002), with context perceived applicability 
(Higgins, 1989; 1996) adding to this effect. This interaction produced a higher magnitude 
effect with more non-organic being chosen in the familiar context compared to the choice in 
the new context (with only mean priming). Accordingly, in a familiar context, this allowed 
for the goal to prime the non-organic mean consistently over decisions, as represented in the 
following connection: means >>> goal >>> non-organic-mean. 
To further understand the preconditions for habit activation, in study 2 we aim to test 
this effect with two different categories of means – habitual means vs. non-habitual means 
(instead of organic and non-organic as in study 1) each associated with a different goal - in 
the same decision context. One of the reasons is to demonstrate that the results weren’t due to 
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contrast effects (see Higgins, 1996) resulting from the presence of organic means in the 
context, which could have made participants choose more non-organic options. Differently, it 
could also be argued that the presence of the organic product mean may have increased the 
probability that the non-organic mean would be chosen, given that even if they are not 
frequently bought they still co-occur with the milk buying goal in the decision context. Given 
this, they are expected to be connected to the same goal to buy milk (see Figure 5), although 
having a weaker connection. I.e., the organic mean could have also contributed to the 
activation of the milk buying goal and this in turn increased the activation of the non-organic 
mean associated with it, given that they were still perceived as applicable although in a lesser 
degree. If they weren’t connected to the same goal, but involved one sub-goal of organic milk 
buying and one sub-goal of non-organic milk buying connected to a super ordinate goal to 
buy milk, the critic wouldn’t be valid. This is because a horizontal connection between the 
two sub-goals could be expected (as evidenced in Kruglanski et al., 2002), which implied that 
by activating the organic milk sub-goal we would inhibit the non-organic milk sub-goal 
activation. In spite of this, we don’t consider the existence of two sub-goals as mentioned, 
given that the participants reported that most of the products bought were non-organic. If 
indeed a sub-goal to buy organic milk existed, this would be the case for only a small 
percentage of the participants and even for those, we infer it would be unstable. This 
instability would result from an infrequent pairing of it with the organic buying means and an 
infrequent pursuit of this goal. 
To control for these possibilities, in the present study we created a choice task in which 
the means and goals in “competition” would involve two different goal systems, with an 
equal proportion for the associated products (.50) to also prevent contextual salience effects. 
This is because given the fact that organic products had a proportion of .33 in the previous 
study, it could be argued that this fact made organic products more contextually salient, 
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which by means of a contrast effect (see Higgins, 1996) could activate the alternative 
response (non-organic milk buying). The opposite could also be argued and the actual bigger 
proportion of non-organic would imply a higher contextual salience of the products. 
Moreover, in study 1, this implied a difference in the choice probabilities, with it being higher 
for non-organic products. Therefore, by using the same proportion for both products, the 
same probability of choice exists for both. 
Although in study 1 the mean priming of goals was inferred to have remained constant 
between contexts, the goal priming of means (goal >>> non-organic mean) wasn’t controlled 
for and only inferred to have had an effect in the predicted way. In the present study, we 
control for the goal priming of means (top-down process; Kruglanski et al., 2002) by 
exploring the interaction of familiarity with goal accessibility, with the latter being either 
manipulated artificially (priming) or through a natural (chronic) accessibility (Higgins, 1989).  
Hence, we want to assess if the milk buying goal higher accessibility can influence the 
decision towards the choice of a habitual mean or similar to the habitual (equifinality).  The 
non-habitual means will also be expected to prime the goal associated with the non-habitual 
choice while the perceived applicability effect is expected to not differ as compared to the 
same effect for the habitual brands. This is because for the non-habitual product, familiar 
means will also be used. Thus, the main difference within each context will be the associated 
goal accessibility which implies the expectance of weaker activation strength for the non-
habitual goal compared to the goal associated with the habitual choice, given that the latter’s 
accessibility will be higher (either through priming or chronic accessibility).  
Regarding the “artificial” priming, people will be provided with a goal to buy milk in 
the supermarket in a supraliminal way (motivational priming) rather than a priming of the 
brand or the product (cognitive priming; for a discussion regarding the different types of 
priming, see Förster et al., 2009). This is expected to (artificially) increase the accessibility of 
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the goal-action cognitive link and therefore increase the probability that the habitual mean to 
attain that goal or a similar mean (equifinality) is chosen when the opportunity arises (Aarts 
& Dijkertuis 2000; Verplanken et al. 1994). The same is not expected to occur when we 
activate an irrelevant buying goal - e.g. buy bread in the supermarket - since the connection 
with the mean to buy milk doesn’t exist. This effect, however, will depend on context 
perceived applicability.  To what concerns the familiar context, we don’t expect differences 
in terms of habitual products choice but only a replication of the effect found in study 1, i.e., 
we don’t expect accessibility to add to the effect found in study 1, given the presence of a 
ceiling effect (expecting that this effect adds to the other accessibility sources and leads to a 
close to 100% choice of milk is very unlikely and it is not realistic).  
Given this, our main prediction concerns the new context. Specifically, we want to 
assess a prediction found in mental constructs accessibility research (but not in habit 
research), following from Higgins and Brendl (1995) activation rule 1: Strong accessibility 
can compensate for weak applicability. Thus, we hypothesize an accessibility effect can 
occur even when perceived context applicability is low, resulting in a consistency in the 
choice between the new and the familiar context (as predicted for the three choices in study 
1), i.e., when the target goal is primed before the decision, participants in the new context can 
follow the same decision process as the one’s in the familiar context. The same is not 
expected to happen when an irrelevant goal is primed, given that as shown in study 1 the 
accessibility from mean priming is not sufficient to produce an effect over the decision, 
compared to the one found for the familiar context. For these participants, consistency 
between contexts is not expected but revision between them is, with more choice of habitual 
products in the familiar context than in the new, i.e., their choice will be determined by the 
context based on the perceived applicability of habit to it.  
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It should be noted however that we use this rule as a basis for testing the idea that habits 
are dynamic mental representations and not as a direct test of the rule, given that we are 
assessing the effect of perceived applicability and not of actual applicability as Higgins and 
Brendl (1995)13
We expect this to occur because, although perceived applicability is lower in the new 
context, this context is not completely new given that even if the familiar means don’t exist, 
the products (milk and orange juice) are still familiar. Thus, there can still be a bias toward 
the product regardless of the brand and even in the absence of the familiar brands a mean 
substitution process can still occur (Kruglanski et al., 2002). The reason is that, although 
perceived applicability is expected to be lower in a new context, the habit might still be 
perceived as applicable to the existent products, instead of to the brands, i.e., although brands 
are not present habit can still be followed because the product is present.  
. Nevertheless, given the state of the literature on habits, what we want to 
assess will be more useful for the existent lines of research, given that it can show that other 
sources of habits activation beyond perceived applicability (Wood et al., 2005) can influence 
habits activation and translation into behavior. By showing the effect of habit even in a 
condition of low perceived applicability, as long as accessibility either from priming or 
chronicity is high, will allow that.  
We infer that this perception should only take place if the habit is activated following 
from the goal or chronic accessibility, i.e., these participants should be the ones to resist the 
context changes. This implies that participants for which a relevant goal is primed can still 
choose the habitual product by substituting the habitual or equifinal means for an unfamiliar 
mean (though familiar product), as long as the latter allows for the attainment of their goal. If 
an irrelevant goal is primed, this effect is not expected to occur, given that the goal to buy 
milk won’t be activated and thus, doesn’t need to be pursued and attained. 
                                                 
13 I.e. we want to assess this effect mediated by perception and not the automatic effect from applicability. 
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Following from this, we aim to test the argument advanced in study 1 that the habit 
discontinuity hypothesis doesn’t hold for every context change and there might be some 
contexts for which habit transfer might occur, if habit is strong enough (i.e., highly 
accessible) and certain “essential” contextual features still allow for it to influence choice. 
Consequently, the goal is expected to be accessible in both contexts and a decision process 
involving means substitution can still occur (Kruglanski et al., 2002) instead of not attaining 
the goal due to the absence of familiar means. This should be evidence of the occurrence of 
goal activation for both contexts and thus, a demonstration of habits dynamic properties, also 
found for other mental representations such as stereotypes for example (see Garcia-Marques, 
Santos & Mackie, 2006).  
This same effect is expected to occur for participants naturally strong in their milk 
buying habits, i.e., participants with a high chronic accessibility (Higgins, 1989; 1996) in 
their milk buying habits will choose habitual products more consistently between contexts. 
Regarding this, automaticity research has shown that chronic and temporary constructs have 
the same effects in short intervals between priming and judgment, although the chronic ones 
are more powerful in longer intervals (Bargh, 1997; Bargh et al., 1988).  
Therefore, we expect an accessibility effect either from an artificial increase in the 
accessibility (goal priming) or from an already high natural accessibility, given that both 
types are expected to have the same consequences in terms of an immediate response. 
A graphical representation of these predictions regarding the accessibility effect, either 
in terms of main or interaction effects with the context can be seen in the following Figures 6 
and 7. 
 
 
 
120 
 
 
Figure 6.  Goal-means structure representation given an (artificially or naturally) highly 
accessible goal to buy milk, for each context 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Goal-means structure representation given an (artificially or naturally) lowly 
accessible goal to buy milk, for each context 
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To assess the predictions regarding the “artificially” increased accessibility, participants 
were randomly assigned to two within and two between participants conditions respectively, 
in an experimental design as follows: 2 (familiar context: high perceived applicability for 
milk buying habit vs. new context: low perceived applicability for milk buying habit) X 
2(accessible target (bread+milk) buying goal vs. accessible irrelevant (bread+water) buying 
goal). To evaluate the predictions regarding the “chronic” accessibility, participants were 
randomly assigned to four within-participants conditions, in an experimental design as 
follows: 2 (familiar context: high perceived applicability for milk buying habit vs. new 
context: low perceived applicability for milk buying habit) X 2(strong vs. weak habit 
participants). 
 
METHOD 
PRE-TEST 
The pre-test was designed to choose the non-habitual products to be used in the choice 
tasks corresponding to the context’s perceived applicability manipulation: familiar context 
task - national products; new and unfamiliar context task - foreign products unknown to the 
participants. Following from the Consumer purchase habits questionnaire in study 1 (pre-
test), one habitual product and one non-habitual product were chosen. 
For the habitual product, we chose the milk category for the same reasons we chose it 
for study 1. The familiar (national) and new (foreign) milk brands were chosen from the 8 
non-organic milk brands used in study 1, being chosen the 6 that had higher frequency of 
buying and level of recall (on the first, second and third choices; see pre-test from study 1). 
For the non-habitual product, we chose the orange juice category, since it was chosen in 
the top 5 products in an infrequent way (2% in the first choice and 3% in the second) and 
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with a small overall proportion (17%)14
Phase 1 – Familiar brands questionnaire. A questionnaire (see Appendix VIII) was 
designed in order to assess the orange juice brands most frequently purchased and more 
familiar. It was answered by 53 participants who volunteered to participate and after 
providing their informed consent, received a questionnaire on “Consumer behavior in 
Portugal” by email and were asked for it to be sent back through the same way to the 
researcher after responding to it.  
. This category was also chosen in order to have 
familiar (domestic) and new (foreign) brands, in order to control for the influence of a brand 
effect over the results and to have a category similar to the habitual products category (both 
are beverages). In order to choose the orange juice brands to be used in the main study, we 
performed a pre-test with two phases. 
This questionnaire consisted on the following: a) recall measure: all the orange juice 
products that came to mind (open-ended question); b) ordering of the brands in the previous 
measure from the most important to the least important; c) frequency of consumption: brand 
bought more often from a list of domestic brands (on a scale from 1- never to 5 - always). 
This choice was based on a market study performed by visiting the top Portuguese 
supermarkets at the time of the study (Continente; Modelo; Jumbo; Feira Nova; Pingo Doce; 
Lidl; Dia; El Corte Inglés), which allowed us to create a list of the 18 brands more frequently 
available in their shelves. 
                                                 
14 This percentage can be even smaller, considering that these percentages refer to fruit juices in general, 
although orange juice is reported as the type of juice most frequently consumed. Also, we cannot report here the 
results regarding the SHRI for this category, since the SHRI referred only to the first two products people chose, 
which implies a very small N for this category (5). 
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Results for these measures regarding the domestic orange juice brands are shown in 
Table 10, in which 6 products were chosen, being the ones with the highest results in both 
measures. These are the products that were used in the high perceived applicability task. 
 
Table 10 - Recall and frequency results for the national orange juice brands 
Orange juice brands 
Recall – 
1st choice 
Recall – 
2nd choice 
Recall – 
3rd choice 
Frequency 
M SD 
Compal  52.9% 17.6% 5.9% 2.88 1.06 
Sumol  5.9% 17.6% 23.5% 2.19 1.17 
Santal  <5% 11.8% 11.8% 1.94 1.02 
Sunny Delight <5% <5% 5.9% 1.52 .92 
Ceres  <5% <5% 5.9% 1.42 .80 
Fresky  5.9% <5% <5% 1.35 .71 
 
Phase 2 – Unfamiliar brands pre-test. A questionnaire (see Appendix IX) was designed 
to pre-test a list of 9 foreign (English) products (brands+images) in a set of consumer related 
variables, in order to choose 6 orange juice products equivalent to the domestic ones. This 
choice was based on a market study performed by consulting English online shopping web 
pages for the top supermarkets at the time of the study (Asda; Waitrose; Sainsbury’s; Tesco), 
which allowed us to create a list of the 9 brands more frequently available in their online 
pages. The questionnaire was responded by 17 individuals who volunteered to participate and 
provided their informed consent for this.  It consisted on the following items: a) percentage of 
preference for each type of orange juice bought, in terms of production process (100% juice; 
from concentrate; fresh); b) association measure for each of the 9 foreign products (first word 
that came to mind associated with the product); c) attitude towards the brand measured with 4 
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items on a Likert type 5 point scale (positive-negative; pleasant-unpleasant; good-bad; 
beneficial-harmful) for each of the 9 foreign products; d) choice frequency: product more 
probable to buy (from the 9) if the person was in a supermarket where this products were 
available.  
Results for the 9 products are shown in Table 11, in which the 6 products chosen - to 
be used in the low context perceived applicability task - are the ones with higher frequency of 
choice, higher positivity in terms of attitude towards the brand and with less frequent 
negative attributes in the association measure.  
 
Table 11 - Pre-test results for the semi-skimmed UHT foreign milk brands 
Orange juice 
brands15
M 
 
Negative attributes 
frequency 
Choice 
frequency 
Products 
chosen 
Del Monte 3.53 1 17.6% √ 
Sainsbury’s 3.52 2 17.6% √ 
Innocent 3.63 2 11.8% √ 
Libby’s 3.38 3 5.9% √ 
Grove 3.50 2 5.9% √ 
Morrisons 3.23 1 <5% √ 
Waitrose 4.09 1 41.2% - 
Costa 3.19 4 <5% - 
Don Simon 3.00 5 <5% - 
                                                 
15 From this list, the brand Waitrose was excluded to prevent a bias toward choosing it, since that its frequency 
of choice was very high comparing to the highest frequency found for the foreign milk products (19%). Thus, to 
maintain some equivalence between orange juice and milk foreign products, we didn’t include it in the main 
study decision task. 
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MAIN STUDY 
Participants and Design. 160 students from the University of Évora - given credits for 
their participation, and other participants that volunteered to participate - were offered the 
possibility of entering a draw to receive 50 Euros in CDs and DVDs, for participating. To 
participate they had to fulfill the criteria of buying food products for domestic consumption at 
least once in two weeks. The sample consisted mainly on young adults, with an overall mean 
age of 25.53 years old (SD = 7.56; Min = 18; Max = 60) and the majority having a high 
school degree (56.90%) or a university degree (33.10%)16
Procedure. Participants were asked to take part in a web-based study on “Real and 
virtual shopping environments”. After providing their informed consent, they performed a 
task with the aim of accessing the types of decisions people make in supermarkets, which 
represented the goal accessibility manipulation.  
.  
Goal priming task. Participants were randomly attributed to one of two goal 
accessibility tasks (between participants tasks) following from a Java function added to the 
HTML code source. The ones in the milk buying goal accessibility condition (see Appendix 
X) were asked to write a brief description of their behavior in a certain situation (following 
from Gaspar de Carvalho, 2006), after being presented with a practice example: “Imagine 
that you need to go shopping for the week’s breakfasts or lunches in your house and in order 
to do that you go to the nearest supermarket/local store. Once you get there, you decide to 
buy bread and milk
                                                 
16 The participants of the University of Évora are the same as in the Consumer purchase habits questionnaire 
from study 1 (pre-test) and therefore the sample characteristics regarding them are the ones presented there. 
Regarding the other participants, the questionnaire in the present study didn’t assess the frequency of buying 
behaviour and other consumer characteristics. Still, this shouldn’t be a problem since the criteria to participate in 
this study clearly stated that they had to buy food products for own consumption at least once in two weeks. 
. Please describe what you would do from the time you arrive at each 
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product section in the supermarket/local store, until the time you choose what you want to 
take, writing in the space below the options available in there and the way you make your 
choice for each of the two products.” They were asked to write this description as if it were a 
short story and not as topics or a list of steps to do. Each product had its own blank space, 
starting with the irrelevant product, followed by the target product.  
The participants in the irrelevant buying goal accessible condition performed the same 
task but with milk being substituted with water17
The idea here is that, priming stimulates or activates the stored knowledge (Higgins, 
1996) and thus providing people with a behavioral goal (buy milk for the week’s breakfasts 
or lunches), should increase its accessibility (and consequently, the mental representation of 
the associated habit). This in turn should increase the probability of being automatically used 
(choose the habitual milk) when the opportunity arises (i.e., the appropriate stimuli are 
presented). This opportunity is only given for the milk goal and not to the water and bread 
goal, since the decision tasks only have products of the former category and from a category 
for which a goal wasn’t made accessible (orange juice). Finally, in order to demonstrate the 
accessibility effect, our aim was also to make the milk buying goal more accessible than an 
alternative construct (orange juice) which is equally applicable in the subsequent decision 
making task (Higgins, 1996). 
. Bread and water were chosen given that 
they had a frequency of choice and SRHI levels similar to milk. Thus, we aimed to activate 
the bread and water buying goals (and associated habits) but only the milk goal had the 
opportunity to be attained, given that the subsequent task had a list of milk and orange juice 
products to choose from.  
                                                 
17 This goal priming procedure was similar to the one used in study 1, although the one used there (for bread, 
cookies and fruit) and the one used here (for water and bread), both represent control manipulations given that 
the relevant goal for the subsequent decision tasks(milk) is not primed in both. 
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This was done through supraliminal goal priming - participants are expected to be 
aware of the stimuli presentation but not of its effect over their choices (Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000). By using this, we departed from previous studies which use subliminal goal priming 
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000), with the aim of testing a new methodology for goal priming 
and at the same time assessing if this methodology could replicate the results obtained with 
subliminal priming. The reason for this is that the type of supraliminal priming we use might 
be valuable to the study of self-regulation processes in the control of the habitual response 
that involve elaborate information processing strategies (e.g. implementation intentions; see 
Gollwitzer, 1999), given that it might be more practical to use it in a consumer behavior 
change intervention than other types of subliminal priming (e.g. Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). 
Context applicability manipulation .After this task, participants were requested to 
participate in a decision making task with the same type of WebPages used in study 1 and 
with the same procedure (see Appendix XI). The main difference from this was that the 
context perceived applicability manipulation was that participants had to perform both 
applicability tasks (within-subjects). Thus, in the high perceived applicability task, 
participants were asked to: “Imagine that you are at your house and have to prepare breakfast 
or lunch”. Following this they were asked to choose the product they would most probably 
buy in that context. In the low perceived applicability task, people were asked to: “Imagine 
that you are at a friend’s house in another country and have to prepare breakfast or lunch”. 
Again, they were asked to choose the product they would most probably buy in that context 
and as in study 1, they were told that the products would be given to them after completion of 
the study. The appearance of the products in the pages and the attribution to the high-low or 
low-high perceived applicability orders was random, following from a Java function added to 
the HTML code source.  
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The list of products consisted on 6 options of UHT Semi-skimmed milk and 6 options 
of 100% Orange Juice (50/50 proportion) showing the price, brand and a picture of the 
product for each. Both the familiar (high perceived applicability) and new (low perceived 
applicability) contexts had the same type of products and matched prices, with the only 
difference being the product pictures and brand names – Portuguese brands in the familiar 
context and English brands in the new context. The appearance of the products in the pages 
was random, following from a Java function added to the HTML code source.  
It should also be noted that before having the decision making tasks, as for study 1, 
participants were given the option to choose one of four different categories of products and 
told to press one of four buttons for that, with every button leading to the same product 
category: milk. Apart from the reasons for using this procedure mentioned in study 1, the 
appearance of the “milk” word also allowed to control the cognitive activation of the milk 
category and rule out the influence of a bias from a semantic activation effect. Thus, 
independently of having been primed with the goal to buy milk or not (in the goal 
accessibility manipulation task)18
Final questionnaire. Finally, participants responded to a short web questionnaire, with 
socio-demographic variables, a SRHI measure for milk and orange juice buying habits 
(Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) and future intentions to buy milk and orange juice (Ajzen, 
1991; 2002). Results regarding the psychometric properties of the habit measure, show a very 
good level of reliability for the milk habit measure (α = .93) and high item-total correlations 
(with the lowest being .60); and a very good level of reliability for the orange juice habit 
measure (α = .95) and moderate item-total correlations (with the lowest being .47). Results 
regarding the psychometric properties of measures for the future intention to buy, show a 
, every participant was primed with the “milk” word and 
thus, differences in results should result from the goal primed and not from the word primed. 
                                                 
18 Participants in the irrelevant goal condition weren’t presented the word “milk” but with “bread” and “water”. 
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very good level of reliability for the future intention to buy milk scale (α = .91) and high 
item-total correlations (with the lowest being .72) for this; and a very good level of reliability 
for the future intention to buy orange juice scale (α = .96) and high item-total correlations 
(with the lowest being .85) for this. 
Apart from characterizing the sample in terms of milk and orange juice buying habits, 
this SRHI measure also allowed the determination of two groups of participants – strong vs. 
weak milk buying habit - based on the lowest (Q = 3.37) and highest quartiles (Q = 5.42), 
associated with the 7 point Likert type scale. Given that this is a questionnaire created to 
measure habit activation strength, we considered that participants with values below the 
lowest quartile have a weak habit and participants with values above the highest quartile have 
a strong habit (see Verplanken and Holland (2002) for a similar procedure). Thus, we inferred 
that the behavior of participants with high values on this measure is performed frequently, 
with high efficiency, reduced control and awareness, and it is part of their identity or personal 
style (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). Consequently, we consider this might indicate that strong 
milk buying habits participants are also chronic to what concerns this mental construct, given 
that chronic accessibility is considered to be associated with automatic processing (Higgins, 
1989; Higgins, 1996). We could be more certain about this inference if we had a response 
frequency measure of habit, a type of implicit measure which assesses response latency and 
other aspects that demonstrate the cognitive association strength between goals and actions 
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). However, SHRI convergent validity studies show that this 
measure correlates strongly with response frequency measures of habit (Verplanken & 
Orbell, 2003; study 2) and thus, we think this inference is admissible. 
After completion of the web questionnaire, participants were thanked for their 
participation and provided with an email contact in the case they wanted additional 
information and/or to receive the study results. 
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RESULTS 
 
Questionnaire and Manipulation Checks. Regarding the baseline characteristics of the 
sample, there is an overall moderate habit strength to what concerns milk buying (M = 4.27, 
SD = 1.42), which the paired-samples t-test shows as overwhelmingly significantly higher 
that the orange juice habit strength (M = 2.41, SD = 1.37), t(159) = 12.00; p = .000. 
Regarding the future intention to buy the products, there is a very high intention to buy milk 
in the future (M = 6.24, SD = 1.33), which the paired-samples t-test shows as 
overwhelmingly significantly higher than the intention to buy orange juice in the future (M = 
4.05, SD = 2.03), t(159) = 10.81, p = .000.  
The independent-samples t-test results show no significant differences between the two 
goal priming conditions in the SRHI for milk and orange juice and in the intentions to buy 
orange juice and milk in the future. Regarding the two chronic accessibility conditions 
(strong vs. weak habit), the independent samples t-test results show no significant differences 
between these conditions in the SRHI and intentions to buy orange juice and in the level of 
influence of habit and price over the participants decision. Significant differences were found 
for the intentions to buy milk in the future (strong habit: M = 6.80, SD = .44; weak habit: M = 
4.86, SD = 1.94), t(77) = 6.10, p = .000, d = 1.40.  
The comparison of the SRHI results for the milk buying habit between the pre-test from 
study 1 (M = 4.80, SD = 1.10) and the present study (M = 5.38, SD = 1.00) performed one 
month after it, show a significant increase in habit strength t(159) = -3.20, p = .004, d = .56, 
and a strong positive and highly significant correlation between these two measures (r = .59; 
p = .001). It should be noted that these results concerns an n of 28 participants which were 
the ones that in the pre-test of study 1 chose milk as the most frequently bought products or 
the second most and which also participated in the present study. Therefore, this can be 
131 
 
considered a small test-retest measure of the SHRI. The fact that there was an increase might 
be attributed to the performance of a task regarding the choice of milk prior to answering (but 
not to the accessibility manipulation, given that there were no SHRI differences between the 
associated conditions). However, we don’t expect it to introduce a confound in the results 
given that this increase was for participants that were part of every condition of the 
experimental design. Thus, if a confound exists it was introduced in every condition and thus 
doesn’t bias each of them individually. 
Regarding order effects, results from the Fisher’s exact test applied to Gart’s test for 
order effects (see Everitt, 1977) show no differences between the familiar-new or new-
familiar task orders. 
Decision Making Task. Chi-square test results for the consecutive choices made in the 
familiar and new context show that the decisions made are significantly different from the 
results that would have been obtained by chance for the independents events, either in the 
irrelevant goal condition, χ2 (3, N=80) =22.60, p = .000; the target goal condition, χ2 (3, 
N=80) =19.30, p = .000; for the strong habit participants, χ2 (3, N=39) =26.54, p = .000; or 
for the weak habit participants, χ2 (3, N=40) =16.80, p = .000 (see Appendix VII for the 
chance probabilities calculation, which served as basis for calculating the expected 
frequencies in the Chi-square test). 
McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the familiar and 
new context when the target goal is accessible (see Table 12) show a significantly higher 
percentage of participants which revised their choice, by choosing the non-habitual product 
(orange juice) in the new context and the habitual (milk) in the familiar context (23.75%) as 
compared to the opposite revision (3.75%) (p = .001; McNemar). Regarding the consistency 
between contexts, it is not significant in this accessible target goal condition. 
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Table 12 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the new and familiar context with 
the accessible target goal with McNemar’s test 
  New context   
  
Non-hab. Hab. 
McNemar  
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
Familiar 
context 
Non-hab. 29 3 
p = .896 p = .001 
Hab. 19 29 
 
McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the familiar 
and new context when the irrelevant goal is accessible (see Table 13) show a significantly 
higher percentage of participants which revised their choice, by choosing the non-habitual 
product in the new context and the habitual in the familiar context (32.5%) compared to the 
opposite revision (6.25%) (p = .000; McNemar). Moreover, in this condition there is a higher 
choice consistency for the habitual (38.75%) than for the non-habitual products (22.5%) 
between contexts, although this difference is marginally significant. 
 
Table 13 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the new and familiar context with 
the accessible irrelevant goal with McNemar’s test 
  New context   
  
Non-hab. Hab. 
McNemar  
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
Familiar 
context 
Non-hab. 18 5 
p = .087 p = .000 
Hab. 26 31 
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McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the familiar and 
new context for the strong habit participants (see Table 14) show a higher choice consistency 
for the habitual (58.97%) than for the non-habitual products (12.82%) between contexts (p = 
.000; McNemar). Regarding the revision between contexts, there are no significant 
differences. 
 
Table 14 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the new and familiar context for 
the strong habit participants with McNemar’s test 
  New context   
  
Non-hab. Hab. 
McNemar  
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
Familiar 
context 
Non-hab. 5 2 
p = .001 p = .070 
Hab. 9 23 
 
 
McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the familiar and 
new context for the weak habit participants (see Table 15) show a significantly higher 
percentage of participants which revised their choice, by choosing the non-habitual product in 
the new context and the habitual in the familiar context (45%) compared to the opposite 
revision (0%) (p = .002; McNemar). Regarding the consistency between contexts, there are 
no significant differences. 
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Table 15 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the new and familiar context for 
the weak habit participants with McNemar’s test 
  New context   
  
Non-hab. Hab. 
McNemar  
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
Familiar 
context 
Non-hab. 18 0 
p = .186 p = .002 
Hab. 12 10 
 
 
Results regarding the interaction between the goal priming conditions and habit strength 
(see Table 16) show no significant effects for the strong habit participants in the accessible 
target goal condition. In the same condition for the weak habit participants there is a 
marginally significant higher percentage of participants which revised their choice, by 
choosing the non-habitual product in the new context and the habitual in the familiar context 
(21.74%) compared to the opposite revision (0%) (p = .074; McNemar).  
For the strong habit participants in the irrelevant goal condition, results show a higher 
choice consistency for the habitual (66.67%) than for the non-habitual products (4.76%) 
between contexts (p = .002; McNemar). Results regarding the weak habit participants in the 
same condition show a significantly higher percentage of participants who revised their 
choice, by choosing the non-habitual product in the new context and the habitual in the 
familiar context (41.18%) as compared to the opposite revision (0%) (p = .023; McNemar). 
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Table 16 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the new and familiar context for 
the interaction between the goal priming conditions and habit strength, with McNemar’s test 
 
Strong habit + target goal 
 
 New context   
 Non-hab. Hab. McNemar (A/D) McNemar (B/C) 
Familiar 
context 
Non-hab. 4 1 
p = .267 p = .371 
Hab. 4 9 
Strong habit + irrelevant goal 
 
 New context   
 Non-hab. Hab. McNemar (A/D) McNemar (B/C) 
Familiar 
context 
Non-hab. 1 1 
p = .002 p = .221 
Hab. 5 14 
Weak habit + target goal 
 
 New context   
 Non-hab. Hab. McNemar (A/D) McNemar (B/C) 
Familiar 
context 
Non-hab. 10 0 
p = .814 p = .074 
Hab. 5 8 
Weak habit + irrelevant goal 
 
 New context   
 Non-hab. Hab. McNemar (A/D) McNemar (B/C) 
Familiar 
context 
Non-hab. 8 0 
p = .114 p = .023 
Hab. 7 2 
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Finally, in order to further understand the type of decision process involved in the 
participant’s decisions, a binary logistic regression was performed with the scales assessing 
milk habit and the intentions to buy milk in the future as independent variables and the choice 
of habitual vs. non-habitual products for each context as the dependent (thus implying two 
logistic regressions). According to Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1177), “Mediation holds if the 
independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable when the mediator is 
controlled”. Therefore, to assess the role of habit as a mediator of the choices in each context, 
we introduced it in the first step of the logistic regression to control for its effect and both 
habit and intention in the second step (Aarts, Dijksterhuis & Midden, 1999). 
Results regarding the binomial logistic regression for the familiar context (see Table 
17), show that habit is a significant positive predictor of choice (B habit = .37, X2Wald (1) = 
8.65, p = .003) in a model with only habit as a predictor at step 1. Overall, the model obtained 
produced a low but reasonable fit to the data (p (-2LL) = .02, X2HL(8) = 15.52 p = .05, R2CS = 
.06, R2N = .078, R2MF = .05), with the percentage of cases correctly identified with it being 
14.53% higher than the one’s identified by chance. Moreover, results show that a one unit 
increase in the habit scale increases the chances ratio of choosing the habitual product in 
44%. The omnibus test shows that the introduction of the intention measure at step 2 doesn’t 
improve significantly the model (G2 = .43, p = .51). 
Results regarding the binomial logistic regression for the new context (see Table 17), 
show that habit is a significant positive predictor of choice (B habit = .47, X2Wald (1) = 13.29, p 
= .000) in a model with only habit as a predictor at step 1. Overall, the model obtained 
produced a low but reasonable fit to the data (p (-2LL) = .02, X2HL(8) = 13.86 p = .09, R2CS = 
.09, R2N = .12, R2MF = .07), with the percentage of cases correctly identified with it being 
11.34% higher than the one’s identified by chance.  
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Moreover, results show that a one unit increase in the habit scale increases the chances 
ratio of choosing the habitual product in 59.4%. The omnibus test shows that the introduction 
of the intention measure at step 2 doesn’t significantly improve the model (G2 = .43, p = .51). 
 
Table 17 - Summary of the binary logistic regression for variables predicting the choice of 
the habitual product in the familiar context (n = 80) and new context (n = 80) 
 Variable B SE B Wald Exp(B) 
Familiar 
context 
Step 1 
Habit .37 .13 8.65* 1.44 
 
Step 2 
Habit .31 .16 3.87* 1.36 
Intention .10 .16 .43 1.11 
New 
context 
Step 1 
Habit .47 .13 13.29** 1.59 
 
Step 2 
Habit .44 .15 8.19* 1.55 
Intention .06 .18 .12 1.06 
* Result significant at p<.05 
** Result significant at p<.001   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
To what concerns the interaction between perceived applicability and chronic goal 
accessibility, the results didn’t refute our hypothesis and demonstrated that other factors 
intervened in the decisions, other than chance. Results showed that the majority of the strong 
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habit participants chose the habitual product consistently between contexts, i.e., as expected 
chose the habitual product in the familiar context but also chose the habitual product in the 
new context. Differently, the decisions of participants with weak habit were consistent with 
the context, with the majority choosing more the habitual product in the familiar context and 
the non-habitual product in the new context. Given their weak habit, their mental 
representation is inferred to be more unstable than for the strong habit participants. Thus, 
given this instability, they are influenced by the context changes associated with a reduction 
in perceived applicability, constraining the decision process associated with the habitual 
product. At the same time, the stability is “aided” by the context, with the weak chronic 
accessibility being compensated by the high context perceived applicability. In addition to 
this, the logistic regression results show that in the familiar context but also in the new 
context, the measure of milk buying habit was a better predictor of the choices than the 
measure of intention to buy milk in the future, which supports the idea that even in the new 
context, an automatic decision process might have also occurred. 
Although this is inferred to have happened for almost the majority of the weak habit 
participants (45%), there is some heterogeneity in the results, which might indicate that even 
within the groups, there are some differences between participants. A marginally non-
significant percentage of the strong habit participants also revised their choice in accordance 
with the context, which we infer that is also a demonstration of heterogeneity within this 
group, i.e., some participants in the strong habit group might have weaker mental 
representations than others and thus, chose the non-habitual product in the new context and 
the habitual in the familiar. 
Accordingly, due to the fact that we created the two strong and weak habit groups based 
on the lowest and highest quartiles on the SHRI results, it is admissible that the weak habit 
group (lowest quartile) for example, includes either participants with no habit at all and 
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participants with a weak habit. Thus, this result regarding choice revision consistent with the 
context is considered to have had happened for the weak habit participants and not for the 
participants with no habit at all. This would explain why this happened for only 45% of the 
weak habit participants. Moreover, there are a non-significant percentage of participants 
which chose consistently the habitual product. This is not surprising given that even though 
the milk buying habit is weak, it is stronger than the orange juice buying habit. Despite of 
this, overall there is evidence that even in the absence of familiar brands the presence of the 
familiar product (milk) can still be enough for the choice of the habitual product by people 
with a strong habit to remain consistent between contexts, supporting the idea that strong 
accessibility can compensate for weak (perceived) applicability (Higgins & Brendl, 1995).  
Moreover, the results of this study compared to study 1 results, evidence that the 
priming of goals through means occurs regardless of a contrast effect resulting from the 
context (see Higgins, 1996), associated with the presence of organic products. This also 
occurs even when we take out the possible effect that the organic milk mean would have in 
terms of the activation of the milk buying goal, which could as well contributed to the 
activation since it might be part of the same goal system. In the present study, by putting two 
different product categories “against” each other, with different goals and means associated, 
we demonstrated that the perceived applicability effect is due to an interaction between 
familiarity and habits, given the presence of not only familiar products (both for milk and 
orange juice) but also habitual products (milk brands frequently bought or considered in the 
past as an alternative, being part of the consideration set; Shocker et al., 1991). 
To what concerns the interaction between perceived applicability and goal accessibility 
through supraliminal goal priming, results refuted our hypothesis of more consistency in the 
habitual product (milk) choice than in the non-habitual product choice, between the familiar 
and new context, when the habitual product buying goal was made accessible. Moreover, for 
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these participants the perceived applicability effect found in study 1 was replicated, with 
differences being found between contexts, with a significant proportion of participants 
choosing more the non-habitual product in the new context and the habitual product in the 
familiar context. Regarding the participants for whom an irrelevant goal was primed, this 
perceived applicability effect was also found and for some of them there was a marginally 
significant higher consistency for habitual products between contexts, than for non-habitual 
products. Thus, it seems that the habitual product goal accessibility manipulation not only 
didn’t work in the direction of our prediction (consistency between contexts) but also 
increased the non-habitual products choice consistency, compared to the irrelevant goal 
accessibility in which the habitual product choice consistency was higher. There are some 
possible explanations for the reason why this happened. 
The first logical reason is that this was a methodological failure given that the 
accessibility manipulation didn’t involve goal priming at all. Another possibility is that it 
involved the priming of something else, namely a procedural priming instead (Förster et al., 
2009), i.e., the priming of the act (or sequence of acts) of buying the habitual product (going 
to the product section in the supermarket, searching for the product, etc.), given that the 
priming manipulation involved a mental simulation of that act. This was expected to facilitate 
carryover effects of goal activation on the subsequent choice. However, given the possibility 
that we primed the procedures instead of the goal, this wouldn’t have an effect given that the 
decision task involved different choice procedures than the ones primed in the simulation task 
(e.g. the choice in the decision task is more constrained given the existence of fewer choices, 
compared to the simulated choice in the previous task). Also, the choice environment in the 
decision task (online shopping environment) is different from the simulated choice 
(supermarket environment) and so the carryover effects associated with procedural priming 
would be constrained. Thus not even this priming could have a significant effect over choice. 
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This wouldn’t happen if a goal had been primed, with carryover effects being expected 
irrespectively of the type of choice context, as long as the existent means still allowed for the 
goal to be attained. This might explain why the effect associated with increased goal 
accessibility from the manipulation didn’t occur but it doesn’t explain why the consistency of 
non-habitual product choice was higher for the habitual goal accessibility condition, not 
being significantly different from the habitual choice consistency.  
Another reason for this having had happened is the possibility of a contrast effect due to 
the priming events awareness (see Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler & Wanke, 1993; Higgins, 
1996). Given that the accessibility manipulation might have involved awareness of the goal 
priming, this can actually have made some participants aware of their own habitual behavior. 
They might have used this awareness to monitor their choices in the two contexts which 
could have had the effect of choosing in the opposite direction of their habits and pursuit of a 
different goal, i.e., of consciously suppressing the milk buying goal associated with their 
habits. In other words, given that the priming was supraliminal, people were aware that they 
were reporting their milk buying behavior and when confronted with a choice in a list with 
milk and orange juice products, they could still be aware of their own behaviors19
One possible result of the contrast effects is that they perceived the goal accessibility 
task as a bias to their choice, by directing it towards milk and thus actively tried to avoid the 
responses in this direction (Higgins, 1996). However, differences weren’t found regarding 
this perceived task influence, between all the experimental conditions, as the results for the 
manipulation checks indicate. Moreover, they could have also seen the choice task as an 
opportunity to choose a new and different product from the habitual choices. Nevertheless, if 
this was the case, this would also happen for the irrelevant goal condition but it didn’t.  
.  
                                                 
19 This might be due to the fact that the priming and choice tasks weren’t presented as two different studies or 
two different parts of the same research. Thus, in the participant’s viewpoint, this was all part of the same study. 
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Another explanation is that the goal priming might have elicited a monitoring process in 
which some of the strong habit participants assessed that the options available weren’t 
appropriate to attain their milk buying habit (see Higgins, 1996). Thus, although the brands 
used were frequently bought brands obtained from a pre-test, there were only 6 options 
available. Given that the habitual goal accessibility task brought the milk buying situation to 
mind, these 6 options might have been perceived as not matching the desired alternative 
options. Consequently, due to this low judged usability, they might have given more 
conscious attention to the alternative option (i.e., to the mean to choose orange juice). Thus, if 
the information is judged as inappropriate (inapplicable to the decision context), it is likely 
that it will be suppressed and produce contrast effects of priming (Higgins, 1996). This would 
explain the results obtained given that “judged usability occurs after knowledge activation but 
before knowledge use” (Higgins, 1996; p.152), which would allow for this contrast effect to 
take place before deciding (and a higher control over the decision). Also, supporting the fact 
that this was elicited by the goal priming manipulation is that the same effect didn’t happen in 
study 1 and the irrelevant goal condition replicated the results in that study. 
Accordingly, literature on contrast effects considers that if a certain stimulus (category, 
trait, exemplar) is potentially relevant for a comparison, then when we compare that stimulus 
with the self (e.g. comparing a stereotypical person with ourselves), a contrast effect can 
follow (Dijksterhuis, Chartrand & Aarts, 2007). In the present study, if the task means were 
seen as relevant to attain the goal associated with habit which was supraliminally primed 
before exposure to the means, then they would have been compared to the ones cognitively 
associated with the primed goal (in the goal system). If a weak match between the habit and 
the available means in the decision task was perceived, then a contrast effect might have 
occurred. Moreover, this comparison process might have also increased the salience of the 
non-habitual products means, which could have attracted more attention given that they were 
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seen as different from the means associated with habitual choice (and also their presence 
would be unexpected). This salience would increase the probability of choosing the non-
habitual products and thus, would bias choice towards its choice (following from a contextual 
salience effect; Higgins, 1996).  
If in fact a goal was primed and contrast effects didn’t occur, then an effect might have 
not occurred given an unconscious goal inhibition (Förster et al., 2005; Förster et al., 2009). 
Given that the task comprised a behavioral simulation, the task itself might have allowed both 
for goal activation and goal attainment within it. Thus by asking people to describe in written 
form what they would do if they had to buy milk and other products in the supermarket (goal 
activation), this same description could have allowed for goal attainment. This is because this 
goal might have been associated with the goal to do the task and therefore the goal would be 
“buy milk in this simulation”, which would be attained upon “buying the milk” in their 
description (in the end of the task). Even if they didn’t consciously associate the goal with the 
task goal, an unconscious effect might have occurred in which finishing the description in the 
task (by describing the final step, of buying the product in the supermarket) might have 
“artificially” allowed for goal attainment. This is turn allowed for the goal suppression, 
preventing it from being activated afterwards and from influencing the subsequent response 
in the decision making task (Förster et al., 2005; Förster et al., 2009). Consequently, the 
higher consistency of non-habitual product choice and lower consistency in the habitual 
product choice between contexts when the goal was primed, compared to the condition with 
an accessible irrelevant goal, could have been due to goal suppression in the simulation for 
the former. In this case, the goal would be suppressed in both contexts, even in a condition of 
high perceived applicability. 
Following from this, we can see that either if there was a contrast effect or a goal 
inhibition process, in both cases the goal was suppressed, with the difference that in the 
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former explanation this suppression was conscious and in the latter was non-conscious. In 
either explanation, this can be inferred to have occurred only for the strong habit participants. 
Given the inhibition explanation, the strong habit participants are expected to have a mental 
representation of the habitual behavior which includes the milk buying goal and thus, if this 
goal is suppressed, the choice either in the new or in the familiar context won’t be determined 
by habit given that its effect was inhibited. The same is not expected for the weak habit 
participants, given that this representation either doesn’t exist or is unstable and thus there is 
no strong goal to be suppressed. If a contrast effect occurred, this would also be more 
probable for the strong habit participants given that they would be the ones to compare their 
habitual behavior with the means existent in the decision context, as explained before. For the 
weak habit participants this would be constrained by the fact that there would be no habitual 
behavior to make the comparison. 
The results regarding the interaction between two sources of accessibility, goal priming 
and chronicity, support the claim that the constraining of the goal effect (either through 
suppression or contrast effects) would be expected for strong habit participants. Accordingly, 
results showed that it was only for the strong habit participants in the habitual goal 
accessibility condition that the consistency in the choice of habitual products between 
contexts was disrupted, having no significant differences compared to the consistency in the 
non-habitual product choice. This wasn’t the case for the strong habit participants in the 
irrelevant goal accessibility condition, in which there was a higher consistency in the habitual 
product choice compared to the non-habitual choice consistency.  
Although this finding supports both the inhibition and the contrast effects explanation, 
the same doesn’t happen to what concerns the weak habit participants, which supports an 
inhibition but not a contrast effects explanation. Thus, although the results were non-
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significant20
With a contrast effects explanation we can only explain the goal suppression but not 
this facilitation for the weak habit participants. Differently, in a goal inhibition explanation 
both results are in accordance with it, given that the goal was suppressed for the strong habit 
participants while for the weak habit participants it increased goal accessibility given that 
prior to this, the accessibility was low or absent and the mental representation unstable (or 
even non-existent). Thus, one possibility is that for some of the weak habit participants the 
goal system was artificially strengthened in it (for the ones with an unstable mental 
representation) instead of being suppressed (which happened for the ones with a stable 
mental representation, i.e., a strong habit).  
, there is a pattern indicating that in the habitual goal accessibility condition, the 
weak habit participants had a higher consistency in the choice of the habitual product, 
compared to the ones in the irrelevant goal condition. These latter participants, in turn, had a 
higher revision in accordance with the context, choosing more the habitual product in the 
familiar context and the non-habitual product in the new context. This pattern suggests that 
the habitual goal priming facilitated the choice in the new context (higher choice of the 
habitual product) compared to the irrelevant goal priming condition in which the choice of 
the habitual product was only facilitated in the familiar context.  
Nevertheless, only future studies can address this specific issue and specifically test this 
explanation. One way of doing it would be to add one more condition in the decision tasks 
with milk being replaced by another product with similar levels in the SRHI. Additionally, 
measures of goal activation and attainment could also be added (for example similar to the 
ones used by Förster et al. (2005) and Liberman et al. (2007)). By doing this we could control 
the mean priming from the milk buying means present in the context and thus measure the 
goal activation strength either associated only with chronic accessibility (irrelevant goal 
                                                 
20 Attributed mainly to the sample’s small n. 
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condition) or following from its interaction with the habitual goal priming. This wasn’t done 
in the present study given that it would add more conditions to the ones presented and thus 
imply a greater complexity in the design.  
Moreover, using the same goal priming procedure but with an interruption of the task 
(Liberman et al., 2007) or instructions that would impede the final step in the choice to be 
described (the actual choice of the product) in the  simulation task, would be a way of 
preventing goal attainment from occurring in the task. By doing this, we infer that the goal 
could be activated and suppression would be avoided. Finally, instead of this goal priming 
procedure, subliminal priming could also be used (see Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000) and also 
assess the effect of subliminally activating alternative means (orange juice buying means; 
using similar procedures to the one used by Shah and Kruglanski (2003)), in order to assess if 
this could have a similar effect of suppression, by in this case instead of inhibiting the goal, 
by facilitating an alternative goal through the priming the associated means. 
Overall, these results support the argument that even though habits are considered to be 
a particular type of mental constructs (involving behavioral goals) they share some 
characteristics of other types of mental constructs (such as stereotypes and attitudes). 
Moreover, they show that habit adaptability to contextual changes, either in the features 
relevant to the decision or the “accidental” features, is sometimes underestimated being habit 
a dynamic mental representation that can compensate for these. In our view, this can be 
achieved through equifinality in the goal system mentally represented and/or means 
substitution, even if the means are not mentally represented in that goal system. This is 
however dependent on the maintenance of high accessibility through the contextual changes 
which in the present study was demonstrated for strong habit participants.  
The same didn’t happen for goal priming (expected to induce high accessibility through 
“artificial” means), which had the ironic effect of showing that habits are also prone to the 
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same type of suppression effects demonstrated for other types of goals not associated with 
habitual behavior (Förster et al., 2005; Liberman et al., 2007).  
 
 
STUDY 3 – THE VISUAL PRIMING EFFECT 
 
In study 3 we aim to demonstrate the accessibility effect through goal priming while 
avoiding the suppression effect associated with the methodology used in study 2. Therefore, 
in the present study the goal priming before the task doesn’t involve a behavioral simulation 
like in study 2 and the priming awareness is reduced, although maintaining its supraliminal 
character. The context manipulation remains the same as in study 2, although here this was 
manipulated between-participants, in order to assess differences within each context (and not 
considering both at the same time, as in study 2). 
Thus, differently from study 2, participants initially perform a visual (supraliminal) goal 
priming task, with a set of photographs either with irrelevant products or products related to 
the target goal. Following from this, we expect that participants will automatically judge the 
situation as a habitual product (milk) buying situation (i.e., automatically infer the goal from 
the images) and that this makes the buying goal associated more accessible, in the same way 
as the goal accessibility manipulation of study 2, but in a less explicit form. Thus, this visual 
(supraliminal) goal priming is expected to make the buying habit more accessible and 
“direct” the choosing of the means in the decision making task towards the means connected 
to the goal (i.e., showing a goal-directed behavior; Aarts & Custers, 2009), replicating the 
results found in study 2 for chronicity. 
Unlike subliminal semantic priming, this type of supraliminal visual priming is not 
found in the literature regarding habits and therefore, we aim to explore if an effect can be 
obtained following from this. Accordingly, research on other types of mental constructs 
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shows that visual priming and goals can indeed work together in order for the mental 
construct to have its effect over behavior and/or decisions. One example concerns stereotypes 
and comes from Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn and Castelli (1997). According to these 
authors visual exposure to a stereotypical member of a group is not sufficient to trigger 
stereotype activation, being this effect moderated by the existence of a processing goal (i.e., 
the way the target is supposed to be analyzed or categorized). Following from this, 
participants had to evaluate photos (1000ms or 225ms, in study 1 and 2 respectively) that 
included female faces on the basis of three processing goals: 1) "feature detection" - white 
circle present or absent in the photo?; 2) "semantic judgment" - picture refers to an animate or 
inanimate object?; 3) "exposure" – participants only had to report the presence of the stimulus 
(picture). The evaluation of the picture was followed by a lexical decision task involving 
words associated with stereotypical (4) and non-stereotypical (4) female traits and non-words 
(8), in which they had to assess if the stimulus presented was a word or non-word. Results 
showed a faster judgment in the semantic judgment condition (either for an exposure of 
1000ms or 225ms) compared to the other conditions and a faster judgment for stereotypical 
words than non-stereotypical words in the former condition. From this, they concluded that 
exposure to a member of a stereotypical group triggers the activation of the associated 
stereotype, when there is an activation of a goal of processing the target. In a similar way to 
this experiment, we expect participants to behave according to their habit given the existence 
of a buying goal. However, differently from this experiment, instead of providing participants 
with the goal (as we also did in study 2), we expect them to automatically infer it from the 
images, given the presence of specific visual contextual cues – fruit products in shelves. 
Given this, in accordance with the predictions made in study 2 (see Figures 6 and 7), we 
expect no differences between the two contexts in the target goal condition, in terms of the 
habitual products chosen, given that the increased accessibility is expected to be sufficient for 
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the habitual products to be chosen for most participants in the new context. This is because, 
in spite of having a reduction in the perceived applicability they are compensated by an 
increase in accessibility from another different source – habitual goal priming. The difference 
is expected in the irrelevant goal condition, in which the participants in the familiar context 
are expected to choose significantly more habitual products, compared to the participants 
choosing in the new context.  
The same effect is expected for accessibility from chronicity (see Figures 6 and 7) and 
thus, we also aimed to replicate this finding from study 2, not expecting differences for strong 
habit participants between the new and the familiar context, in terms of the habitual products 
chosen. Thus, although there is a reduction in the perceived applicability, their natural 
chronically high accessibility is expected to compensate for that and influence their decision 
towards choosing the habitual product (in spite of being an unknown brand). For the weak 
habit participants, the high context perceived applicability can compensate for the low 
chronic accessibility for most of the participants, with more habitual products chosen in the 
familiar than in the new context. This should happen for the ones with an unstable (weak) 
mental presentation but not if they have no mental representation at all, which is expected to 
be the case for only a small minority.  
To assess the predictions regarding the “artificially” increased accessibility, participants 
were randomly assigned to four between-participants conditions, in an experimental design as 
follows: 2 (familiar context: high perceived applicability for milk buying habit vs. new 
context: low perceived applicability for milk buying habit) X 2(accessible milk buying goal 
vs. accessible irrelevant buying goal). 
To assess the predictions regarding the “chronic” accessibility, participants were 
randomly assigned to two between-participants and two within-participants conditions 
respectively, in an experimental design as follows: 2 (familiar context: high perceived 
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applicability for milk buying habit vs. new context: low perceived applicability for milk 
buying habit) X 2(strong vs. weak habit participants). 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants. 160 students from the University of Lisbon - given credits for their 
participation, and other participants that volunteered to participate - were offered the 
possibility of entering a draw to receive 50 Euros in CDs and DVDs, for participating. To 
participate they had to fulfill the criteria of buying food products for domestic consumption at 
least once in two weeks. For this reason, the students that participated were requested to bring 
in their parents or friends that fulfilled these criteria, if they didn’t.  
The sample consisted mainly on young adults with the majority being students, with an 
overall mean age of 21.74 years old (SD = 6.56; Min = 18; Max = 51) and the majority having 
a high school degree (89.40%) or a university degree (6.90%). A questionnaire (see 
description below) portrays them as frequent shoppers, shopping for food on an average of 
five times per month (M = 5.26, SD = 2.48). 
Procedure. Participants were asked to take part in two web-based studies, one on 
“Physical factors and consumption” and the other on “Real and virtual shopping 
environments”. These were present as two different studies, with the first trying to assess the 
importance of the placement of products in shelves and their physical characteristics to the 
consumers, and the second aimed to assess the use of the internet for selling products by 
assessing the choices people make in online decision environments. Given that there was an 
explicit connection between the study tasks in terms of the subject (consumption and decision 
making) this was done in order to reduce the perceived connection between them and for not 
be seen as the priming and decision making tasks, respectively. 
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Goal priming task. After providing their informed consent, participants were requested 
to perform a task (see Appendix XII) and told that its aim was to assess the importance of 
physical factors and the placement of products in shelves, on the decisions people make in 
supermarkets, which represented the goal accessibility manipulation. They were randomly 
attributed to one of two goal accessibility tasks (between-participants tasks): irrelevant goal 
vs. target goal. This was derived from a mathematical formula in Microsoft Excel (generation 
of random numbers between 0 and 1) and sorting of participants list by column. 
This task involved the presentation of images in individual slides (see Appendix XIII) 
through the use of the software “Slide Generator” (Tucker, 2006). For this, a link (and 
associated instructions) was provided in the webpage which allowed downloading a zip file 
containing the program, onto to the participants computer. In order to assure that all the 
images were seen and the program was run until the end, the participants were requested to 
write in the web page, the word that appeared to them in the last slide shown. After writing 
this word (which was saved on the server, allowing the confirmation of participation), they 
could continue with the experiment in the internet. 
The target (milk) buying goal accessibility condition included the presentation of 4 
target images (milk), 4 target related images (cereals; other types of dairy) and 4 general 
images (drinks; personal hygiene items; …)21
                                                 
21 All conditions had images with a dimension of 300x225 pixels and the scales approximately 742x82 pixels. 
, each of them together with a neutral scale for 
assessment of the shelves in terms of its physical features (on a 7 point scale: light-dark and 
colorful-without color). The assessment scale was used in order to oblige participants to 
process the visual information and focus their attention on the images shown and at the same 
time to mask the real aim of the task, which was to make the fruit buying goal more 
accessible. Thus, we aimed to make the milk buying goal accessible following from the 
assessment of visual contextual cues – milk and milk related products in shelves.  
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The irrelevant buying goal accessibility condition involved the presentation of 
supermarket shelves images, with 8 target images (car products and other related materials) 
and 4 general images (gardening products) with the same scale as in the target goal condition. 
None of these conditions used words associated with the concepts of “buy”, “supermarket”, 
“milk” or others that could imply a semantic priming of concepts that could influence the 
activation of habit or of other mental representations which could influence decisions. 
Moreover, the brands of the products presented in the images weren’t visible or readable in 
order to control for brand effects. 
After the accessibility manipulation task, participants performed a small web 
questionnaire both aimed to be a distraction task representing the end of the “first study” and 
at the same time to assess: 1) the 5 most frequently bought products (recall measure) by them 
(and not their family, friends or partners), with the first being the most bought and so forth; 2) 
the intention to buy a certain product from a list of 12 products in which milk and orange 
juice were included (with the other products being there just as a distraction measure). This 
question was formulated as “When do you intend to buy each of the following products?” and 
the answer comprised a 6 point scale (0 – Never; 1 – in less than 7 days; 2 – between 7 and 
15 days; 3 – between 15 and 22 days; 4 – between 22 and 30 days; 5 – in more than 30 days); 
3) the frequency of buying food products in the supermarket or other places (number of times 
per month); 4) socio-demographic measures (sex, age, school level, place of living). 
Regarding the measure of the 5 products more often bought, the aim was not only to 
assess it but also to serve as a manipulation check, in order to assess if the target goal was 
activated. Thus, it was expected that if the priming of the milk buying goal was successful, 
this can have two consequences: a) the participants in the target goal condition report milk as 
the most frequently bought product more than the participants in the irrelevant goal 
condition; b) the participants in the target goal condition report milk more often in the top 5 
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products most frequently bought than the participants in the irrelevant goal condition. This 
measure was adapted to the case of goal activation. Since that the first measure was used in a 
study by Higgins, King & Mavin (1982), in which they predicted that chronicity associated 
with a trait related construct would be present if the construct was listed first in responding to 
one or more questions. The second measure was used in a second study by the same authors, 
using the frequency of responding with the construct to different questions, instead of 
construct primacy as in the previous measure. Given that explicit measures of goal activation 
are still scarce and only recently have started to be developed in a systematic way (Förster et 
al., 2009), we decided to use this measure of construct activation and apply it here, given that 
our previous measures were based only on the effect at the output (decision) and not prior to 
it.  
Context applicability manipulation. After the goal accessibility task and the distraction 
task, participants were requested to participate in a decision making task with the same type 
of WebPages and procedure used in study 2 (see Appendix XIV). The main difference was 
that the context perceived applicability manipulation was conducted between-subjects22
                                                 
22 Although the attribution of the participants to the two conditions was random, through a function inserted in 
the HTML page, at the end of the study there were more participants in the new context (n=90) than in the 
familiar context (n=70). However, this is not considered to be a problem given that results were analysed with 
non-parametric tests (Fisher’s exact test) which take into account the different proportions.  
 and 
there were slightly different instructions from study 2. Thus, in the high perceived 
applicability task, people were asked to: “Imagine that you are at your house and have to 
prepare breakfast or lunch”. Following this they were asked to choose the product they would 
most probably buy in that context. In the low perceived applicability task, people were asked 
to: “Imagine that you are at a friend’s house in another country and have to prepare breakfast 
or lunch”. Again, they were asked to choose the product they would most probably buy in 
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that context and as in study 1 and 2, they were told that the products would be given to them 
after completion of the study.  
Final questionnaire. Finally, participants responded to a short web questionnaire, with: 
1) chosen product and chosen brand buying frequency (never, once, twice, three times, 4 or 
more times per month); 2) level of satisfaction with the choice made (5 point Likert type 
scale from not at all satisfied to extremely satisfied); 3) probability of choosing again in the 
future, the product chosen in the decision task (5 point Likert type scale from not at all 
probable to extremely probable); 4) feelings toward the choice made in the decision task (5 
point Likert type scale from very bad to very good); 5) level of influence of a list of factors 
over the participants decision in the decision task (same as in study 1, with a 5-point Likert 
type scale from “no influence at all” to “strong influence”), including among other irrelevant 
factors, their habitual behavior and price of the products (the main factors we aimed to assess 
with this). 
In the same way as we used explicit measures of goal activation (5 products bought 
more often) before the decision, we also created measures to demonstrate that the choice 
made in the decision task was a goal-directed choice. Thus, following from Förster et al. 
(2009) principles of goal activation, we used items 2, 3 and 4 of the questionnaire as different 
measures of satisfaction with the choice made. This aimed to demonstrate the principle that 
“goals involve emotion” and that goals accessibility moderate the level of emotion upon goal 
attainment (Higgins, Shah & Friedman, 1997).  According to Förster et al. (2009), when 
goals are attained, people feel happy, relieved or satisfied (with the opposite happening if 
they are not achieved) and therefore, either participants with strong habits (chronics) or 
primed with the target goal, should have higher levels of satisfaction associated with these 
three measures, compared to participants with weak habits or primed with an irrelevant goal. 
These goal attainment items also allowed the creation of what we called the “post-choice goal 
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motivation scale”, resulting from the aggregation of items 2, 3 and 4 of the questionnaire. 
Results regarding the validity measures for this scale, show a good level of reliability (α = 
.79) and high item-total correlations (with the lowest being .66). 
Additionally to these measures, we also used the SRHI measure for milk and orange 
juice buying habits (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) and a measure for the future intentions to 
buy milk and orange juice (Ajzen, 1991; 2002). Results regarding the validity measures for 
the SHRI measure, show a very good level of reliability for the milk habit measure (α = .93) 
and high item-total correlations (with the lowest being .52); and a very good level of 
reliability for the orange juice habit measure (α = .94) and high item-total correlations (with 
the lowest being .58). Results regarding the validity measures for the future intention to buy, 
show a very good level of reliability for the future intention to buy milk (α = .93) and high 
item-total correlations (with the lowest being .70); and a very good level of reliability for the 
future intention to buy orange juice (α = .96) and high item-total correlations (with the lowest 
being .82). Apart from characterizing the sample in terms of milk and orange juice buying 
habits, in the same way as for study 2, this SRHI measure also allowed the determination of 
two groups of participants – strong (high chronic accessibility) vs. weak milk buying habit 
(low chronic accessibility) - based on the lowest (Q = 2.67) and highest quartiles (Q = 4.75).  
After completion of the questionnaire, participants were thanked for their participation 
and provided with an email contact in the case they wanted additional information and/or to 
receive the study results. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Questionnaire and Manipulation Checks. Regarding the baseline characteristics of the 
sample, there is an overall moderate habit strength to what concerns milk buying (M = 3.71, 
SD = 1.44), which the paired samples t-test shows as overwhelmingly significantly higher 
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that the orange juice habit strength (M = 2.36, SD = 1.35), t(159) = 8.51, p=.000. Regarding 
the future intention to buy the products, the paired samples t-test result was also 
overwhelmingly significant, with a higher intention to buy milk in the future (M = 6.26, SD = 
1.37), than an intention to buy orange juice in the future (M = 4.50, SD = 2.02), t(157) = 8.96, 
p=.000. Additionally, there is a reported buying frequency for the product chosen of twice to 
three times a month (M = 3.33, SD = 1.34), a moderate perceived influence of habit over the 
participants decision (M = 3.38, SD = 1.32) and a low perceived influence of price over the 
participants decision (M = 2.87, SD = 1.30). Also, the sample is characterized by a high 
percentage of milk buying, with 55.1% of the participants reporting it in the top 5 products 
frequently bought (most frequently bought product: 16.90%; second most: 23.80%; third 
most: 5.60%; forth most: 4.40%; fifth most: 4.40%). Moreover, the participants report 
intending to buy milk on average between the week in which they participated in the task and 
the following week (M = 1.38, SD = 9.06)23
The manipulation checks regarding the goal activation showed that there are no 
differences in the percentage of milk choice within the top 5 products most frequently 
bought, between the target vs. irrelevant goal conditions. Also, there are no differences 
between the target vs. irrelevant goal conditions, regarding the percentage of milk chosen as 
the most frequently product bought, i.e., as the first in the top 5. Additionally, the 
independent samples t-test results show no significant differences between the two goal 
priming conditions in the SRHI for milk and orange juice, in the intentions to buy orange 
juice and milk in the future, in the reported buying frequency for the product chosen and level 
of influence of habit and price over the participants decision. 
.  
                                                 
23 This was measured in a scale in which 0 represented “never”, 1 represented “to buy in less than 7 days” and 2 
represented “to buy between 7 and 15 days”. 
157 
 
Concerning the two chronic accessibility conditions (strong vs. weak habit), the 
independent samples t-test results show no significant differences between them in the SRHI 
and intentions to buy orange juice and in the level of influence of habit and price over the 
participants decision. Significant differences were found for the intentions to buy milk in the 
future (strong habit: M = 6.89, SD = .31; weak habit: M = 5.19, SD = 1.99), t(80) = 5.37, p = 
.000, d = 1.2, and in the reported buying frequency for the product chosen (strong habit: M = 
4.00, SD = 1.16; weak habit: M = 2.88, SD = 1.44), t(80) = 3.88, p = .000, d = .86. 
Regarding the two perceived applicability conditions (familiar and new context), the 
independent samples t-test results show no significant differences between them in the SHRI 
for milk and orange juice, in the reported buying frequency for the product chosen, in the 
intentions to buy orange juice and to buy milk in the future. Significant differences were 
found for the level of influence of habit (familiar context: M = 3.77, SD = 1.28; new context: 
M = 3.08, SD = 1.27), t(158) = 3.41, p = .001, d = .54, and price (familiar context: M = 2.60, 
SD = 1.30; new context: M = 3.08, SD = 1.27), t(158) = 2.33, p = .021, d = .38, over the 
participants decision. 
To what concerns the goal attainment items and the goal motivation scale, results show 
no significant differences between the target vs. irrelevant goal conditions for the level of 
satisfaction with the choice made, probability of choosing again in the future the product 
chosen, in the feelings toward the choice made in the decision task and in the goal motivation 
scale.  
In respect to the goal attainment items and the goal motivation scale for the strong and 
weak habit participants, results show no significant differences in the level of satisfaction 
with the choice made and in the probability of choosing again in the future the product 
chosen. A marginally significant difference was found in the feelings toward the choice made 
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in the decision task (strong habit: M = 3.90, SD = .77; weak habit: M = 3.60, SD = .70), t(81) 
= 1.90, p = .060, d = .41. 
With regard to the differences between the participants deciding in the familiar context 
and the participants which did that for the new context, the goal attainment items and the goal 
motivation scale show significant differences for the level of satisfaction with the choice 
made (familiar context: M = 4.10, SD = .88; new context: M = 3.54, SD = .84), t(157) = 4.07, 
p=.000, d = .66, probability of choosing again in the future the product chosen (familiar 
context: M = 3.66, SD = 1.10; new context: M = 2.74, SD = 1.13), t(158) = 5.13, p=.000, d = 
.83 and in the feelings toward the choice made in the decision task (familiar context: M = 
3.90, SD = .78; new context: M = 3.49, SD = .74), t(158) = 3.40, p = .001, d = .54.  
For the goal motivation scale, ANOVA results show a main effect for applicability with 
a higher result obtained for the participants choosing in the familiar context (M = 3.88, SD = 
.82), compared to the participants choosing in the new context (M = 3.26, SD = .72), F(1, 79) 
= 11.09, p = .001, d = .81; and an interaction effect between applicability and chronicity F(1, 
79) = 6.26, p = .014, with post-hoc analysis showing a higher result for the strong habit 
participants that decided in the familiar context (M = 4.21, SD = .69) compared to the strong 
habit participants that decided in the new context (M = 3.26, SD = .77), p = .000, d = 1.34, 
and a higher result for the strong habit participants that decided in the familiar context (M = 
4.21, SD = .69) compared to the weak habit participants that decided in the same context (M 
= 3.55, SD = .82), p = .007, d = .89; with no significant results for the other interactions. No 
significant main effect was found for chronicity. 
Finally, the comparison of the SRHI results for the milk buying habit from study 2 (M = 
4.26, SD = 1.43) and the present study (M = 3.71, SD = 1.44), shows that the latter is 
significantly lower than the former t(318) = 3.41, p = .001, d = .38. No significant differences 
are found for the orange juice habit. 
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Decision Making Task. Binomial test results for the choice in the familiar context show 
no significant differences between the proportion of the habitual product chosen (.56) and an 
expected proportion that would have been obtained by chance24
To what concerns the differences in the habitual product choice between the familiar 
and new context (see Table 18), Fisher’s Exact test results show that there is a higher 
proportion of habitual products chosen in the familiar context (.58) compared to the new 
context (.39) (p = .025; Fisher’s exact test).  
 (.50). For the new context, 
there is an almost marginally significantly higher proportion of the non-habitual product 
chosen (.61), than an expected proportion that would have been obtained by chance (.50) (p = 
.045; Binomial). 
 
Table 18 - Differences between the familiar and new context choice frequencies with Fisher’s 
Exact test 
 Habitual 
Non-
habitual 
Habitual product 
proportion. 
One-tailed 
(right) 
Familiar context 39 31 .58 
p = .025 
New context 35 55 .39 
 
Fisher’s Exact test results regarding the differences between contexts in the choice of 
habitual products for the target goal (see Table 19), show a marginally significant difference 
with a higher proportion of habitual products chosen in the familiar context than in the new 
context. For the irrelevant goal condition the result is identical to the previous condition 
although being non-significant. This difference in significance in spite of the almost equal 
proportions can be attributed to the small n. 
                                                 
24 With this representing the actual proportion existent in the choice list for the first decision. 
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Table 19 - Differences in frequencies between the two goal priming conditions with Fisher’s 
Exact test, for each type of context  
 Habitual 
Non-
habitual 
Habitual product 
proportion. 
One-tailed  
(right) 
Target goal (Fam) 23 18 .56 
p = .086 
Target goal (New) 18 28 .39 
Irrelevant goal (Fam) 16 13 .55 
p = .125 
Irrelevant goal (New) 17 27 .39 
 
Finally, Fisher’s Exact test results regarding the differences between contexts in the 
choice of habitual products for the weak habit participants (see Table 20), show that there are 
no significant differences. Regarding the strong habit participants, there is a significantly 
higher proportion of habitual products chosen in the familiar context (.77) compared to the 
new context (.33) (p = .004; Fisher’s exact test).   
 
Table 20 - Differences in frequencies between the strong and weak habit participants with 
Fisher’s Exact test, for each type of context  
 Habitual Non-habitual 
Habitual product 
proportion. 
One-tailed  
(right) 
Strong habit (Fam) 17 5 .77 
p = .048 
Strong habit (New) 9 10 .47 
Weak habit (Fam) 7 14 .33 
p = .500 
Weak habit (New) 6 15 .27 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Regarding the perceived applicability effect, we expected a replication of the results 
obtained in the previous studies, which was refuted. Accordingly, participants in the familiar 
context chose in a way close to chance and the participants in the new context chose more 
organics than chance, although this being almost marginally significant. In spite of this, 
results still show that more habitual products were chosen in the familiar than in the new 
context, independently of the accessibility manipulations.  
Moreover, the measures of goal motivation as evidence of a goal-directed choice 
(Förster et al., 2009) show differences between the participants that chose in the familiar and 
those who did it in the new context. Participants who made decisions in the familiar context 
were significantly more satisfied with the choice made, had a higher perceived probability of 
choosing the same product again in the future, felt better with their choice and had an overall 
higher goal motivation, compared to the participants who decided in the new context. Given 
that we acknowledge that the goal activation happened in both contexts due to the prime of 
goals through means, these results indicate that its attainment was more facilitated in the 
familiar than in the new context. This is in accordance with Higgins et al. (1997) who 
consider that goal accessibility moderates the level of emotion upon goal attainment (higher 
accessibility implies a higher level of emotion when the goal is attained). Thus, given that the 
participants felt better and were more satisfied with their choice (goal attainment) in the 
familiar context, according to these authors, this might be evidence that the habitual goal was 
more accessible in that context. Although this type of measures are still being developed 
(Förster et al., 2009) and need further assessment in terms of their validity in future studies, 
nevertheless they seem to support the argument we made before since the results demonstrate 
a motivational effect rather than a cognitive effect based only on brand or product priming. 
162 
 
To what concerns the hypothesis regarding the visual goal priming effect, which aimed 
to test the same hypothesis advanced in study 2 but in this case with a different methodology, 
the results show it is refuted. Differently from study 2, we tried to use a methodology which 
could overcome the critics regarding the possibility of involving procedural priming instead 
of goal priming or a procedure that allowed for goal suppression. At the same time, the 
methodology used in the present study aimed to reduce the priming awareness and 
consequently the possibility that for some of the people, contrast effects emerged. This was 
not accomplished and there is no evidence of goal activation, which in our view wasn’t due to 
contrast effects or goal suppression but rather to a methodological failure in doing this, as 
evidenced by some results regarding the manipulation checks.  
First, the checks of goal activation based on recall measures show that there are no 
differences between the goal priming conditions regarding the recall of milk as the most 
bought product or the most often recollected product in the top 5 of products frequently 
bought and thus, there is no evidence that the mental construct was activated (Higgins et al., 
1982). Second, the expectance of no differences in the products chosen in the familiar and 
new contexts, for the irrelevant buying goal priming and of more habitual products chosen in 
the familiar context for the milk goal priming, is refuted and there is no evidence of a goal 
priming effect but only of a perceived applicability effect. Moreover, this also shows that the 
failure was due to the methodology and not to a suppression effect given that in study 2 
differences were still found between the two conditions, although not in the expected 
direction. Third, differences between these conditions regarding the measures of goal 
attainment and the goal motivation scale, as evidence of a goal-directed choice (Förster et al., 
2009) aren’t found.  
To our knowledge, this visual priming effect wasn’t yet explicitly demonstrated in the 
habit research literature. Consequently, a methodology that demonstrates the supraliminal 
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(visual) goal priming effect remains in need of being developed. On one side, this 
methodology could involve a subliminal visual priming of the products through images, in 
the same way that in Consumer Psychology is done for brand priming (Coates, Butler & 
Berry, 2006), and thus evaluate if these images haven an influence over choices, in the same 
was as logos or symbols associated with certain products (e.g. Tang, Fryxell & Chow, 2004). 
On another side, it could involve the supraliminal presentation of the actual products instead 
of the product shelves or even a manipulation of the physical characteristics of the shelves 
(background, position of the products, etc.), in order to make the products or associated cues 
more visually salient (following the same idea used by Mandel & Johson (2002) for web 
environments) – implying an “incidental” context manipulation. In every case, this 
methodology should involve a pre-test to assess if the manipulation has an effect, which 
lacked in our study (for the visual priming manipulation). 
Regarding the interaction between the perceived applicability effect and chronicity, we 
expected a replication of the results obtained in study 2. Results show that this hypothesis is 
refuted. This happens because strong habit participants chose more habitual products in the 
familiar context than the strong habit participants in the new context. Also, there are no 
differences between contexts to what concerns the weak habit participants. In our view, this 
can be explained by the fact that in this study, habit was significantly weaker than in study 2, 
which prevented the results from being replicated. This is consistent with the results given 
that, for the weak habit participants the mental representation would have been too unstable 
or even non-existent for the context perceived applicability to have an influence over their 
decisions. At the same time, given that for the strong habit participants the mental 
representation wouldn’t be so strong then they would be closer to the weak habit participants 
from study 2 than to the strong habit participants. Accordingly, the results for the strong habit 
participants in the present study replicated the results for the weak habit participants in study 
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2. In other words, given the weaker mental representation of the strong habit participants in 
the present study, it wasn’t enough to maintain choice consistency between contexts and 
allow for a higher choice of habitual products in the new context, compared to the weak habit 
participants.  
Nevertheless, there is still evidence that the goal was activated for the strong habit 
participants but not for the weak habit participants, given that they felt slightly better about 
their choice compared to the latter, which might indicate goal accessibility was higher for the 
former (Higgins et al., 1997). At the same time this might also be evidence that this mental 
representation was not strong enough given that there are no differences in the satisfaction 
with the choice or the probability of choosing the product again in the future.  
However, it should be noted that this concerns the overall results for the strong and 
weak habit participant’s main effects. If we consider the interaction between applicability and 
chronicity, a clear picture appears. In fact, the goal motivation scale results showed a higher 
post-choice goal motivation for the strong habit participants deciding in the familiar context, 
compared to the ones deciding in the new context, with the same not happening for the weak 
habit participants. Therefore, we infer that strong habit participants were “aided” by the 
activation resulting from the higher perceived applicability in the familiar context and were 
the ones with higher goal activation level. This is because they were the ones with the higher 
post-choice goal motivation, which might also indicate that more than a cognitive effect we 
are in the presence of a motivation effect resulting from goal activation and attainment 
(Förster et al., 2009), given that differences in the choices were also associated with 
differences in the goal motivation dimensions. 
Overall, in accordance with study 2 there might be evidence that when mental 
representations are not strong (no naturally high chronic accessibility or accessibility due to 
goal priming), people are more influenced by context and thus, are more susceptible for their 
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habit to be disrupted, than people with strong habits. Thus, it seems that the prediction that 
the decision processes change with context changes (Verplanken et al., 2008) and that habit is 
disrupted in new and unfamiliar contexts (Neal et al., 2006; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Wood 
& Neal, 2007; Wood et al., 2005) seems to hold. However, this seems to be the case only 
when habits are not strong enough (high activation potential) to resist context changes and 
thus for habit transference to occur between contexts. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Our main argument across the three studies, was that even though habits are a particular 
type of mental constructs involving goal activation (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Wood & 
Neal, 2007), they share some characteristics with other types of mental constructs such as 
stereotypes for example (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000), with one of them being their dynamism 
(see Garcia-Marques et al., 2006). Consequently, we argue against classical views of habit in 
which the situation’s influence over behavior is direct (as simple S-R responses; see Aarts & 
Custers, 2009) by considering that the situations effect over behavior is mediated by 
psychological factors. Moreover, we argue against the idea that the repetition of the same 
behaviors in the same contexts should elicit the habitual behavior over and over. 
Accordingly, if the context changes and becomes new, unfamiliar and/or unstable, habit 
should be disrupted as predicted by the habit discontinuity hypothesis (see Verplanken et al., 
2008). Differently, we consider that even if the context changes, the habitual behavior can 
still occur, as long as some conditions are maintained – which we can call the habit 
transference hypothesis. 
To demonstrate this, we based our predictions on results from Social Psychology in 
general and Social Cognition in particular, in terms of the mental constructs activation rules 
(Higgins, 1989; 1996; Higgins & Brendl, 1995) and Goal Systems Theory (Kruglanski et al., 
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2002), which we considered a basis for showing habits dynamic properties. In this line of 
research, mental constructs activation is predicted to occur given the presence of two 
psychological factors: 1) cognitive accessibility of the construct, i.e., high readiness to be 
used at output (i.e., behavior; Higgins & Brendl, 1995); 2) applicability of the construct to the 
context, i.e., the greater the overlap between the features of a knowledge structure and the 
features of a stimulus or the context that is presented to us, the greater that construct’s 
perceived applicability to that stimulus or context (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). 
Although evidence of accessibility effects regarding habits has been shown (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000) the same cannot be said about evidence of applicability effects in an 
automatic and unconscious way (see Higgins, 1996). The few examples that exist concern a 
more conscious judgment which can be considered perceived applicability or judged usability 
effects - perceived relevance and appropriateness of the stored knowledge for use in a given 
context (Higgins, 1989; 1996). Nevertheless, neither the goal-dependent or goal-independent 
views acknowledges explicitly the role of mental constructs applicability although it can be 
inferred from the results of Wood et al. (2005), as a demonstration of perceived applicability. 
This perceived applicability effect was demonstrated in our first study, which showed 
that it was not the mere presence of perceived situational “barriers” to the choice of organic 
food like price and availability of the products (which were maintained constant in the choice 
tasks) that determined the habitual behavior of buying non-organic milk. What determined 
behavior were psychological processes, with differences in results being explained by 
familiarity. This familiarity implied that the means in the choice context would be recognized 
and perceived as frequently pursued means (product brands) to attain the goal to buy a certain 
product. Given this, there is a high probability of at least one or more product having been 
bought in the past (and thus be part of the choice set) or at least having been considered for 
choice (being part of the consideration set; Shocker et al., 1991) and thus be mentally 
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represented, i.e., there is a high probability of a partial or complete overlap between the 
means present in the choice context and the means existent in the goal system associated with 
the habit mental representation. Consequently, perception is expected to determine the 
application of this cognitive information to the decision situation. Accordingly, in the familiar 
context there is a higher perceived applicability - higher perceived match between the 
mentally represented goal and linked means and the means existent in the choice context - 
which increases the probability that the milk buying goal is attained by choosing the non-
organic means. Accordingly, study 1 results showed that means associated with habit (non-
organic milk) were more chosen in the familiar than in the new context. Study 2 and 3 also 
supported this effect, showing that the habitual product (instead of a non-habitual product) 
was chosen more in a familiar context than in a new context, regardless of other experimental 
manipulations.  
In our view, this is explained by the fact that the buying goal increased accessibility 
from the means present in the choice context benefited from a perceived applicability effect 
in a familiar context, in which the mean-goal cognitive association is inferred to be stronger 
for the non-organic means (study 1) or habitual means (study 2 and 3), given a past co-
occurrence in similar choice situations. This effect occurred even when other alternative and 
competing means were presented (non-organic milk buying means in study 1 and orange 
juice buying means in study 2 and 3). This effect wasn’t strong in a new and unfamiliar 
context given that the means presented didn’t frequently co-occur in the past with the milk 
buying goal activation and thus, the context’s applicability is perceived as lower. Although 
not being explicitly acknowledged in the Goal Systems Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002) 
these effects can easily be included in it, by adding a concept not explicitly identified or 
studied in behavioral goals and habit research – decision context familiarity. 
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Although these results showed that the context’s influence over behavior is not direct 
but mediated by psychological processes by means of a perceived applicability effect, they 
are not enough to demonstrate habits dynamic properties. For this, the accessibility of the 
mental representation of habit must also be shown as an important determinant of habitual 
behavior and moreover the effect of its interaction with context perceived applicability. 
Accordingly, a demonstration that is still lacking on habits research regards the interaction 
between accessibility and applicability (either actual or perceived applicability), which we 
also aimed to show. Thus, in our view habit is a dynamic mental representation that has been 
underestimated given that under certain conditions it can compensate for contextual changes. 
These contextual changes, as we define them, refer to changes in the “essential” 
features of the context – relevant to the decision, being in our studies considered as the means 
to attain the goals – and not changes in the “incidental” features (e.g.: physical characteristics 
of the online shopping environment and of a supermarket environment; presence or absence 
of people that usually accompany us for shopping; etc.). In this regard, the definition of what 
can be considered context changes is very important for behavioral change interventions on 
one side and for research on habits on the other side. This is because misconceptions 
concerning what is a context change have led to habits being portrayed as rigid mental 
representations, which results from the fact that habit can be seen as associated with certain 
context features when in fact can be associated to others. For example, changes in price and 
availability of organic products can be seen as a way to change non-organic buying habits, 
when in fact they can be associated with other contextual features such as the presence of 
means to attain the goal associated with the habit. In our studies, we considered that habit 
could be maintained given that these means to attain the goal could still be used even if they 
were unfamiliar, This resulted from equifinality in the goal system mentally represented 
and/or means substitution (Kruglanski et al., 2002) which allowed the strong habit 
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participants in study 2 for example, to “resist” the changes in the “essential” contextual 
features. In other words, this can occur as long as the chronic accessibility or accessibility 
due to priming is high enough to maintain itself through the context changes, which was 
demonstrated in study 2. In this study, participants characterized as having strong habits (high 
chronic accessibility) maintained consistency in the habitual product (milk) choice, even 
when there was low context perceived applicability, .i.e., when the context became new and 
unfamiliar. Although we analyzed perceived applicability and not actual applicability of the 
mental construct, still we think this is in accordance with one of the mental constructs 
activation rules: “strong accessibility can compensate for weak applicability” (Higgins & 
Brendl, 1995), which to our knowledge had not been demonstrated in habit research. 
Moreover, the dynamic properties of habit were also demonstrated in study 1, in which 
consistency in the choice of non-organic products (habitual products) was found within-
participants choices. In this study, most of the participants maintained their choice over three 
decisions, even though there were changes in the decision context (decrease in perceived 
applicability) which constrained more that choice from one decision to the next, given that 
the same product chosen before couldn’t be chosen again. This consistency between choices 
made by the same participants happened mainly for choices in the familiar context, which is 
consistent with a dynamic view of habit, given that the contribution both from accessibility 
and perceived applicability was enough to maintain the choice over the decisions. This is not 
in disagreement with the results found in the self-regulation literature in which it would be 
expected that goal activation would be suppressed after deciding in the first choice (Förster et 
al., 2005; Förster et al., 2009). Although in our view this might have happened for a small 
number of the participants which revised their choice in the familiar context (only between 
the first and second decisions), for most of them goal activation might have been maintained. 
Therefore, in our view suppression might happen when there is no alternative available mean 
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that allows for goal-attainment. Consequently, our prediction was that the goal activation can 
maintain itself overtime given that other means are still available to achieve the same goal 
(equifinality in goal systems; Kruglanski et al., 2002). Nevertheless, it is interesting to see 
that even in the new context there was some consistency in the non-organic choice between 
decisions. This goes against the habit discontinuity hypothesis, given that in spite of the 
context changes - i.e., habit becoming less applicable, given that if it was chosen in the 
previous choice fewer options were available in the second, to choose according with it – 
consistency in the habit was still achieved by some participants. Thus, the “window” of 
opportunity to deliberate, as predicted by the habit discontinuity hypothesis (Verplanken & 
Wood, 2006; Verplanken et al., 2008), was actually “closed” by the participants. 
As we said before, this habit effect is dependent on a high accessibility of the habit 
mental representation (involving a mental representation of the goal system). Thus, even if 
the habitual mean (e.g. the habitual brand) is not present, the fact that the habitual product is 
still present in the new context might be sufficient to choose it, as long as there is a high 
accessibility of the associated goal. This could explain why the choice is still biased towards 
choosing the habitual product in the new context given that, since perceived applicability is 
low, the most logical reason for the bias is that it comes from the high accessibility. In 
support of this, results from study 2 and 3 showed that when there is no naturally high 
chronic accessibility (i.e., when there is a weak habit), people are more influenced by context 
and thus, more susceptible for their habit to be disrupted, i.e., they choose consistently with 
their habit in the familiar context but this consistency ceases to exist when they have to 
choose in the new context. Thus, when habits are not strong enough (low accessibility) they 
cannot resist context changes and habit transference between contexts doesn’t occur, as 
shown in study 3 for the (not so) strong habit participants. Under this condition, the 
prediction that the decision processes change when context changes (Verplanken et al., 
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2008), which causes habit to be disrupted when this context becomes new and unfamiliar 
(Neal et al., 2006; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Wood & Neal, 2007; Wood et al., 2005) seems 
to hold. 
To what concerns the effect of goal accessibility from priming, we failed to demonstrate 
it and to support the prediction that “strong accessibility can compensate for weak 
applicability” (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). In our view, this had to do with a goal inhibition 
effect which suppressed its activation. Accordingly, study 2 showed that by making people 
simulate their behavior might allow for both goal activation and goal attainment. This has a 
different effect when there is a strong vs. weak habit. Results seem to indicate a pattern in 
which goal suppression happens for the former and goal facilitation happens for the latter (for 
which an unstable or weak goal system is inferred to have become stronger following from 
goal priming). In spite of our research not being sufficient to explicitly demonstrate what the 
cause of this effect was and further research is needed to address this specific issue, it still 
demonstrates an effect that to our knowledge hasn’t been found in habit research and 
therefore should be more studied in the future. Specifically it showed that habits are also 
prone to the same type of suppression effects demonstrated for other types of goals not 
associated with habitual behavior (Liberman et al., 2007; Förster et al., 2005). Since goals are 
an important component of self-regulation and monitoring processes, it should not be 
surprising that suppression effects can also happen in the case of goals associated with habits, 
given that to attain a goal sometimes we need to suppress other alternative and competing 
goals or means (Kruglanski et al., 2002). As far as we know, this suppression effect due to 
goal priming wasn’t yet demonstrated on habit research in particular and is therefore 
necessary to develop additional studies to understand the processes involved. 
Overall, these studies raise some important questions regarding the pre-conditions that 
allow for habit to influence behavior, and specifically showed context’s perceived 
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applicability (concerning familiarity) and habit accessibility as important factors in this sense. 
However, studies assessing “automatic” applicability without the perceived component 
(subjective utility) should also be performed, given that this effect remains to be 
demonstrated in habit research. Another aspect that should be taken into consideration is that 
our studies involved short term responses. Thus, although study 1 analyzed habit transference 
over three responses within the same context, this is not enough to demonstrate the long-term 
effects of habits regarding the interaction between context perceived applicability and 
accessibility. This could be accomplished through a longitudinal methodology in which the 
habits effect and the influence of context conditions (e.g. context stability) and accessibility 
could all be assessed within-participants overtime.  
Moreover, regarding the measures used in our studies, it should be noted that all of our 
measures of goal activation and habitual behavior were explicit. This can be argued as a 
failure in demonstrating automatic processes given that only implicit measures could tap into 
these processes associated with habit and goal activation, for example through a measure of 
response speed in the familiar vs. the new context. However, in our view this is not a problem 
given that we still showed either through the results or some of the manipulation checks that a 
motivational effect from goal activation was indeed involved and not semantic or procedural 
priming (Förster et al., 2009). Also, the SRHI measure of habit strength used to create the 
weak and strong habit groups has proven to possess discriminant validity regarding other 
implicit measures of habit (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). Nevertheless, future studies should 
include this type of measures and also test the effect of subliminal goal priming in producing 
the same type of results found here. The expectance is that an increase in goal accessibility 
from subliminal priming will produce the same results as the chronicity effect (see e.g. 
Higgins, 1996), regarding the consistency within habitual product choice and consistency 
between contexts. 
173 
 
Finally, despite of our view of habits being closer to the goal-dependent perspective 
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000), we didn’t aim to support this over the goal-independent view 
with our studies (Wood & Neal, 2007), i.e., to demonstrate if goals have a mediating or 
moderating role. What we aimed to demonstrate was that goals are important to respond to 
the question: Do habits involve a rigid mental representation dependent only on the context or 
do they involve a flexible and dynamic mental representation resulting from an interaction 
between the context and behavioral goals? We think our studies represent a contribution to 
answer this question given that our results are best explained by means of a motivational 
effect based on the existence of mentally represented goal systems and their structural and 
functional properties (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Thus even if goals don’t mediated the 
decisions of participants in our studies and given that we didn’t demonstrate this mediating 
role, still we showed that they are important “aids” for habits dynamism. This dynamism was 
demonstrated by1) habit transference between contexts (from a familiar to an unfamiliar 
context), which we inferred to be associated with a means substitution process and 2) habit 
transference between decisions (with habitual choice being consistent over three decisions, in 
spite of a reduction in perceived applicability), which we inferred to be associated with a 
equifinality in the goal system mentally represented. Moreover, differences in decisions 
matched differences in goal motivation and habit strength, and are not consistent with an 
explanation in terms of a semantic effect (due to the priming of the word “milk”) or a 
cognitive effect (brand). Accordingly, if we were in presence of a semantic effect, then we 
shouldn’t expect differences between contexts, given that the word milk was equally present 
in both and also all participants were equally primed with the word milk (before the decision 
making tasks, when the product category appeared; see method section). Also, if we were in 
presence of a cognitive effect, we shouldn’t expect decisions in accordance with habit in the 
new context (with unfamiliar brands). However, we demonstrated that habit was still 
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followed in the new context for strong habit participants, which shows that if people are 
motivated towards attaining a certain goal, this goal will be attained even if the habitual brand 
is not present our was already chosen in a previous choice. 
All these processes are not explicitly included in theoretical principles (namely in the 
Goals Systems Theory; Kruglanski et al., 2002) but they actually match the processes that 
occur in real life. In everyday decisions, people frequently encounter changes in the 
decisional contexts, such as for example: 1) being confronted with the absence of their 
habitual product in the supermarket or local store shelf (or even in the online shopping 
webpage); 2) having to relocate to a geographical and culturally different context in which 
the habitual options are no longer present or are different (e.g. moving to another country or 
city); 3) changes in the choice context characteristics associated with the habitual product, 
such as an increase in the social pressure towards the choice of alternative products (e.g. the 
organic alternative) or other changes. Despite of these changes, we view consumers and 
decision makers in general (e.g. in the recycling behavior domain) as adaptive decision 
makers (Palma-Oliveira, 1995; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993) who can surpass certain 
contextual changes. This is in opposition with the view in which they are “machines” that 
stop working if their “habitual fuel” is spent and cannot use any fuel other than this, without 
causing problems to the machine. 
Other studies should be done regarding the demonstration of habits dynamic properties 
and the identification of other important preconditions of its activation, which can work either 
as a barriers or facilitators to a conscious and intentional mediation to behave in an 
environmentally friendly way. Still, we think our work has implications for various areas of 
human behavior research and specifically to Environmental and Consumer Psychology, since 
we showed that habit can be influenced by the choice context, working either as an 
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unconscious barrier 25
In order to change a “frozen” habit individuals need to invest in a long-term self-
regulatory effort to resist the temptation of falling prey to it. Our results indicate that habit 
has been underestimated given that it is a dynamic mental representation that when strong, 
can adapt to certain contextual changes. Interventions aimed at disrupting habits should take 
this into consideration and develop self-regulatory competency (Fraijo-Sing, Corral-Verdugo, 
Tapia-Fonllem & González-Lomelí, in press) in order for these to be successful. Results from 
study 2 seem to indicate that by making people aware of their habits we can constrain their 
negative effect by suppressing goal activation. This is a new finding not found in the 
literature regarding habitual behavior change and still needs further study regarding the 
conditions in which this can take place. Nevertheless, we think this is a starting point for 
increasing the success of intentional proenvironmental behaviors development and to 
“vaccinate” people to resist the temptations of which influence they are not aware. 
 by almost completely inhibiting the choice of organic products - study 
1 - or as an unconscious constraint on the choice of a non-habitual product - study 2 and 3 
(which for example can have implications for projects aimed at promoting the installation of 
new energy efficient devices or to the promotion of new types of products, such as fair trade, 
ecological or recyclable).  
 
                                                 
25 For definitions and differences between the concepts of unconscious barriers and constraints, see chapter 1. 
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Chapter 3 
HABITS VS. IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS: INHIBITIVE AND 
FACILITATIVE CONDITIONS 
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Even when an individual has the intention to behave in a proenvironmental way, there 
can be various barriers and constraints to the implementation of this intention into action. 
These barriers and constraints can have their effect mediated by perception or with reduced 
awareness and consciousness. Their presence can prevent the operation of a goal intention26
This could be avoided if we designed strategies for shielding individuals from the 
influence of anti-environmental goals (“temptations” and “bad habits”), i.e., activating focal 
goals to which the individual is committed and has the intention to pursue (development of 
“good habits”), in order to inhibit the accessibility of alternative goals (Shah, Friedman & 
Kruglanski, 2002). These strategies are still lacking in the literature regarding environmental 
behavior (for exceptions, see Bamberg, 2000; 2002a; 2002b; Holland, Aarts & Langendam, 
2006) with most examples being taken from research in Social Psychology in the last few 
decades. One of the strategies that can be used with this aim is the development of 
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). 
 
(e.g. “I intend to buy organic food”) or performance of goal directed behavior from 
occurring. This can take place because these barriers and constraints can interfere/inhibit a 
proenvironmental goal and/or increase the activation strength of an anti-environmental 
behavioral goal (e.g. “Buy non-organic food”) (see chapter 1 and 2).  
Some authors argue that the predictive value of a goal intention and its effective 
translation into action depends on the formation of a subsequent implementation intention, 
which is causally closer to the decision to perform a behavior (Bamberg, 2002; Rise, 
Thompson & Verplanken, 2003). In this sense, implementation intentions have more 
predictive value than general goal-intentions as they specify what is needed to perform the 
                                                 
26 I.e. the intention to achieve a goal, with goal being defined as an internal representation of a desired state, 
such as a behaviour or outcome (Aarts & Custers, 2009). 
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behavior, which means that stronger implementation intentions will increase the probability 
of performing the behavior (Bamberg, 2002; Gollwitzer, 1999; Sheeran, Webb & Gollwitzer, 
2005).  
Implementation intentions follow from goal-intentions and involve a planning process 
specifying that “when situation Y arises, I will perform response X” (e.g. “when I am in the 
dairy section, I will buy organic milk”), linking a critical situation (situation Y) with a goal 
directed behavior (response X) (Schweiger Gallo & Gollwitzer, 2007). This planning 
includes the “when”, “where” and “how” the responses will allow the attainment of the goal, 
i.e., behaving or deciding in accordance with the goal (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). The 
formation of implementation intentions with this type of planning implies that the expectation 
of encountering situation Y in the future makes the mental representation of it more 
cognitively accessible (due to an increase in its activation strength). This heightened 
accessibility in turn, facilitates the selective attention involved in the detection of the 
presence of situation Y in the surrounding environment and thus the individual readily 
responds to it (response X) whenever it is detected (Aarts, Dijksterhuis & Midden, 1999; 
Gollwitzer, Bayer & McCulloch, 2005). 
The power of implementation intentions comes from the fact that they can artificially 
and temporarily simulate the automaticity characteristic of habitual behaviors (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000). Thus, under certain conditions, the frequent implementation of an 
intention in a given situation creates a goal-action link, which can be activated in the presence 
of the relevant environmental cues. This process underlies the formation of “natural” habits, 
which some authors consider goal-directed automatic behaviors that are mentally represented 
(as knowledge structures; Higgins 1989) and can be triggered by environmental cues (Aarts, 
Verplanken & van Knippenberg 1998; Verplanken, Aarts & van Knippenberg 1997). Hence, 
a habit exists when the activation of a certain goal (e.g. buy non-organic milk) from the 
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relevant situational cues (e.g. products in the supermarket shelves), automatically elicits the 
cognitively associated action (e.g. choose the habitual non-organic milk brand). Following 
from this, either “natural” habits or implementation intentions can be seen as a form of goal-
dependent automaticity, as this type of automaticity requires an initial past or present 
intention or act of will for a goal to be activated (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Thus, before 
automaticity is achieved, an effective goal-directed behavior to attain our goal intention 
should be chosen and linked to a selected critical situation (Gollwitzer et al., 2005), therefore 
creating the goal-action link. The difference is that while for habits this occurs naturally, for 
implementation intentions this is achieved “artificially” (thus, promoting “artificial” habits).  
The way in which implementation intentions can acquire automaticity characteristics 
involved in habits activation and operation is demonstrated in the dual process model of 
behavioral goal activation (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). According to it, the cognitive and 
motivational processes that take place prior to goal operation and the way in which the 
behavioral goal is activated can vary depending on two preconditions: 1) Triggered by a 
conscious and intentional mediation or an act of will (e.g., as in the case of athletic skills), 
which corresponds to an intended goal-dependent automaticity; 2) Triggered automatically by 
environmental features, unintentionally and without awareness (e.g. stopping the car when 
the red sign appears without a conscious decision to do it), which corresponds to an 
unintended goal-dependent automaticity. 
Given this, with a frequent implementation of the same intentions and decisions in the 
same contexts (i.e., the more familiar and stable they are), the operation of the goal becomes 
automatic, as represented by the first type of activation. However, a reduction of 
consciousness can take place, which means that control is passed from the individual onto the 
environment (conferring a higher relative weight to the environment’s influence), as 
represented by the second type of activation (Gollwitzer, 1999). In other words, the first type 
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of activation can lead to the second, depending on the frequency and consistency of the 
activation and operation of the same goals in the same contexts (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  
Summarizing, due to similarity in terms of the processes involved, it is argued that 
implementation intentions and habits are similar constructs in terms of structure and 
activation from context (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000), the difference being that the former are 
temporary (“artificially” created) and the latter are “chronic” (created naturally overtime). 
Accordingly, research by Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2000; experiment 2) showed that when the 
goal associated with a habit and the goal associated with an implementation intention are the 
same, their consequences (i.e., goal operation) are also the same.  
More recently, Papies, Aarts & DeVries (2009) showed that, although in the beginning 
these cue-behavior cognitive associations are important for the goal directed behavior to be 
attained, the effect of implementation intentions in the long run goes beyond these 
associations. The fact that by planning, people are asked to imagine the critical situation and 
formulate a behavior that responds to it and thus, envision the behavior that they should have 
in the future, is the defining key to make these goal-directed associations stronger. Thus, 
according to the authors, a mere learning of this association without this, wouldn’t be enough 
to promote the desired behavior in the long run, and this imagination and future behavior 
simulation is necessary for implementation intentions to be effective. This was demonstrated 
in their longitudinal study, which involved a comparison between a control condition, an 
associative learning condition and an implementation intentions condition, in different 
moments in time. Results showed that although initially both the associative learning 
condition and implementation intentions condition had the same effects, only the latter 
demonstrated long-lasting behavioral effects (one week after the intervention). The 
implication of this is that the procedures and time involved in this cue-behavior association 
are some of the factors that determine if they are successful. However, these cue-behavior 
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associations can also be more or less constrained, depending on the context where the 
behavior takes place and these are also factors that should be taken into consideration. The 
way in which the cognitive changes involved in the planning associated with implementation 
intentions can be inhibited/constrained or facilitated by the context, is the aim of the studies 
to be presented in this chapter. However, we first need to understand the different conditions 
that can induce these inhibitions/constraints or the facilitative effects. 
 
WHEN IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS “BREAK” HABITS 
 
The similar consequences from habits and implementation intentions only take place 
when the behavioral goals underlying habits and implementation intentions are the same. 
When there are conflicting goals, the situation is different.  
Accordingly, research shows that implementation intentions developed with a goal X 
are successful in changing behaviors that are performed habitually associated with a goal Y, 
i.e., implementation intentions can “break” habits. In support of this Aarts et al. (1999) 
showed that developing implementation intentions while performing a habitual behavior, 
disrupts performance of the behavior such that the goal associated with that implementation 
intention was pursued instead. In their study, students were asked to go from the lab (located 
near the central hall) to the cafeteria sometime after being provided with a goal to collect a 
coupon halfway (in the secretary office of the Department of Operation and Statistics). This 
was aimed to interrupt the habit of going directly from the central hall to the cafeteria. 
Regarding this, half the participants were requested to develop a plan to collect the coupon 
(goal related), describing when (time of the day), where (location) and how (path) they would 
do so. The other half did the same type of plan but for spending the coupon after its collection 
(goal unrelated). Results showed that participants who received the goal related 
implementation intention were much more successful in collecting the coupon (80%) 
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compared to the control group (50%). Also, the former showed an enhanced access to 
environment-related words associated with goal attainment. This is evidence that 
implementation intentions allowed the (“artificial”) creation of new cognitive associations 
between situation and behavior and a heightened accessibility of the situational cues 
associated with attaining the goal. 
Some studies in the environmental behavior domain also investigated this effect, 
although the examples regarding this are scarce. One of the exceptions comes from the work 
of Bamberg (e.g. 2002a; 2002b). In one study (Bamberg, 2002a) he investigated the 
promotion of public transportation use (a new behavior), for university students that 
habitually use private transportation. Half of the participants had to develop an 
implementation intention to use public transportation while the other half was only provided 
with the relevant goal intention. To participate in this study the criteria was that they have 
never used the public transportation before and that they frequently used the private 
transportation network (based on a frequency measure of habitual behavior). Also, only the 
ones that volunteered as testers of a new route (public transportation) participated in the 
study, to assure a high level of intention in the performance of the new behavior. Thus, the 
dependent measure was the actual use of the new route instead of the habitual route. The 
experimental manipulation involved the development of an implementation intention, with 
the participants being asked the following: “Now we want to help you to plan and prepare the 
test of the university circular bus route as well as possible. For this purpose you should 
commit yourself to one specific day and opportunity/situation within the next 7 days when 
you will really conduct the bus-route test” (Bamberg, 2002a; p. 402). As an incentive for 
participating, a lottery (with prizes around 52 Euros in total) was offered. Results showed that 
participants benefited from the implementation intentions, with 53.3% trying the new public 
transportation route, compared to 31.1% that only had the goal intention. Moreover, results 
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regarding a logistic regression performed on the dichotomous variable route use vs. non-use 
for each group showed that in the implementation intention group only the goal-intention had 
a significant influence over results. For the control group, both the goal intention and an 
interaction between the goal intention and habit strength had a significant influence over the 
participant’s choice. In summary, results seem to indicate that the implementation intention 
was successful in the initiation of a new behavior in a new context (new travel route). On the 
other hand, when the implementation intention was not developed, behavior was influenced 
significantly more by an interaction between the (public transportation) goal intention and 
(private transportation) habit strength. This shows that a goal intention alone was not 
sufficient to successfully initiate behavior and to overrule habits influence. 
In a second study, Bamberg (2002a) analyzed the effect of implementation intentions on 
organically produced food purchase in a local bio-food shop. Participants were requested to 
be “test buyers”, i.e., buy organic food in a local shop at least once in the following week, 
been given a voucher to do so. They were chosen as testers if they never or rarely bought 
organic food in the past. The dependent measure was the number of vouchers collected in the 
local shop by the research assistants. As in study 1, they developed implementation intentions 
in the following way: “From experience we know that you are more likely to carry out your 
intention to test within the next 7 days the bio-shop ‘Klatschmohn’ if you make a decision 
about the exact day and time-point you will do so. Decide now at which day and exact time-
point you will test the bio-shop within the next 7 days. Please write that day and time-point 
on the next sheet of the questionnaire” (Bamberg, 2002a; p. 406). Additionally the voucher’s 
value was manipulated, with half being given a 2.5 Euros voucher and the other half a 7.5 
Euros voucher, in order to see if the monetary incentive had any influence over the decisions. 
The aim was to assess if action initiation was facilitated via motivational means (monetary 
incentive), via volitional means (implementation intention) or both. Results showed that the 
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higher percentage of vouchers used by the participants was in the implementation intention 
group which received the 7.5 Euros voucher (60.8%), followed by the group with only the 7.5 
Euros voucher (54.3%), the group with the 2.5 Euros voucher plus the implementation 
intention (50%) and finally the group with only the 2.5 Euros voucher (34.2%). However, 
differences between the results of the first three groups didn’t show significant differences, 
meaning that using high monetary incentives (7.5 Euros) or implementation intentions 
doesn’t show any differences. The explanation given was that the monetary incentives might 
imply the development of implementation intentions by the participants themselves (such as 
‘To get this attractive special offer, I have to go to the shop as soon as it opens’; Bamberg, 
2002; p. 406). According to Bamberg (2002a), in this case the two types of implementation 
intentions would overlap and produce no combined effect (as also shown in Bamberg, 
2002b). 
 
WHEN HABITS “BREAK” IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS 
 
Other studies show that the effect of implementation intentions in breaking habits is not 
so straightforward and might not occur under certain conditions. For example, Verplanken 
and Faes´s (1999) field experiment showed that the formation of implementation intentions to 
eat a healthier diet was successful in following through with it for the people with healthy 
behaviors, which added to the previous behavioral intentions effect. However, for the 
participants with unhealthy (counter-intentional) habits this effect occurred only for habit 
unrelated aspects and wasn’t sufficient to break the negative influence of prior habits (e.g. 
made them eat more fruit while the consumption of food with fat was unchanged). Given this 
discrepancy in results, there are some reasons to believe that habits are being underestimated, 
given that implementation intentions don’t work in every situation. The findings from this 
study seem to indicate that implementation intentions success might be reduced or inexistent 
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if we develop them in a habitual and familiar context. Accordingly, in this study (Verplanken 
& Faes, 1999), implementation intentions were successful in adding “new behaviors” to the 
already existent global set of habitual behaviors (as in Aarts et al., 1999) but not in 
developing a new behavior by breaking the habits, i.e., participants developed new healthy 
behaviors (e.g. eating more fruit) that added to the previous unhealthy behaviors (e.g. eating 
unhealthy snacks). 
Other studies also cast some doubts on the success of implementation intentions in 
changing behaviors. For example Betsch, Haberstroh, Molter and Glockner (2004) showed 
that due to the action of situational constraints - time pressure - the effects of habit were 
maintained even after an implementation intention was formed. This contradicts studies 
showing the effect of implementation intentions in changing behaviors even under high 
cognitive load (Brandstätter, Lengfelder & Gollwitzer, 2001). In their study (Betsch et al., 
2004), participants first learned a certain routine, by pairing a color and a destination (city). 
This pairing was done by embedding it in a path-finding task, consisting on a maze (subway 
map) in which they had to find the path for a train to reach a certain city and draw it with a 
color pen. This was followed by other procedures with the aim of pairing the colors and 
cities, with variations in the frequency of pairing (2 to 14 times) which allowed the creation 
of two groups of participants with weak and strong routines. A second phase involved the 
formation of intentions to comply with certain rules, either consistent with the previously 
learned routines or which deviated from them (new choice rules, different from the one’s 
previously learned). These rules involved the memorization of 4 “if-then” statements (e.g. “If 
I am asked to travel to A-town, then I will choose the red line; Betsch et al., 2004; p. 66), 
thus involving the development of implementation intentions. Regarding this, the 
“consistent” group had to implement intentions to maintain the previously learned routine, 
while the “deviating” group had to implement intentions to deviate from the previously 
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learned routine. In either case, these intentions implementation was done under different time 
pressure conditions. The dependent variable was the false choices or relapse errors in judging 
the pairs of colors-cities appearing in a serious of 80 choice trials, when they had the 
“deviant” condition comparing to the “maintenance” condition. Results showed that 
implementation intentions failed under time pressure with the effects of habit being 
maintained, i.e., more errors and relapses to the previously learned routine were done even 
though the implementation intentions were developed to deviate from that routine. According 
to the authors (Betsch et al., 2004) this indicates that cognitive constraints can cut the link 
between intentions and behavior, even if an implementation intention is formed with the aim 
of strengthening those links. Thus, cognitive constraints can destabilize implementation 
intentions and thus constrain its positive effect over behavior. However it should be noted 
that in this study this was only demonstrated for newly developed implementation intentions 
and the consistency in the memorization of the rules (4 statements) was not as great as the 
consistency in the routine learning (14 pairings). 
Apart from this, few research has assessed the stability of implementation intentions 
and its effects, before the process becomes automatic (i.e., before a new habit is developed, 
following from an implementation intention). In fact, it is argued that the stability of the 
intentions is a moderator of their impact on behavior (Ajzen, 2002) and thus, given that a goal 
intention is the basis for an implementation intention development, the same can be said 
about the latter. However, only the pre-conditions for the success of implementation 
intentions and for increasing their stability have been identified so far (e.g. Parks-Stamm, 
Gollwitzer & Oettinggen, 2007; Sheeran et al., 2005; Sniehotta, Nagy, Scholz & Schwarzer, 
2006), while the conditions that can induce instability and specifically the context’s role in 
that, have not been considered.  
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Therefore, stability seems to be an important precondition for the implementation 
intentions success and for this stability to occur there should be a frequent pairing between 
the situation and the goal intentions in order for behavior to turn into a stable and “frozen” 
habit. However, there are reasons to believe that some habits are stronger than 
implementation intentions when in an initial stage of their development. This is because, 
implementation intentions involve the creation of a temporary construct in the beginning of 
their development, before changing into a habit. Differently, habit is as a chronic construct 
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis 2000) which confers to it some particularities regarding cognitive 
activation and accessibility.  
First, it is argued that the more accessible a construct is (i.e., “the readiness of stored 
knowledge to be used”; Higgins, 1989, 115) the higher the probability of its use, with the 
frequent activation of the construct increasing its accessibility (Higgins, 1989). Second, 
automaticity research has shown that chronic constructs are more powerful in longer intervals 
between priming and judgment, i.e., although having the same effects as temporary 
constructs, after a short period the chronic tendencies tend to dominate (Bargh, Lombardi & 
Higgins, 1988; Bargh, 1997). These are especially important given that when there are 
multiple behavioral representations, behavior will be guided by the one with the highest 
activation level (Aarts & Dijksterhuis 2000). Consequently, it is inferred that this will happen 
for strong habits when the necessary environmental cues for its activation are present, since it 
is a chronic construct that has had the opportunity to be activated more times and therefore is 
more accessible (and thus, stronger; Fazio, 1990). In this view, an accessible habit can 
function as a barrier to intentional behavior initiation, without people being consciously 
aware of its effect (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Moreover, even if implementation intentions 
break habits, if they don’t gain chronic characteristics, habits should return in the long-run. 
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Besides this, another gap in the research on the relationship between habits and 
implementation intentions has been the role of the decisional context characteristics, i.e., 
which environmental features can facilitate or inhibit their mental representations. As we said 
before, success has been demonstrated in the development of new behaviors in new contexts 
(Bamberg, 2002a; 2002b) and at the same time in the “tuning” of habits (changing some 
components of an already existent habit) in habitual contexts. However there is a lack in the 
demonstration of their success in promoting completely new behaviors when the habit cuing 
situational features are still present, i.e., the context remains stable and facilitative of habits. 
One prediction regarding this comes from the literature on dual models of social 
information processing, which implies that an effortful decisional context is more favorable to 
heuristic processing and an effortless decisional context is more favorable to systematic 
processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Thus, since in the initial stage of its development, 
implementation intentions involve a more systematic processing associated with a heightened 
attention focused on specific environmental cues (Gollwitzer et al., 2005), it is expected that 
they should be less successful on complex decisional situations which can involve effort and 
constrain this type of cognitive processing (as seen in Betsch et al., 2004).  
In accordance with this, a study by Dewitte, Verguts and Lens (2003) showed that the 
implementation intention’s success depends on the goal difficulty associated with it. In their 
study, people forming implementations intentions for easy goals benefited from the former. 
However, there were no positive effects when certain types of difficult goals were associated, 
specifically when people focused more on the outcomes than on the actions themselves. This 
is because according to them: “difficult goals for which the actions that are required to reach 
them have not been imagined yet do not benefit from implementation intentions” (Dewitte et 
al., 2003). Also, Verplanken et al. (1997) showed that participants with a strong habit 
followed a more heuristic processing using less information and more superficial and non-
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compensatory information search strategies (leaving information relevant to alternatives to 
their habitual behavior uninspected), compared to weak habit participants. The latter used 
more elaborated information search and inspected equal amounts of information for each 
option.  
Given that many behaviors are complex in nature, a great deal of self-regulation 
processes and action control is needed in the development of new intentional behaviors 
(Sniehotta et al., 2006). Accordingly, planning, time, frequency of the intentions 
implementation into actions (i.e., frequency of goal-action pairing) and the context facilitative 
features (the presence of cues that elicit the goals associated with implementation intentions) 
being very important in this. Therefore, we have reasons to doubt that a onetime institution of 
an implementation intention might be sufficient to break habits and develop into a completely 
new behavior (as shown e.g. in Bamberg, 2002a; 2002b), when there are no changes in the 
habitual context and if implementation intentions do not “stabilize” and consolidate. 
Differently, implementations intentions success might be increased if the context is changed 
in order to facilitate the goal directed desired behavior, i.e., if the context becomes more 
facilitative of this response. 
 
WHEN ARE WE REALLY BREAKING? 
 
Following from what was said before, we have reasons to doubt the success of 
implementation intentions in initiating a new behavior, before they develop into a new habit, 
when there are no changes in the context, i.e., as long as it remains stable and familiar (i.e., 
facilitative of habit). This is because, in spite of the interesting results regarding the 
implementation intentions effect as “habit breakers”, some questions can be raised regarding 
the success of the procedures involved in achieving this, especially to what concerns 
environmental behavior change. 
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In the first example given (Aarts et al., 1999) regarding change in a habitual route, 
participants didn’t actually have to perform a completely new behavior but to add a “new 
step” to an already existent behavior. This was done within a familiar and habitual context. 
On the contrary, participants in the two Bamberg’s (2002a) studies had to initiate a 
completely new behavior, which they never or at least rarely performed before. However, in 
this case the behavior wasn’t expected to be performed in a habitual and familiar context 
(habitual travel route in study 1 or habitual supermarket in study 2) but in a new context (new 
travel route in study 1 and new food buying shop in study 2). Thus, implementation 
intentions didn’t actually change a habit in a habitual context in this latter example, but 
created a new (one time) behavior in a new context. Moreover, implementation intentions 
also didn’t completely change the habit in the first example given but actually “tuned” it, i.e., 
they changed some aspects of the habitual behavior but not the overall behavior (going from 
the hall to the cafeteria). Consequently, nothing is said in these and other examples in the 
literature on environmental habit change through implementation intentions, regarding their 
power in developing a completely new behavior within a familiar and habitual context.  
This is in accordance with Holland et al. (2006; p. 77), who consider that a habit 
breaking effect has to be demonstrated by “stably changing an old behavior that was 
frequently performed within a specific context into new behavior that is repeatedly performed 
within that same context”. Studies on ecological behavior mostly show the facilitation of new 
behaviors in new contexts (e.g. Bamberg, 2002a) and consider implementations intentions as 
a good technique to break habits independently of the context. One exception is the Holland 
et al. (2006) study. In their study, they aimed to promote new waste disposal behaviors in a 
set of Telecom company departments, thus breaking the previous habit of disposing the same 
type of waste – paper and plastic cups - in their personal waste bins. They did this not only by 
changing the habitual context - installation of new personal bins, apart from the already 
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existent general recycling bins at the department - but also by developing implementation 
intentions. These involved a plan regarding the when, where and how they would recycle the 
paper and plastic cup waste, therefore associating the habitual behavior cues (empty cup; 
paper) with a new goal to dispose the waste in the proper recycling bin. For this, they 
measured behavior by weighting the paper and the number of plastic cups disposed in the 
personal wastebaskets (and not in the recycling bins) for some days at the end of the work 
day (without participants knowing this), in four moments of measurement: 1) before the 
intervention; 2) one week; 3) two weeks and 4) two months after it. Results showed that the 
paper disposal in the personal bin decreased either in a condition in which the new personal 
bins were installed or when implementation intentions were developed (and both), compared 
to a condition in which the bins weren’t installed. For plastic cups, this decrease was only 
obtained in the implementation intentions condition. Thus, while for certain behaviors a 
change in context might be enough to promote a new behavior (paper disposal), for other 
behaviors (plastic cups) this might not be the case and a cognitive change based on 
implementation intentions is needed. 
The findings of the Holland et al. (2006) study show that the behavioral change didn’t 
imply adding a new behavioral step to an already existent behavior (as in Aarts et al., 1999), 
but developing a completely new behavior inside an habitual and familiar context (unlike 
Bamberg, 2002a), which maintained its effects even two months after the intervention. This 
study represents an exception in the area of proenvironmental behaviors, and still more 
studies are needed in order to assess the efficacy of implementation intentions in changing 
environmental habits within a familiar and habitual context. Nevertheless, the Holland et al. 
(2006) study, albeit important in defining this, doesn’t say anything regarding what happens 
when there are context changes after the intervention, i.e., if the context destabilizes the 
cognitive change achieve with the implementation intentions. In their case, this would 
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represent for example a worker moving from a context in which the habitual recycling 
behavior is stable to a new department in which this behavior would be constrained. Given 
this, our studies propose to study not only the implementation of a new behavior within a 
familiar and habitual context but also the effect of implementation intentions when context 
changes occur. 
 
STUDY 4 – WHEN HABITS “BREAK” IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS 
 
According to Holland et al. (2006) for a habitual behavior to be changed in a habitual 
context, the planning needs to link a new behavioral response to the already existent habit 
activation cues. However, there are some contexts in which this is not possible. For example, 
if you have a decision situation (e.g. being in the supermarket section in which you want to 
buy a certain product) in which there is a choice of organic vs. non-organic products, the 
organic choice cannot be promoted by associating it with the non-organic products, given that 
usually both categories are mutually exclusive (e.g. people usually don’t buy the same type of 
milk both in its organic and non-organic versions; they usually buy one or the other). In this 
case the new choice needs to be associated with new cues and not with the habit activating 
cues (as in Holland et al., 2006), for the behavioral change to occur.  
The problem with this situation is that, given that you can only associate the organic 
choice with the cues that can elicit that same choice (e.g. organic products or brands), the 
implementation intentions effect can be constrained if the habitual behavior cues (e.g. non-
organic products or brands) have a higher activation potential than the organic choice cues 
(e.g. due to a high perceived applicability associated with non-organic choice). Given this, we 
aim to assess the effect of the prior development of an implementation intention to buy 
organic products in interaction with the applicability effect from study 1 (see previous 
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chapter). This implementation intention will be directed towards the facilitation of the desired 
response (choose the organic option), using the procedure from Bamberg (2002a). This type 
of implementation intentions is considered to be of type 2 (Gollwitzer et al., 2005), differing 
from type 1 - oriented towards the suppression of the undesired response (e.g. not choosing 
non-organic) – and type 3 – oriented towards taking the attention focus of the critical 
situation (e.g. not choosing at all in a certain context).  
By using this type of implementation intention our prediction is that it will have no 
effect in a familiar (habitual) context, i.e., in overruling the effect of a high perceived 
applicability on the first decision made, and thus results from study 1 will be replicated. As 
said before, this is because in the familiar context, the new response cannot be associated 
with the habit activation cues (as proposed by Holland et al., 2006) but instead has to be 
associated with new cues. Also, given the perceived applicability effect, the habit activation 
cues are predicted to have a higher activation potential than the organic choice activation 
cues. Thus, even with an implementation intention, this won’t be enough to overrule the 
habitual behavior activation from the habit activation cues. In a different way, in the new 
context this perceived applicability is lower and there is no expectance of a stronger 
connection between the non-organic buying means and the habit (see study 1 in the previous 
chapter), i.e., the context is less facilitative of habit. Consequently, more attention should be 
given to the alternative non-habitual organic means, due to a heightened attention following 
from the implementation intention to buy organic food (characteristic of a type 2 
implementation intention). In other words, in this context, the development of a connection 
between the organic choice and its activating cues (organic means) should be facilitated given 
that they are not competing as much with habit activation (as in the familiar context). 
A graphical representation of these predictions regarding the implementation intentions 
effect can be seen in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Goal-means structure representation for each type of context, when preceded by 
the development of an implementation intention to buy organic products. 
 
 
 
Given that the same procedure of study 1 will be used, we will also assess the 
implementation intentions effect on the second and third decisions. Regarding these, the same 
facilitative effect of the new context should be found and thus there should be a higher 
interference with the consistency in the choice of non-organic products observed in study 1. 
To test our predictions, participants performed a web based study (experimental field study), 
in which they were asked to choose three times (different products) in a list of 4 organic and 
8 non-organic milk products, chosen through a pre-test, being randomly assigned to two 
between-participants conditions: 1) familiar context: high perceived applicability for non-
organic milk buying habit; 2) new context: low perceived applicability for the non-organic 
milk buying habit. 
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METHOD 
 
Participants and Design. 80 students from the University of Lisbon and other 
participants were either given credits for their participation or volunteered to participate 
respectively. To participate they had to fulfill the criteria of buying food products for 
domestic consumption at least once in two weeks. For this reason, the students that 
participated were requested to bring in their parents or friends that fulfilled these criteria, if 
they didn’t.  
The sample consisted mainly on young adults, with an overall mean age of 29.46 years 
old (SD = 11.51; Min = 18; Max = 61) and the majority having a high school degree (53.80%) 
or a university degree (35%). A questionnaire (see description below) portrays them as 
frequent shoppers, shopping for food on an average of twice a week (M = 1.81, SD = 1.08). 
Also, the sample is characterized by a low percentage of reported organic food products 
bought in general (M = 10.81%, SD = 12.72), with 98.7% of the participants having only 
50% or less of the total amount of products they buy being organic products and a medium 
intention to buy organic food in the future (M = 3.76, SD = 1.94), portraying them as habitual 
non-organic food buyers. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to take part in two web-based studies, one on 
“Health and Consumption in Portugal” ministered by the research group in Social and 
Environmental Psychology and one on “Real and Virtual Shopping Environments” by the 
research group in Consumer Psychology. These represented two parts of the same study but 
were presented as such in order to reduce the perceived connection between them.  
After providing the informed consent, they performed a web-based questionnaire (see 
Appendix XV) regarding organic and diet products and were told its aim was to assess the 
type of decisions people make in web-based environments. This was the same questionnaire 
as in study 1 with the difference being the implementation intentions task. In this, they were 
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asked to develop implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) to buy organic products27
Context applicability manipulation. Two days after this task, participants were 
requested to participate in what they thought was the second study, consisting on a decision 
making task aimed to assess the type of decision people make in web-based environments. 
This used WebPages for simulation of online shopping, comprising HTML pages developed 
with the use of the Comersus Cart Software (Comersus Open Technologies L.C., 2004), 
which is a software package used in the creation of online shopping web pages. The 
construction of the HTML forms for the storage of the participants data on a web server, used 
SurveyWiz (see Birnbaum, 2001), a software used for the development of online surveys. 
. 
For this they had to go to a supermarket web store, in which they had to choose four products 
and then go back to the questionnaire, and insert them in the provided spaces. Moreover, they 
had to develop a plan to buy each product on the following week (adapted from Bamberg, 
2002a), in terms of the “how much” (quantity/weight), “where” (shop/supermarket), “when” 
(day of week & time of day/hour) they expected to buy the products. This also allowed them 
to familiarize with the online shopping environment, given that their familiar environment is 
the local shop or supermarket (only a small percentage of people buy food products online). 
Thus, by the time they performed the choice task this environment wouldn’t be so new to 
them and they would have practice in implementing intentions in this kind of environment. 
First, people were given the option to choose one of four different categories of 
products and told to press one of four buttons for that. However, this was only to allow for a 
perceived randomness in the attribution of products, increase their motivation and reduce the 
possible frustration of having only one category of products, with no other available options. 
Thus, every button led to the same product category: milk. After choosing the category, a 
page appeared with the “random” category attributed – milk - and the instructions for the 
                                                 
27 In study 1 this was done for diet products. 
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decision making task. In these, people were requested to choose the product they would most 
probably buy from a list and told that the product would be given to them, after completion of 
the study. They were also asked to choose two additional options, just in case the first option 
wasn’t available in stock, i.e., their second and third preferences in case the first wasn’t 
available. This procedure was based on the one created by Coates, Butler and Berry (2004) to 
study the effect of priming on the choice of familiar brands. 
After the instruction, the list of products appeared, consisting of 12 UHT Semi-
skimmed milk options with 8 non-organic and 4 organic options (proportion of .66 and .33 
respectively) showing the price, brand and a picture of the product for each. Both the familiar 
and new context’s had the same type of products and matched prices in a fixed position, with 
the only difference being the product pictures and brand names – Portuguese brands in the 
familiar context and United Kingdom brands in the new context. The participant’s attribution 
to the familiar or new context tasks (between participant’s tasks) followed from their random 
attribution to the experimental conditions. This derived from a mathematical formula in 
Microsoft Excel (generation of random numbers between 0 and 1) and sorting of participants 
email list by column. 
Final questionnaire. Finally, after choosing three products from the same list available, 
participants responded to a short web questionnaire, with manipulation checks and other 
socio-demographic variables. The first of the manipulation checks asked the level of 
influence (in a 5-point Likert type scale from “no influence at all” to “strong influence”) of a 
list of factors over the participants decision in the previous tasks, namely: color of the 
webpage; sound environment; organization of the products on the webpage; distance from the 
computer; their habitual behavior; price of the products and other factors. The color, sound 
and distance aspects were inserted only to make the others less salient. The second check, 
asked how frequently they buy the 3 brands chosen (1 to 5 scale, from “never” to “four times 
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or more”) and the future intention to buy organic products (to retest the intention measure 
from two days before). 
After completion of the web questionnaire, participants were thanked for their 
participation and provided with an email contact in the case they wanted additional 
information and/or to receive the study results. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Questionnaire and Manipulation Checks. Regarding the baseline characteristics of the 
sample, the t-test for independent samples results show that there are no significant 
differences between the familiar and new context conditions, in terms of habits perceived 
influence over the choice, percentage of organic food bought in general, intention to buy 
organic food in the future and frequency of shopping in general. The only difference found 
referred to the perceived influence of habit over the decision to choose the milk products on 
the decision tasks, with the participants on the familiar context condition considering it 
influenced significantly more their decision (M = 5.98, SD = 1.29) compared to the 
participants in the new context condition (M = 4.98, SD = 1.69), t(78) = -2.98, p = .004, d = 
.6728. Also, the participants in the familiar context task, reported an average frequency of 
buying the first product chosen of three times a month (M = 4.15, SD = 1.03), and the second 
and third on an average of once per month (second product: M = 2.55, SD = 1.32; third 
product: M = 2.13, SD = 1.09)29
                                                 
28 Cohen’s d was calculated following from the formula created by Thalheimer and Cook (2002). 
. Additionally, there were no significant differences between 
the intention measure in the first and second moment (2 days after) of the study. Finally, 
concerning the checks and sample characteristics there are no significant differences between 
study 1 and the present study. 
29 On the scale from 1 to 5, the value 1 represented “never” and 5 represented “four times or more”. 
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To what concerns the influence of the products price in the webpage used as the 
decision task, the frequency table analysis shows no clear pattern of choosing the products in 
accordance with their prices (see Table 21).  
 
Table 21 - Choice frequencies for the three decisions made by context, price and webpage 
position 
 Milk brand 
Webpage 
position 
Price 
(Euros) 
Frequency of choice 
1st 
choice 
2nd 
choice 
3rd 
choice 
Familiar 
context 
Mimosa 2 0.59 10 12 6 
Agros 10 0.60 1 2 4 
Seleccionado Matinal 6 0.76 11 7 4 
Terra Nostra 12 0.56 6 1 6 
Continente 5 0.44 1 2 2 
Vigor 11 0.70 4 2 7 
Gresso 3 0.52 0 8 5 
Pingo doce 4 0.40 3 1 2 
Agros Bio* 9 1.39 4 2 3 
Purnatur* 7 1.93 0 0 0 
Président Bio* 1 1.69  0 3 0 
Andechser Natur* 8 1.70 0 0 1 
New 
context 
Nature's way 6 0.59 4 3 3 
Tiffany 4 0.60 3 3 2 
Asda 10 0.76 2 2 3 
First choice 12 0.56 2 0 6 
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Waitrose 7 0.44 0 4 0 
Devondale 11 0.70 6 5 5 
Harvey 1 0.52 4 3 5 
Ultra 5 0.40 3 2 1 
Heritage organic* 3 1.39 4 6 4 
Organic Valley* 9 1.93 4 5 1 
Moo’s organic* 8 1.69 4 2 5 
Rachel's organic* 2 1.70 4 5 5 
* Organic products. 
 
To further analyze this possibility, we recoded the data into two categories of products: 
low price (below .70 Euros) and high price (above .70 Euros). Regarding either the choice 
made in the familiar context or the choice made in the new context, overall results with the 
Binomial test show no significant differences between the choice frequencies in the two price 
categories, in each of the three decisions made. The only difference found was for the second 
decision in the new context, with significantly more high price products (.64) chosen than 
low price products (p = .018), and for the third decision in the new context, with marginally 
significantly more high price products (.61) chosen than low price products (p = .057)30
Given that the products position in the webpage was fixed between decisions (which 
could have introduced a bias in the choice participants made), we performed a check in order 
to assess it. The analysis of the frequency table shows no clear pattern of choosing the 
products in accordance with their prices (see Table 19). To further analyze this possibility, we 
recoded the data into two categories of positions: top (aggregating the choice of the 6 
. 
                                                 
30 This is result is due to the fact that they chose more organic products in the third decision, being most of them 
in this “high price” category. 
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products on the webpage’s top) and bottom (aggregating the choice of the 6 products on the 
webpage’s bottom). Regarding the choice of organic vs. non-organic products made overall, 
results with the Binomial test show significant differences between the choice frequencies in 
the two position categories for the second choice, with more products chosen at the top (.69) 
than the bottom (p = .001). Regarding either the choice made in the familiar context or the 
choice made in the new context, results with the Chi-square test show no significant 
differences between the choice frequencies in the two position categories, for the first and 
third decision made. To what concerns the second decision, results with the Chi-square test 
show a significantly higher proportion of products chosen in the top in the familiar context 
(.83) than in the bottom χ2 (1, N=80) =7.04, p = .007.  For the new context no significant 
differences are found. 
Decision Making Task. Binomial test results for the first choice in the familiar context 
show a significantly higher proportion of non-organic milk chosen (.95) than an expected 
proportion that would have been obtained by chance31
 
 (.66) (p = .000; Binomial). For the 
new context, these differences are non-significant. To what concerns the differences in the 
non-organic milk choice between the familiar and new context, Fisher’s Exact test results 
show that there is a higher proportion of non-organic products chosen in the familiar context 
(.93) compared to the new context (.65) (p = .003; Fisher’s exact test), with no significant 
differences between the proportion of organics chosen in the familiar or the new context 
compared to study 1. The results concerning Fisher’s Exact test can be seen in Table 22. 
 
 
                                                 
31 With this representing the actual proportion existent in the choice list for the first decision the participants 
made. 
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Table 22 - Differences in frequencies between the familiar and new context choices with 
Fisher’s Exact test 
 Non-organic Organic 
Non-organic 
proportion. 
One-tailed 
(right) 
Familiar context 37 3 .93 
p = .003 
New context 26 14 .65 
 
 
Chi-square test results for the three consecutive choices made in the familiar context 
show that the decisions made are significantly different from the results that would have been 
obtained by chance for the dependents events, either associated with the choice in the first 
decision and then the choice in the second, χ2 (3, N=40) =23.01, p = .000; associated with the 
choice in the second decision and then the choice in the third, χ2 (3, N=40) =23.01, p < .005; 
and associated with the choice in the first decision and then the choice in the third, χ2 (3, 
N=40) =31.00, p = .000.   
These results can be seen in Table 23.  
 
Table 23 - Differences between choice frequencies for the four combinations of consecutive 
product choices with the Chi-square test – Familiar context (n=40) 
  Choice frequency   
  Expected Observed 
Composite 
Chi-square 
(df=3) 
P 
1st decision vs. 
2nd decision 
NO-NO 16.8 34 
26.47 .000 
O-O 3.6 2 
 NO-O 9.6 3 
 O-NO 9.6 1 
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2nd decision vs. 
3rd decision 
NO-NO 18.4 31 
19.37 .000 
O-O 4 0 
 NO-O 10.4 4 
 O-NO 10.4 5 
1st decision vs. 
3rd decision 
NO-NO 18.4 33 
24.79 .000 
O-O 4 0 
 NO-O 10.4 4 
 O-NO 10.4 3 
O = Organic; NO= Non-organic 
 
 
With respect to the three consecutive choices made in the new context,  chi-square test 
results show that the decisions made are significantly different from the results that would 
have been obtained by chance, for the dependents events either associated with the choice in 
the first decision and then the choice in the second, χ2 (3, N=40) =31.11, p < .001; associated 
with the choice in the second decision and then the choice in the third, χ2 (3, N=40) =23.01, p 
< .001; and associated with the choice in the first decision and then the choice in the third, χ2 
(3, N=40) =31.00, p ≈ .05.  These results can be seen in Table 24.  
The probabilities calculation which served as a basis for determining the expected 
frequencies for the Chi-square test are shown in Appendix VII. 
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Table 24 - Differences between choice frequencies for the four combinations of consecutive 
product choices with the Chi-square test – New context (n=40) 
  Choice frequency   
  Expected Observed 
Composite 
Chi-square 
(df=3) 
P 
1st decision vs. 
2nd decision 
NO-NO 16.8 22 
37.12 .000 
O-O 3.6 13 
 NO-O 9.6 4 
 O-NO 9.6 1 
2nd decision vs. 
3rd decision 
NO-NO 18.4 21 
31.34 .000 
O-O 4 13 
 NO-O 10.4 2 
 O-NO 10.4 4 
1st decision vs. 
3rd decision 
NO-NO 18.4 23 
29.21 .000 
O-O 4 12 
 NO-O 10.4 13 
 O-NO 10.4 2 
O = Organic; NO= Non-organic 
 
 
McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the familiar 
context (see Table 25) show a high significant consistency (i.e., choice of non-organic milk 
between two decisions) across the three decisions, with the highest consistency being 
between the first and second decisions (85%).  
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Table 25- Differences in frequencies between decisions in the familiar context with 
McNemar’s test 
 
Organic Non-organic Consistency 
McNemar 
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
1st decision (rows) vs. 
2nd decision (columns) 
Organic 2 1 
85% p = .000 p = .617 
Non-organic 3 34 
2nd decision (rows) vs. 
3rd decision (columns) 
Organic 0 5 
77.5% p = .000 p = 1.000 
Non-organic 4 31 
1st decision (rows) vs. 
3rd decision (columns) 
Organic 0 3 
82.5% p = .000 p = 1.000 
Non-organic 4 33 
 
Results regarding the differences between decisions in the new context (see Table 26) 
show no significant consistency between the three decisions, with the highest being between 
the first and third choices (57.5%).  
 
Table 26 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the new context with McNemar’s 
test 
 
Organic Non-organic Consistency 
McNemar 
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
1st decision (rows) vs. 
2nd decision (columns) 
Organic 13 1 
55% p = .176 p = .371 
Non-organic 4 22 
2nd decision (rows) vs. 
3rd decision (columns) 
Organic 13 4 
52.5% p = .230 p = .683 
Non-organic 2 21 
1st decision (rows) vs. 
3rd decision (columns) 
Organic 12 2 
57.5% p = .091 p = 1.000 
Non-organic 13 23 
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To what concerns the differences in choice consistency between study 1 and 4 (see 
Table 27), results show that there are no differences in the familiar context between both 
studies and a slightly higher consistency in the choice of non-organic in the new context for 
study 1 compared to study 4, where this consistency is non-significant (see Table 23).  
 
Table 27 - Differences in non-organics choice consistency between study 1 and 4 
 Study 1 (no ImIn) Study 4 (InIm) 
Familiar context New context Familiar context New context 
1st decision vs. 
2nd decision 
77.5%** 55% 85%** 55% 
2nd decision vs. 
3rd decision 
72.5%** 55% 77.5%** 52.5% 
1st decision vs. 
3rd decision 
87.5%** 55%* 82.5%** 57.5% 
* Result significant at p<.05 
** Result significant at p<.001 
 
Specifically, there are small differences between the second and third decisions, with a 
slightly higher consistency in the choice of organic between study 4 (32.5%) and 1 (27.5%), a 
slight reduction in the percentage of those who chose non-organic from the second to the 
third decision between study 4 (15%) and 1 (10%) and a slight increase in the percentage of 
those who chose organic from the second to the third decision between study 4 (5%) and 1 
(2.5%). Differences are also found between the first and third decisions, with a higher 
consistency in the choice of organic between study 4 (30%) and 1 (17.5%) and a slight 
reduction in the percentage of those who chose non-organic from the first to the third 
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decision between study 4 (15%) and 1 (5%). All these differences proved to be non-
significant with the Difference Between Two Proportions32
 
. 
DISCUSSION 
 
We predicted that the development of an implementation intention to buy organic 
products would increase the proportion of organics chosen in the new context on the first 
decision made, comparing to study 1. The results refute this and show a complete replication 
of study 1 results, with the participants choosing significantly more non-organic milk in a 
familiar context compared to a new context, with no significant differences in these 
proportions between study 1 and the present study. There are some reasons that can be 
attributed to this result. 
First, the type of implementation intentions that was used, oriented towards the 
facilitation of the desired response, is not adequate to develop a new behavior within a 
familiar and habitual context and the results supported our prediction regarding this. This is 
because, the organic buying goal is not associated with the non-organic habit eliciting cues 
and there are no changes in the context cues which elicit the habitual behavior and in the cues 
that facilitate the desired behavior (Holland et al., 2006). Even though some means to attain 
the goal to choose organic were present, there were still means strongly associated with the 
habitual behavior and no alterations in the perceived applicability occurred, with this 
allowing for the same effect in study 1 to occur. Another explanation for this is that the goal 
associated with the implementation intentions development (buy organic food) is an abstract 
goal. This implies that the implementation intentions developed might not have competed 
directly with the specific behavior to choose non-organic milk (Holland et al., 2006). Thus, 
                                                 
32 Found in the Statistica 6.0 statistical analysis software. 
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the connection between behavior and the organic buying goal might have been made for other 
products, other than milk, and thus the cognitive changes achieve for this product weren’t 
strong enough to increase the organic milk buying goal. Nevertheless, although the goal 
provided was abstract, the participants had not only to make a plan to choose organic in the 
following week, but also to choose some products and include then in the plan, while making 
it (see the procedure section). Consequently, the abstract goal was expected to be made 
concrete during the plan development and thus the implementation intentions were developed 
towards various specific products. However, further post-hoc analysis supports this failure 
given that regarding all the products chosen during the plan development, milk was only 
chosen 13.75% of the times. 
Despite of these reasons for the implementation intentions not being powerful enough 
to decrease the proportion of non-organics chosen in the familiar context, we expected an 
increase of organic products chosen in the new context, given that habit is more constrained 
in it. In other words, in this context the implementation intentions shouldn’t compete directly 
with the specific behavior to choose non-organic milk, given that habit is supposed to 
influence less the decisions in this context. Thus, due to the fact that the context wouldn’t be 
familiar and habitual anymore, people would be expected to link the new behavioral 
responses to the new situation (Holland et al., 2006). Surprisingly, this was not the case. 
One reason for this to have happened, apart from the goal concreteness justification, has 
to do with the fact that the organic buying intentions, in which the implementation intentions 
were based, were medium and not sufficiently high to produce stability enough for the 
implementation intentions to have an effect (Sheeran et al., 2005). In other words, for the 
paths between the goal to buy organic products, the goal to buy milk and the potential organic 
milk buying means to develop and get stronger. Moreover, the fact that the implementation 
intentions were developed two days before the decision, might have not also allowed for this 
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stability and enough time for cognitive associations to be created or strengthened. In fact, 
although it is argued that a onetime institution of an implementation intention is enough to 
produce an automatic elicitation of the intended behavior under the same circumstances 
(Ajzen, 2002; see Golwitzer, 1999), the same is not said when changes in the context take 
place and about what is needed (the preconditions) for the implementation intentions to have 
an effect in this situation. 
In agreement, few research has assessed the stability of implementation intentions and 
its effects, in the early stage of its development before automaticity in behavior is achieved. 
Accordingly, it is argued that stability of the intentions is a moderator of the impact of 
intentions on behavior (Ajzen, 2002; Conner, Sheeran, Norman & Armitage, 2000). 
However, nothing is said about the conditions that can induce this instability and specifically 
the role of habit in this sense. In our view, even though the intention to buy organics 
remained stable between the two moments of the study (within the two days), the habit also 
remained stable given that there were no changes in the decision context (and the habit 
activating cues) during that time. Thus, the cognitive changes that were achieved with 
implementation intentions haven’t achieved enough strength to counteract the “frozen” habit. 
Another possibility is that implementation intentions produced an effect in an opposite 
direction of the suppression effects found in study 2. Thus, by asking people to develop them 
by going to the supermarket online store and select the organic products in accordance (see 
procedure), might be seen as goal activation followed by goal attainment within that task (in 
the same way as what happened in the habitual goal priming task in study 2). Consequently, 
by the time that they made the decision (two days after this task), the goal was already 
attained before and thus didn’t need to be pursued again. This could only be assessed with 
implicit measures of goal activation after the development of implementation intentions and 
two days after, before the decision making task, in order to assess this. Although goal 
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suppression effects are found in the literature, nothing is said about if they would last for two 
days, although decay with time is expected to occur (Liberman, Förster & Higgins, 2007). 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that this was the case for some participants given 
that the significant percentage of participants that revised their choice between the first and 
second choices found in study 1 wasn’t found in the present study and the proportion of non-
organics and the consistency in their choice was higher in the present study. Also, the 
participants in the present study that decided in the familiar context reported being more 
influenced by their habits in the decision made than the ones in the new context, which was 
not found in study 1. Thus, implementation intentions seemed to have had the effect of 
suppressing the organic buying goal activation in the new context and thus, increasing the 
consistency in the choice of non-organics between contexts. 
One final explanation is that, as our results from study 2 and 3 demonstrated, in the new 
context the habitual behavior can still determine choice. Consequently, as long as people 
have a strong habit, they can still substitute the habitual means by new means if they still 
allow for goal attainment (Kruglanski et al., 2002). However, given that in the present study 
we didn’t measure habit directly but only with perception based measures (e.g. frequency of 
organic food buying), this can only be inferred to have happened. Nevertheless, there are 
some reasons to believe that this was the case given that the implementation intentions failure 
occurred mainly for the first decision.  
In fact, to what concerns the effect on the second and third decisions, we have reasons 
to believe that implementation intentions did have an effect, especially in the third choice 
made. Still, this wasn’t strong enough to interfere with the choice of non-organic products but 
only with the choice of organics, showing that habit was still followed by some participants 
in the new context and that implementation intentions were successful mainly in association 
with their non-habitual choices. Comparing to study 1, results indicate that the 
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implementation intentions effect occurred only in the new context, given an increase in the 
consistency in organic products choice and a decrease in the choice of non-organics from one 
decision to the next. This translated into a non-significant consistency found between the first 
and third decision, which in study 1 was significant. The same happened in a lower degree for 
the consistency between the second and third decision, for which there was an almost 
significant difference in study 1, the same not being found in study 4. Finally, there are also 
reasons to believe that the organic choice was more goal directed (associated with the 
implementation intentions) compared to study 1, given that the “departure” from chance was 
overall significantly higher in this study than in study 1 independently from the context. This 
was especially the case for the third choice in the new context, for which in study 1 the 
choice almost approached chance and in the present study was significantly different from it. 
Overall, this might indicate that the reasons for the implementation intentions failure 
didn’t have so much to do with the level of goal intention or that only two days were allowed 
for stabilization in them, but more to do with the actual processes involved in each context, 
i.e., the failure as to do more with the context characteristics than with a failure in the 
methodology used. Also, this is in accordance with the organic buying goal suppression 
explanation given that this was the case mainly for the first decision. Thus, given time to 
think and follow a more systematic procession of the information (after following the 
heuristic processing associated with habit in the first choice), this suppression could be 
overruled for some participants. However, it remains untested if this was the case only for the 
participants with more unstable mental representations of the goal system (i.e., weak habit 
participants, which were the ones that in study 2 benefited from goal priming). For this, 
future studies should use habit measures to assess this specifically. 
Implementation intentions can have an effect when the context is less facilitative of 
habits (less familiar), although this appears to happen only over the consistency in the choice 
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of organic but not over the non-organic choice consistency, given that no significant 
alteration was produced in that. This is in accordance with the Verplanken and Faes´s (1999) 
study, given that they found an implementation intentions effect over habit unrelated aspects, 
producing an increase in the consumption of non-habitual products while maintaining the 
same amount of habitual products consumed as before. In our study this would correspond to 
the organic products choice, given that there were no changes in non-organic choice 
consistency with our without implementation intentions. Also, this is in accordance with the 
Holland et al. (2006) reinterpretation of Verplanken and Faes´s (1999) study, given that in 
our study the goal associated with the implementation intentions was also abstract and milk 
was involved in the plan development only for a small percentage of the participants. Thus, 
the effect was only found mainly in the new context and for the second and third decisions, 
and only for those participants to which the implementation intentions weren’t in competition 
with habit (Holland et al., 2006).  
Given all this, we think the implementation intentions success in changing behavior in a 
familiar context would be increased if we directed the response towards the inhibition of the 
undesired response, additionally to directing it towards the facilitation of the desired 
response. The latter procedure seems not to be enough in breaking the type of consumption 
habits we studied, in the early stages of implementation intentions development. This is 
because in the decision making contexts we assessed, the planning cannot link a new 
behavioral response to the already existent habit activation cues (i.e., the organic choice 
cannot be made by buying non-organic products) as proposed by Holland et al. (2006). 
Instead, in this type of decision making context, the new behavior has to be linked to new 
cues (organic means) and at the same time attention given to the “old” cues has to be 
inhibited and the associated goal activation to be suppressed. This implies that the success in 
behavioral change through implementation intentions should also involve a change in some 
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aspects of the decision context (Holland et al., 2006), in order to facilitate more the choice of 
organic products, i.e., the cognitive change should be accompanied by changes in the context 
cues. These aspects will be assessed in the next study. 
 
STUDY 5 – WHEN IMPLEMENTATION INTENTIONS “BREAK” HABITS 
 
Study 4 analyzed the effect of a type 2 implementation intention – directed towards the 
facilitation of the desired response (Gollwitzer et al., 2005) - and showed that if the context is 
not facilitative of it (i.e., is more facilitative of an alternative response), their effect is 
constrained. In the study, participants who developed implementation intentions had not only 
to initiate a new behavior by cognitively linking the desired goal (choose organic) to the 
critical situation (milk buying situation), but also had to inhibit the habitual behavior. This 
habitual behavior was inferred to have a stronger cognitive connection with the non-organic 
milk buying means present, compared to the connection between the organic means and the 
temporary increase in the organic milk buying goal. Thus, the cognitive changes based on the 
creation of a link between the organic buying milk and the choice situation weren’t strong 
enough to suppress the habitual behavior in a familiar context. 
In other words, the formation of implementation intentions resulted in the mental 
representation of the organic milk buying goal being more cognitively accessible in the 
choice situation. This was expected to facilitate the selective attention involved in the 
detection of the presence of organic milk buying means and respond in accordance with it 
(Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Aarts et al., 1999). However, given the higher perceived 
applicability of the non-organic means and a more frequent co-occurrence in the past with the 
non-organic milk buying goal, the accessibility of the non-organic buying goal was still 
higher than the organic milk buying goal. Between the organic milk buying goal and the 
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organic milk buying means this past frequent pairing didn’t occur so often or didn’t occur at 
all. In fact, the implementation intentions only started to have their effect when the 
participants had to choose in a new context (less facilitative of habit and with a lower 
perceived applicability associated with it) for the second and third choice. In spite of still 
being influenced by habit in the new context, the fact that they had to choose again might 
have started a choice monitoring process. This was what allowed for the selective attention 
given to the organic buying means to be increased and choose accordingly, although only for 
participants which we infer to have an unstable or weak habit. 
Given that in study 4 the new context was still not facilitative enough and habit was still 
followed in the first decision, in study 5 we will try to overrule this. In the present study the 
same type of implementation intentions were used but this time the context was manipulated 
in order to increase the selective attention given to the organic buying means (increased 
awareness due to an increase in the context salience of the means; Higgins, 1996). For this, 
price and availability of organic and non-organic products were manipulated in order to 
facilitate more the choice of organic products. Although we manipulated price and 
availability, we only did so in order to manipulate the organic vs. non-organic means 
salience. Thus, as said in chapter 2, we define these context differences not in terms of 
“incidental” features but in terms of “essential” features, given that the manipulation of these 
means in terms of salience implies the manipulation of features “central” to the decision. 
Differently from studies 1 to 4 in which these differences and changes in the contexts didn’t 
favor the alternative response to the habitual choice, in the present study these changes are 
aimed at favoring the implementation intention to buy organic in one of the contexts. Thus, 
we predict that when implementation intentions are developed, more organic products will be 
chosen in a facilitative context with equal price and availability of organic and non-organic 
products, compared to a context in which there is a lower salience of the organic buying 
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means (less availability and higher price). A graphical representation of these predictions 
regarding the implementation intentions effect can be seen in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Goal-means structure representation for each type of context, preceded or not by 
the development of an implementation intention to buy organic products. 
 
 
Moreover, we think the implementation intentions success in changing behavior will be 
increased if the response were to be directed towards the inhibition of the undesired response, 
additionally to directing it towards the facilitation of the desired response. This is because 
this latter procedure is not enough to break habits in the early stages of implementation 
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intentions development (as seen in study 4). With this aim, after the implementation 
intentions development, we used the goal priming procedure from study 2 in order to produce 
a similar suppression effect found in it. Therefore, a procedure which is close to the type 1 
implementation intentions (oriented towards the suppression of the undesired response) was 
added to the type 2 implementation intentions. A graphical representation of these predictions 
regarding the implementation intentions effect can be seen in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Goal-means structure representation for each type of context (manipulated in 
terms of means salience), with or without suppression of the habitual goal. 
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To test our prediction associated with changes in the decision context and the prediction 
regarding the positive effects associated with a suppression effect from goal priming, two 
similar studies were designed to test each of them. In study 5a, participants were randomly 
assigned to two between and two within-participants conditions respectively, in an 
experimental design of 2 (with vs. without implementation intentions) X 2 (low organic 
means salience vs. equal salience). Additionally, differently from study 4, there was a one 
week interval between the implementation intentions development and the choice in the 
decision making tasks. The aim of this procedure was to start the development of the relevant 
goal-action links and therefore artificially create the goal-dependent automaticity (see 
Gollwitzer, 1999) with this week interval allowing for the cognitive changes to gain stability 
overtime (Conner et al., 2000) and for the strength in the cue-behavior association to be 
increased (Papies et al., 2009). 
In study 5b, participants were randomly assigned to two between and two within-
participants conditions respectively, in an experimental design of 2 (implementation 
intentions with a target goal vs. with an irrelevant goal) X 2(low organic means salience vs. 
equal salience). Unlike in study 5a, participants made the decisions right after the 
implementation intentions development, therefore allowing to study the effect of goal 
suppression (found in study 2) without the intervention of the time factor. By doing this, we 
can study their effect as an “aid” to the implementation intentions development in the 
beginning of the process and thus, as an effective technique in one-time interventions to 
change behavior. 
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METHOD – STUDY 5a 
 
Participants. 39 students from the University of Plymouth were given credits for their 
participation in two studies, the first concerning of a general survey on “Food production and 
consumer behavior in the United Kingdom” (UK) and the other a study on consumers 
“Shopping behavior in internet based environments”. 
Regarding the sample characteristics, a questionnaire (see description ahead) portrayed 
them as frequent shoppers, going shopping for food almost twice per week (M = 1.85, SD = 
1.09). Also, the sample is characterized by a high percentage of non-organic fruit buying in 
general (M = 87.95, SD = 11.69) and in the previous week (M = 82.75, SD = 11.18). No 
participants reported buying less than 50% of non-organic food in both.  
Questionnaire and implementation intentions. After providing their informed consent 
when registering to participate in the experiment, participants received a questionnaire on 
“Food production and consumer behavior in the UK” by email and were asked for it to be 
sent back through the same way to the researcher after responding to it.  
The questionnaire started with information regarding organic food (see Appendix XVI) 
and its definition according to the UK standards. The information was the same for every 
participant in order for the term “organic” to be equally accessible to everyone and to control 
for the knowledge level, given that prior information can affect the decision (Bettman & 
Park, 1980). This consisted of questions designed to assess sample characteristics such as: 1) 
the number of times per week the participant shopped for food; 2) the percentage of organic 
vs. non organic food bought; 3) the goal intention to buy organic food in the following week 
(5-point Likert type scale from 1 - “very weak” to 5 - “very strong”; adapted from Ajzen, 
2002; Bamberg, 2002).  
In addition to responding to the questionnaire, half of them were asked to develop 
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) to buy organic fruit (the product used in the 
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following decision making task). Accordingly, they were asked the following (adapted from 
Bamberg, 2002): “From experience we know that you are more likely to buy organic food if 
you develop a specific plan regarding where, when and how you will do so. First think 
carefully about your plans for the upcoming week, and make a specific plan for where and 
when you will shop for food. Following this, please indicate your plans for buying organic 
fruit when you shop for food in the next week - write down what type of fruit you will buy 
and how much.”  
Context manipulation. One week after the questionnaire, the participants came to the 
lab and were requested to perform a new study (see Appendix XVII) on “Shopping behavior 
in internet based environments”, with two online shopping tasks consisting of a simulation to 
assess shopping behavior in an internet environment. Given this, they were told that 
“although this is a simulation you should think of it as if you are actually buying”. 
Before performing the two tasks, they were asked to make a written description of what 
they would do in a situation in which they had to buy supermarket products for their weekly 
breakfasts. This aimed to familiarize them with the type of decision processes (regarding 
supermarket products) they had to report in the subsequent decision making tasks. 
The subsequent two tasks comprised the choice of two types of fruit - apples and 
oranges - within a choice of organic vs. non-organic of one type of fruit per task. The choice 
of the fruit category is justified by the Consumer purchase habits questionnaire from study 1 
(pre-test), in which 41% of the participants reported it in the top 5 products frequently bought 
with a moderate to high level on the SRHI between M = 6.25, SD = .6033
                                                 
33 This high result is due to the fact that this value represents the average of only 3 participants (the only one’s 
that chose fruit as the most bought product). 
 if it was the first 
product chosen and M = 4.67, SD = .81 if it was chosen in the second place. Moreover, this 
fruit category was chosen because it allowed finding two different products within the same 
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category, namely oranges and apples. If, for example, we used the same category as in study 
1 and 2 but with the option of semi-skimmed milk and skimmed milk, those two products 
wouldn’t be seen as different but as variations of the same product. Also, using the same 
product would be seen by the participants as strange and artificial, because the only 
difference between them would be the price and availability (thus, the manipulation would be 
more “visible”). Also, the use of the fruit category allows for an assessment in which brand 
involvement, brand preferences or a brand semantic priming effect are controlled for, being 
only studied the preference for particular types of fruit. Finally, although we chose these two 
types of fruits, the goals associated are expected to be part of the same goal system and 
therefore, activating the general goal of buying fruit should activate the orange and apple 
buying sub-goals. 
Based on this, participants performed the two online shopping tasks, which comprised 
HTML pages developed with the use of the Comersus Cart Software (Comersus Open 
Technologies L.C. 2004) and HTML forms developed through SurveyWiz (see Birnbaum, 
2001). The types of oranges and apples included in the each of the decision making tasks 
resulted from on a market study performed by visiting a random set of supermarkets online 
shopping WebPages in which these were the types of fruit that were more available and with 
more different categories to buy from.34
                                                 
34 Although these two types of fruit involve different behavioural patterns in their purchase and decision to buy, 
this might introduce some confound in the results. However, due to the fact that they are the two types of fruit 
most bought should make them more similar, than if other types of fruit were chosen. 
 The two tasks corresponded to a within-participant 
manipulation of the organic means salience. This involved a reduction of the number of 
options available, from 12 (study 1 to 4) to 6 options. The aim was to make the means 
associated with organic fruit buying less salient in one context (less means available 
comparing to the non-organic buying means) - lower salience condition - and equally salient 
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in the other context (same number of organic and non-organic options available) - equal 
salience condition. The lower organic means salience condition included a choice of oranges, 
within a list of 4 non-organic (.66 proportion)35 and 2 organic products available, with a 
higher price for the organic products compared to the non-organic. The equal salience 
condition included the choice of apples, within a list of 3 non-organic and 3 organic products 
available (equal proportion) with similar prices. Additionally, in both conditions, the 
participants had a “more information” option for each product that could be pressed in order 
to assess additional information regarding the product, with the message “this information is 
not available at the moment” if pressed. This was included as a manipulation check to see if 
the participant’s decision process reflected a more systematic or heuristic processing of the 
information36
To test for order effects, one group completed the lower salience task (oranges) first 
followed by the equal salience task (apples), while the other group did the reverse order. 
Moreover, to prevent the influence of the products position in the web page, although both 
products categories appeared in the same page, this position was varied. Thus, the two orders 
of presentation mentioned were manipulated by fixing the oranges products on top and the 
apples in the bottom of the webpage in one of the conditions (oranges-apples order) and 
reversing the positions in another condition (apples-oranges order). 
. 
Finally, in these tasks participants were requested to think-aloud while choosing the 
product (see Bettman & Park, 1980; Yang, 2002), by reporting everything they were thinking 
and the way they were deciding (which was preceded by a practice example regarding the 
                                                 
35 The proportion was the same as in study 1, although here the reduction of the options available from 12 (study 
1) to 6 aimed at increasing the salience of this difference. 
36 It is inferred that if they follow their habit, the need to search more information won’t be as high as in the case 
where they don’t follow their habit (Verplanken et al., 1997). 
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choice of current movies to see at the cinema)37
Final questionnaire. Finally, after choosing one product in each task, participants 
responded to a short web questionnaire, with manipulation checks and other socio-
demographic variables, such as: 1) perceived influence of habit on the decisions made (5-
point Likert type scale from 1 - “extremely weak” to 5 - “extremely strong”); 2) percentage of 
organic vs. non-organic food bought in the previous week; 3) goal intention to buy organic 
fruit during the following week (same measure as in the initial questionnaire). The last two 
aimed to assess the consistence of these when compared to the answers given in the week 
before.  After completion of the questionnaire, participants were debriefed about the specific 
aims of the study and expected results and asked about the perceived influence of the 
manipulations over their choices. None of the participants reported being aware of this 
influence. 
. The choices made by the participants were 
recorded on a sheet, regarding the option of orange/apple chosen (from 6 available) and its 
type (organic or non-organic). 
 
RESULTS – STUDY 5a 
 
Questionnaire and Manipulation Checks. Regarding the baseline characteristics of the 
sample, the t-test for independent samples results show that there are no significant 
differences between the with and without implementation intentions conditions, in terms of 
habit perceived influence on the decisions made and other sample characteristics measures 
(e.g. intention).  
Regarding the intention to buy organic food in the following week, there was an 
increase in the overall sample between the low intention measured at home (M = 2.30, SD = 
                                                 
37 The data resulting from the think-aloud procedure was recorded but the qualitative information in it wasn’t 
analysed in this thesis and will be the subject of a future study regarding it. 
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.98) and the moderate intention measured one week later at the lab (M = 3.05, SD = .95), 
t(19) = -3.68, p = .002. The difference between the percentage of organic food bought in 
general and bought in the previous week was non-significant. To what concerns the influence 
of products price in the webpage used as the decision task, the frequency table analysis shows 
no clear pattern of choosing the products in accordance with their prices (see Table 28).  
 
Table 28 - Choice frequencies for each type of fruit by context, price and webpage position 
 Fruit Type 
Webpage 
position38
Price 
(Pounds)  
Choice 
Frequency 
Lower salience 
context (oranges) 
Seville  1 1.39 4 
Seville Organic 2 2.23 6 
Navelina  3 1.25 5 
Finest  4 2.45 3 
Jaffa Organic 5 1.99 10 
Jaffa  6 1.14 11 
Equal salience 
context (apples) 
Braeburn  7 1.30 4 
Braeburn Organic 8 1.35 11 
Gala Organic 9 1.22 11 
Gala  10 1.14 3 
Pink Lady Organic 11 2.24 4 
Pink Lady  12 2.19 6 
 
                                                 
38 This position was randomized in two order conditions, with one type of fruit first in one condition (products 
1-6) and last in the other (6-12) and vice-versa for the other type of fruit. No significant order effects were 
found. 
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To further analyze this possibility, we recoded the data into two categories of products: 
low price (aggregating the three products with the lowest price) and high price (aggregating 
the three products with the highest price). Regarding either the choice made in the high 
salience context or the choice made in the equal salience context, overall results with the 
Binomial test show no significant differences between the choice frequencies in the two price 
categories.  
Binomial test results regarding the choice of the option to search for “more 
information”, showed a significantly higher percentage of participants not selecting that 
option (.74) than the ones selecting it (p= .003; Binomial). Moreover, Chi-square test results 
show no significant differences in this, between the conditions with or without 
implementation intentions. 
Regarding order effects, results from the Fisher’s exact test applied to Gart’s test for 
order effects (see Everitt, 1977) show no differences between the low salience-equal salience 
and the equal salience-low salience orders. 
Decision Making Task. Chi-square test results for the consecutive choices made in the 
low salience and equal salience contexts show that the decisions made are not significantly 
different from the results that would have been obtained by chance for the independents 
events, both in the implementation intentions condition and in the condition without 
implementation intentions. The probabilities calculation which served as a basis for 
determining the expected frequencies for the Chi-square test are shown in Appendix VII. 
McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the lower and 
equal salience contexts when no implementation intentions are developed (see Table 25) 
show no significant differences in the consistency of organic and non-organic choice between 
contexts (McNemar A/D) and no significant differences in the revision of the choice between 
contexts (McNemar B/C). 
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McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the lower and 
equal salience contexts when the implementation intentions are developed (see Table 29) 
show a significantly higher percentage of participants which revised their choice, by choosing 
the non-organic option in the lower salience context and the organic option in the equal 
salience context (40%) compared to the opposite revision (0%) (p = .013; McNemar). 
Regarding the consistency in the choice of organic and non-organic options between 
contexts, there are no significant differences. 
 
Table 29 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the low vs. equal salience contexts 
for the participants with vs. without implementation intentions, with McNemar’s test 
Without Implementation Intentions 
  Equal salience context   
  
Organic 
Non-
organic 
McNemar  
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
Lower salience 
context 
Organic 6  3 
p = 1.000 p = .724 
Non-organic 5 5 
With Implementation Intentions 
  Equal salience context   
  
Organic Non-organic 
McNemar  
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
Lower salience 
context 
Organic 7  0  
p = .773 p = .013 
Non-organic 8  5  
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METHOD – STUDY 5b 
 
Participants. 42 participants volunteered to participate39
Regarding the sample characteristics, a questionnaire (see description ahead) portrayed 
them as frequent shoppers, going shopping for food at least twice per week (M = 2.10, SD = 
1.06), fruit almost twice per week (M = 1.70, SD = 1.04) and candy less than once per week 
(M = .82, SD = 1.11). Also, the sample is characterized by a high percentage of non-organic 
fruit buying in general (M = 80.68, SD = 16.15) and in the previous week (M = 82.00, SD = 
16.09). Additionally, the participants reported a frequency of organic food buying between 
“rarely” and “sometimes” (M = 2.70, SD = 1.16). 
 and were paid 3₤ for their 
participation in two studies, the first concerning a general survey on “Food production and 
consumer behavior in the UK” and the other, immediately after it, a study on consumers 
“Shopping behavior in internet based environments”. From these, 2 participants were 
dropped out given that they reported buying less than 50% of non-organic food in general and 
in the previous week. 
Questionnaire and implementation intentions. After providing their informed consent 
upon arrival at the lab, participants were requested to fill a questionnaire on “Food production 
and consumer behavior in the UK” 
The questionnaire started with the same information regarding organic food (see 
Appendix XVIII) and its definition according to the UK standards, used in study 5a. This 
consisted of questions designed to assess sample characteristics such as: 1) the number of 
times per week the participant shopped for food, fruit and candy; 2) the percentage of organic 
vs. non organic food bought; 3) the frequency of organic food purchase (5-point Likert type 
scale from 1 - “never” to 5 - “always”); 4) the goal intention to buy organic food in the 
                                                 
39 Collected from the participant’s pool of the School of Psychology, University of Plymouth. 
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following week (5-point Likert type scale from 1 - “very weak” to 5 - “very strong”; adapted 
from Ajzen, 1991; Bamberg, 2002); 5) perceived probability to buy organic food in the 
following week (5-point Likert type scale from 1 - “extremely improbable” to 5 - “extremely 
probable”; corresponding to a self-prediction measure as identified by Sheppard, Hartwick & 
Warshaw, 1988); 6) perceived difficulty to buy organic food in general (5-point Likert type 
scale from 1 - “extremely easy” to 5 - “extremely difficult”; corresponding to a perceived 
behavioral control measure; adapted from Ajzen, 1991).  
In addition to responding to the questionnaire, half of them were asked to develop 
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) to buy organic products. Accordingly, they 
were asked the following (adapted from Bamberg, 2002): “From experience we know that 
you are more likely to buy organic food if you develop a specific plan regarding where, when 
and how you will do so. First think carefully about your plans for the upcoming week, and 
make a specific plan for where and when you will shop for food. Following this, please 
indicate your plans for buying organic food when you shop for food in the next week - write 
down what type of food you will buy and how much.”  
The aim of this manipulation was to start the process of development of the relevant 
goal-action links and therefore artificially create the goal-dependent automaticity (see 
Gollwitzer, 1999). It should be noted that this manipulation asked the participants to identify 
organic products and not specifically organic fruit (as in study 5a), which is the aim of the 
decision making task and habit manipulation. The objective is to assess the effect of the 
development of an implementation intention through the activation of a superordinate goal 
(buy organic food) in the same level as the goal associated with the intention, which can 
subsequently be implemented in the relevant situation (buy fruit). Moreover, not developing 
implementation intentions associated with organic fruit prevents this concept - “fruit” - from 
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being activated at the time of the goal priming task, which could increase the accessibility of 
the habit associated with fruit buying (but not candy). 
Goal priming manipulation. Immediately after completing the questionnaire, the 
participants were requested to participate in a new study on “Shopping behavior in internet 
based environments”. In this, half of them were asked to write a brief description of their 
behavior in a certain situation (after being presented with a practice example): “Imagine that 
you are going to buy food for yourself in the supermarket/local store and take it home. Once 
you get there, you start shopping and then you realize that you want to buy fruit
Context manipulation. Immediately after the goal priming manipulation, the participants 
were requested to perform a new study on “Shopping behavior in internet based 
environments”, with two online shopping tasks consisting on a simulation to assess shopping 
behavior in an internet environment. This followed the same procedure as in study 5a. 
. Please 
describe what you would do from the time you arrive at the fruit section until the time you 
choose the fruit, describing the options available and the way you make your choice.” In 
study 5a the participants did this only for candy, with no relevant goal manipulation involved. 
In the present study, additionally to this candy condition (irrelevant goal) representing the 
control condition, half the participants did this for fruit instead of candy, thus constituting the 
target (fruit) goal priming group.  
Final questionnaire. After choosing one product in each task, participants responded to 
the same short questionnaire as in study 5a. After completion of it, participants were 
debriefed about the specific aims of the study and expected results and asked about the 
perceived influence of the manipulations over their choices. None of the participants reported 
being aware of this influence. 
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RESULTS – STUDY 5b 
 
Questionnaire and Manipulation Checks. Regarding the baseline characteristics of the 
sample, the t-test for independent samples results show that there are no significant 
differences between the target vs. irrelevant goal priming conditions, in terms of habit 
perceived influence on the decisions made and other sample characteristics measures (e.g. 
intention).  
Overall there is a moderate intention to buy organic food in the following week, with no 
significant differences between the intention measured in the initial and final questionnaire, 
n.s. Moreover, there is a moderate to low perceived probability to buy organic food in the 
following week, with a higher perceived probability in the end of the study (M = 3.40, SD = 
1.36) compared to the beginning, before the experimental manipulations and decision tasks 
(M = 3.08, SD = 1.29), t(39) = 2.82, p = .008. Additionally, there is a low perceived difficulty 
to buy organic food in general (M = 2.42, SD = .90).  
Finally, comparing the intention to buy organic food of the participants from study 5a at 
moment 1 (M = 2.30, SD = .98) and the study 5b participants intention (M = 3.07, SD = 1.26), 
the latter is significantly higher than the former, t(60) = 2.41, p = .019, d = .69. 
To what concerns the influence of the products price in the webpage used as the 
decision task, the frequency table analysis shows no clear pattern of choosing the products in 
accordance with their prices (see Table 30).  
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Table 30 - Choice frequencies for each type of fruit by context, price and webpage position 
 Fruit Type 
Webpage 
position40
Price 
(Pounds)  
Choice 
Frequency 
Lower salience 
context (oranges) 
Seville  1 1.39 3 
Seville Organic 2 2.23 11 
Navelina  3 1.25 10 
Finest  4 2.45 7 
Jaffa Organic 5 1.99 11 
Jaffa  6 1.14 18 
Equal salience 
context (apples) 
Braeburn  7 1.30 2 
Braeburn Organic 8 1.35 18 
Gala Organic 9 1.22 22 
Gala  10 1.14 14 
Pink Lady Organic 11 2.24 2 
Pink Lady  12 2.19 2 
 
As in study 5a, to further analyze this possibility we recoded the data into two 
categories of products: low price (aggregating the three products with the lowest price) and 
high price (aggregating the three products with the highest price). Regarding the choice made 
in the high salience context, results with the Binomial test show no significant differences 
between the choice frequencies in the two price categories. Regarding the choice made in the 
equal salience context, results with the Binomial test show marginally non-significant 
                                                 
40 This position was randomized in two order conditions, with one type of fruit first in one condition (products 
1-6) and last in the other (6-12) and vice-versa for the other type of fruit. No significant order effects were 
found. 
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differences with a higher frequency of choice in the low price (.63) than in the high price 
category (p = .052). 
Binomial test results regarding the choice of the option to search for “more 
information”, showed a significantly higher percentage of participants not selecting that 
option (.72) than the ones selecting it (p= .001; Binomial). Moreover, Chi-square test results 
show no significant differences in this, between the implementation intentions conditions 
with the accessible target goal vs. irrelevant goal. 
Regarding order effects, results from the Fisher’s exact test applied to Gart’s test for 
order effects (see Everitt, 1977) show no differences between the low salience-equal salience 
and the equal salience-low salience orders. 
Decision Making Task. Chi-square test results for the consecutive choices made in the 
low salience and equal salience contexts, show that the decisions made are significantly 
different from the results that would have been obtained by chance for the independents 
events, in the implementation intentions condition with the target goal, χ2 (3, N=20) =8.54, p 
< .025. In the implementation intentions condition with the irrelevant goal, the choice is not 
significantly different from chance. The probabilities calculation which served as a basis for 
determining the expected frequencies for the Chi-square test are shown in Appendix VII. 
McNemar’s test results regarding differences between decisions in the lower and equal 
salience contexts when the irrelevant goal is primed (see Table 27) show a significantly 
higher percentage of participants which revised their choice, by choosing the non-organic 
option in the lower salience context and the organic option in the equal salience context 
(30%) compared to the opposite revision (0%) (p = .041; McNemar). Regarding the 
consistency in the choice of organic and non-organic options between contexts, there is a 
higher consistency in the choice of non-organic (45%) than in the choice of organic (25%), 
although these differences are non-significant. 
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McNemar’s test results regarding the differences between decisions in the lower and 
equal salience contexts when the target goal is primed (see Table 31) show a significantly 
higher percentage of participants which revised their choice, by choosing the non-organic 
option in the lower salience context and the organic option in the equal salience context 
(30%) compared to the opposite revision (0%) (p = .013; McNemar). Regarding the 
consistency in the choice of organic and non-organic options between contexts, there is a 
higher consistency in the choice of organic (40%) than in the choice of non-organic (20%), 
although these differences are not significant.  
 
Table 31 - Differences in frequencies between decisions in the low vs. equal salience contexts 
for the participants with the target vs. irrelevant goal, with McNemar’s test 
Irrelevant goal 
  Equal salience context   
  
Organic Non-organic 
McNemar  
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
Lower salience 
context 
Organic 5  0  
p = .423 p = .041 
Non-organic 6  9  
Target goal 
  Equal salience context   
  
Organic Non-organic 
McNemar  
(A/D) 
McNemar 
(B/C) 
Lower salience 
context 
Organic 8  0  
p = .387 p = .013 
Non-organic 8  4  
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Finally, by aggregating the frequencies regarding the participants that were consistent in 
the choice of organic and who revised their choice between contexts, results show that this 
percentage is higher in the target goal priming condition (80%) than in the irrelevant goal 
priming condition (55%), although not being significant41 with the Difference Between Two 
Proportions test. Moreover, the consistency in the choice of non-organic is higher in the 
irrelevant goal condition (45%) than in the target goal condition (20%), although also not 
being significant42
 
. 
DISCUSSION - STUDIES 5A & 5B 
 
We predicted that the success of an implementation intention in increasing the amount 
of organic products chosen, would be greater if the context was changed in order to facilitate 
that choice. The results do not refute this and show that when implementation intentions are 
developed, significantly more organic fruit is chosen in the equal (organic means) salience 
context than in the lower (organic means) salience. When no implementation intentions are 
developed, the context doesn’t facilitate the organic choice and no differences between them 
are found. This shows the context relevance in influencing decision making and specifically 
habit interaction with it, as a very important determinant, in this case the non-organic fruit 
consumption habit which is a particular type of fruit consumption habit not yet studied in 
research (see Brug, Vet, Nooijer & Verplanken, 2006). 
This implementation intentions effect happens either when they are developed towards 
a more abstract target - organic food - and the decision is made right after this - study 5b - or 
towards a more specific one - organic fruit - and they are allowed one week to “stabilize” and 
                                                 
41 The non-significance (p = .099) regarding this difference in 25% can be explained by the small sample being 
studied (n = 20 in each condition) which implied a low statistical power. 
42 Ibidem. 
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increase the cue-behavior strength (Papies et al., 2009) before the relevant decision - study 
5a. However, their effect appears to be of a lower magnitude in the case of study 5b, given 
that this difference approached a marginally significant result in the irrelevant goal priming 
condition, compared to the condition with implementation intentions in study 5a. Moreover, 
it is important to note that the intention to buy organic food in the future was lower for study 
5a participants one week before the decision compared to study 5b participants and that study 
5a participant’s intention increased significantly during that week. This seems to have 
benefited the implementation intentions and it might indicate that the cognitive connections 
developed by them, were strengthened during that time (Papies et al., 2009). Also, it is said 
that implementation intentions which involve more abstract goals (organic food) have a more 
reduced effect than when a more specific goal is involved (organic fruit), which can explain 
why the effects magnitude was lower in study 5b (with the same said to have happened in the 
Verplanken & Fae’s (1999) study; see Holland et al., 2006). Nevertheless, despite of the 
more abstract implementation intentions used, the goal priming used to produce a suppression 
effect involved a concrete goal to buy milk and thus, this effect might have been diminished. 
Therefore, differences in magnitude might have more to do with the one week interval rather 
than this goal concreteness. Nevertheless, this is just an inference and should be studied in 
future studies, in which goal abstraction can be manipulated, for example using two 
conditions of goal abstractness (implementation intentions for organic milk vs. organic 
products), and two conditions of goal priming in order to induce the goal suppression effect 
(organic milk vs. organic products goal priming). 
Overall, these results are in accordance with research showing that the implementation 
intentions effect can be disrupted when there are changes in the goal intentions and context 
stability (e.g. Sheeran et al., 2005; Sniehotta, Nagy, Scholz & Schwarzer, 2006), i.e., when 
contexts become more constraining (Betsch et al., 2004). When this happens, people with a 
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strong habit are expected to follow a more heuristic processing using less information and 
more superficial and non-compensatory information search strategies (leave information 
relevant to alternatives to their habitual behavior uninspected; as shown in Verplanken et al., 
1997). This is expected mainly in the initial stages of the relevant cognitive linking (goal-
action) associated with the implementation intentions, given that these links didn’t have 
enough time and/or opportunity to become stronger. Thus, given that a great deal of self-
regulation processes and action control is needed in the development of new intentional 
behaviors (Sniehotta et al., 2006) and that this consumes many cognitive resources, it 
shouldn’t be surprising that “unstable” implementation intentions are not strong enough to 
overcome the context constraining effects. On the other side, when the context becomes more 
supportive, their success is increased, as the results from the two studies (5a and 5b) show. 
Apart from the facilitative characteristics of the context, we aimed to asses if 
implementation intentions could also be facilitated by inducing a suppression effect similar to 
the one found in study 2 (see previous chapter). Thus, we wanted to see if by priming 
supraliminally the buying goal associated with the habitual choice of non-organic means, this 
would increase the consistency in the choice of organic products between contexts. In other 
words, we expected that participants would choose not only more organic in the equal 
salience context but also more organic in the low salience context. The results refute this by 
replicating in the target goal priming condition the context effect found in the irrelevant goal 
priming condition and showing that the expected higher consistency in the choice of organic 
is non-significant. 
Nevertheless, two aspects should be noted. First, although the effect in the target goal 
priming condition replicated the effect found in the irrelevant goal priming condition, its 
magnitude was higher in the former than in the latter and significantly departed from a choice 
by chance (unlike the choice made for the irrelevant goal condition and the conditions in 
247 
 
study 5a)43. Thus, not only the percentage of participants that chose non-organic in the low 
salience context and organic in the equal salience context was higher but also the effect was 
higher in significance. Also, it was the only result that actually demonstrated to be goal 
directed (choose organic) in interaction with the facilitative context and different from 
chance. Second, although the difference in the organic choice consistency between the two 
priming conditions is not significant, still the organic choice consistency is 15% higher and 
the non-organic consistency is 15% lower in the target goal priming condition compared to 
the irrelevant goal priming condition. Moreover, the aggregation of the participants consistent 
in the choice of organic and the ones who revised their choice between contexts (by choosing 
organic in the equal salience condition and non-organic in the low salience condition) shows 
that this percentage is higher in the target goal priming condition (80%) than in the irrelevant 
goal priming condition (55%)44
Therefore, although overall our prediction was refuted, results seem to indicate that by 
inducing habitual goal suppression, we might be “vaccinating” some people against habits 
“behavioral deviating” effect. This has some support in the self-regulation and goal 
attainment literature, which shows that in order to attain goals, some cognitive flexibility is 
needed in the sense that individuals need to resist the salient temptations with which the 
desired goals are in conflict (Fishbach & Shah, 2006). This can be seen as the blockage of 
unwanted influences or “temptations” by directing implementation intentions toward goal 
pursuit (Gollwitzer et al. 2005).  
. 
                                                 
43 It should be noted however, that the fact that the number of options available to choose from was reduced 
from 12 to 6 limits the choice strategies and preferences used and thus, can increase the probability that the 
choices are closer to chance. This could explain why in studies 5a and 5b this was the case but not in studies 1 to 
4. Moreover, the fact that they had to think-aloud could have introduced some confound by introducing a more 
systematic processing of the information, although we have no way to asses that this was the case. 
44 Although this being non-significant for the reasons presented before. 
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In order for this to occur, the temptations can be made salient for the individual. This 
can be achieved by making people aware of the available behavioral options, including the 
desired (through the development of implementation intentions) and the undesired ones 
(through awareness). The downside of this is that it consumes attentional resources, i.e., when 
exerting effort, “self-regulatory resources become depleted, decreasing the ability to proceed 
with self-regulation” (Coelho do Vale, Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2008; p. 5). However, by 
inducing the suppression effect that we used, this amount of effort can be reduced given that 
in our view this happened in an automatic way without people being aware of it. Thus, self-
regulatory measures that involve less effort like this one can be used, which can increase the 
success in the development of behavioral change strategies. 
In spite of this, it should be noted that the suppression effect might be dependent on 
habit strength, which wasn’t directly assessed in this study. Accordingly, participants more 
susceptible to suppress their non-organic goal might be the ones with strong habits (“stable” 
habits) in accordance with study 2 results. This prediction should be tested with future 
studies, in which habit strength is measured. Moreover, behavioral change techniques using 
this kind of suppression effect should be pitted against more effortful self-regulation 
strategies (e.g. asking people directly to avoid the use of their habits and consciously 
suppressing it), in order to access the success of each of them. To this, situational constraints 
(e.g. time pressure; task complexity; see e.g. Betsch et al., 2004; Verplanken & Faes, 1999) 
could also be added in order to assess if the benefits of goal suppression could be obtained 
with our manipulation (involving less effort) but not with techniques involving a higher level 
of consciousness. 
To our knowledge, this “vaccine” effect hasn’t yet been demonstrated in the habit 
research literature, although it might be seen as closely related to the classical inoculation 
effect found in the literature regarding persuasion (McGuire, 1964), which considers that 
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“being forewarned of a persuasion attempt can help people resist persuasion” (Smith & 
Mackie, 1995; p. 304). Accordingly, immunity to persuasive arguments can be achieved if we 
expose people to “small doses” of the infection, by rehearsing the counterarguments 
(inoculation; McGuire, 1964). In the same way, in order to prevent people from falling prey 
to habitual behavior, exposing them to their own habits might be a successful technique, 
given that it can be seen as a form of exposing them to the “virus”, while implementation 
intentions allow for the desired response rehearsal. This prediction should be tested with 
future studies, given that the statistical power of our results is not enough to give a strong 
support for this.  
  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The studies presented show two main results: habits can “break” implementation 
intentions (study 4) and implementation intentions can “break” habits (study 5a and 5b). 
Regarding the first result, when the context is familiar and facilitative of the habitual 
behavior, the decision is determined more by the habit than the implementation intentions, 
which have a low success in “breaking” the former. This happened when the means 
associated with the habitual behavior (non-organic means) were either more (4 non-organic in 
6; study 5) or less contextually salient (8 non-organic in 12; study 4), while maintaining the 
proportion constant (.66 of the products in the choice list were non-organic). Also, this 
happened for two different categories of products, which seems to indicate that the effect is 
more due to the goal systems involved and the presence of a habit, than actually to the type of 
product or brand. Accordingly, the same effect was found both in a category (milk) for which 
familiar brands were included in the choice context, and in a category (fruit) without brands 
but with product sub-categories (e.g. Sevilla oranges). Thus, this effect goes beyond brand 
involvement and familiarity as a determinant of choice (see e.g. Coupey, Irwin & Payne, 
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1998; Quester & Smart, 1998) and rather than a cognitive effect, it shows the presence of a 
motivational effect apart from the brand. 
Also, in study 4, the comparison of the results for the first choice between the familiar 
and new context seems to indicate that the first choice for the majority of the participants was 
the habitual choice. Thus, it seems that in this case even when the context is less facilitative 
of habit, the habitual behavior can still be followed. However, it should be noted that this is 
only the case because the new context is not completely new given that the product (milk) 
remains the habitual product even in the absence of brands and the two alternative categories 
(organic and non-organic) are still known categories. Thus, although the context changed in 
the features “essential” to the decision, the existent means still allowed goal attainment for 
some participants. In this regard, a new choice context for habitual cow milk consumers that 
involved a complete change in the “essential” features could be a choice of soya milk, with 
two alternative categories of “added calcium” vs. “added omega 3”, for example. 
Nevertheless, it shows that habit can still be followed when there are “essential” changes in 
context and an alternative choice is made salient through implementation intentions. 
Accordingly, apart for some reasons that might have constrained the implementation 
intentions effect, this effect was still found when participants had to choose more options 
after the first choice and especially on a third choice. This shows that when obliged to revise 
their choice, this revision can elicit a more systematic processing of the information because 
changes in the “essential” features of context occurred which lowered the perceived 
applicability of habit (less available means to achieve the goal). This seemed to be the case in 
our study, with participants making their first choice following a more heuristic processing. 
At the same time, when participants had to choose again, the revision seemed to involve a 
more systematic processing of the information, with this effect being higher for participants 
251 
 
who developed implementation intentions, i.e., implementation intentions seemingly induced 
a more systematic processing of the information but only on the second and third choices.  
This showed that implementation intentions are important when adapting to new 
contexts (Betsch et al., 2004) and that “deliberation can alter learned relations among goals, 
behaviors and affect” (Betsch et al., 2004; p. 72), i.e., can “break” habits. Apparently, this 
only occurs when changes in the “essential” contextual features occur in a way that facilitates 
the implementation intentions and people are allowed time and opportunity to monitor and 
revise their choices in accordance with them. However, this deliberation consumes cognitive 
resources because it demands cognitive control over owns choices and behavior in order for 
the achieved changes to last (Betsch et al., 2004). Therefore, if they don’t achieve 
automaticity and the associated cognitive connections are not strengthened (i.e., if they don’t 
develop into a habit), it is expected that behavior falls back to the previous state (i.e., the 
habit takes over again). This affirmation, however, can only be assessed with a longitudinal 
methodology, which should be the aim of more studies in the future. 
From this, it is clear that the context has an important role in allowing for 
implementation intentions to “break” habits. Although this effect wasn’t shown for the first 
decision made in study 4, this was because the “new” context still allowed for the habitual 
behavior to occur and there were no big changes in the “essential” contextual features that 
could facilitate the desired response (choose organic). Also, for the planning to be effective, it 
needs to link a new behavioral response to the already existent habit activation cues. In both 
decision contexts studied (familiar and new) this wasn’t possible, given that the organic 
choice could not be promoted by associating it with the non-organic products choice, given 
that both categories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, either in the familiar context or in the 
first choice made in the new context, the choice of organic means was in competition with a 
higher activation potential of the non-organic means. Thus, only in the second and especially 
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in the third decisions, was it possible to associate the goal to choose organic with the actual 
choice of organic, given that only then this connection was facilitated. 
Due to the fact that the organic choice cannot be promoted by associating it with the 
non-organic products choice, in our view, the only way to facilitate this is by means of a 
change in the “essential” contextual features that accompanies the cognitive change. 
Accordingly, in study 5 the context was manipulated in order to increase the organic buying 
means salience, from a context in which this salience was lower than the salience of the non-
organic means, to a context in which both organic and non-organic means were equally 
salient45
In our view, this shows that although linking the goal associated with the 
implementation intentions (new behavioral goal), to the cues associated with habitual 
behavior is important to increase their success, this might also be achieved through other 
ways. Thus, when this cannot be achieved, context changes might be enough to facilitate the 
desired response associated with implementation intentions targeted to this facilitation. 
Therefore, for certain choices and decision contexts, we might not need both to associate the 
new goal with the old (habitual cues), and to change the context and one of them should be 
enough, depending on the situation and behavior (Holland et al., 2006). With our study 5 we 
complement the findings of Holland et al. (2006), by showing that an increased attention to 
the cues associated with the new goal (organic means) by developing the implementation 
. This increase in the organic means salience allowed for the implementation 
intentions to have an effect, with a higher number of organics being chosen in the equal 
salience context compared to the lower salience context. This effect wasn’t observed in the 
participants for whom the implementation intentions weren’t developed.  
                                                 
45 Having a context with a higher salience of organic means (lower price for organics and higher availability) 
would be perceived as too artificial and unrealistic and therefore, we chose only to have an equal salience 
condition to reduce the bias introduced by this. 
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intention (instead of connecting the new goal to the old cues) accompanied with a change in 
context to make them more salient, is effective in overruling the cuing of habit from the “old” 
cues (non-organic means).  
Accordingly, study 5 showed that a change in context is not enough to produce 
successful results in behavior change, given that this effect had a higher magnitude, only 
when combined with the implementation intentions. In other words, the manipulation of the 
context by itself still wasn’t sufficient for the implementation intentions to overcome habits 
in a low salience condition, i.e., when the non-organic buying means were more salient and 
therefore the habit activation potential was higher. However, although our results weren’t 
significant in the manipulations we used to overcome this, there are reasons to believe that 
this can be accomplished when a suppression effect from (goal) priming is induced. 
Accordingly, study 5b showed that it might be important to prime the goals associated to the 
habitual behavior in a way that induces their suppression. In this regard, by promoting goal 
activation and attainment in the same task (see study 2 and 5b), seemingly has the 
consequence of inhibiting it (Liberman et al., 2007). However, following from results in 
study 2, it should be taken into consideration that this effect might only be expected for 
people with a strong habit. For people with a weak habit this procedure might have the ironic 
effect of increasing the strength of the habit we want to “break” and therefore, caution should 
be taken in using it. 
Despite of this, its implementation intentions facilitative effects, can be seen as a 
“vaccine” effect similar to the classical inoculation effect found in the literature regarding 
persuasion (see McGuire, 1964), which considers that “being forewarned of a persuasion 
attempt can help people resist persuasion” (Smith & Mackie, 1995; p. 304). Accordingly, 
being forewarned of our socially undesired habits can help people resist the “temptation” of 
falling prey to them. This effect hasn’t been studied on habit research although it finds some 
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support in the literature on self-regulation and goal attainment, which shows that in order to 
attain goals, some cognitive flexibility is needed to resist the salient temptations with which 
the desired goals are in conflict (Fishbach & Shah, 2006). This awareness can allow the 
blockage of the unwanted influences or “temptations” while at the same time the 
implementation intentions are directed toward goal pursuit (Gollwitzer et al. 2005).  
Overall, these studies raise some important questions regarding the pre-conditions under 
which a habit can “break” the implementation intentions effect, and an implementation 
intention can “break” a habit. Specifically it showed the context’s role, namely familiarity 
and situational features salience as important factors in this sense. Additional studies should 
be conducted regarding other important preconditions, in order to comprehend the situations 
role in constraining or facilitating a habit. Also, more research should allow the study of its 
role either as a barrier or facilitator (regarding the suppression effect) to a conscious intention 
to behave in an environmentally friendly way to buy organic food.  
Nevertheless, these studies and the ones from the previous chapter (studies 1, 2 and 3) 
have obvious implications for the development of consumer behavior change programs, since 
they show that price and availability of organic products in supermarkets and food stores is 
only the visible part of the problem. In fact, they sometimes work more as post-decisional 
justifications for not behaving in a certain socially desired way. Consequently, behavior 
change projects developers must be aware that habits can become accessible and influence 
behavior and consumers decisions without them being aware. Also, researchers should be 
aware of the fact that apparently successful behavioral modification techniques can be 
overthrown by situational features, in simple acts such as a visit to the supermarket, which 
can elicit a previously established behavior.  
Various examples in the real world show that in order to change a “frozen” habit, 
individuals need to invest in a long-term self-regulatory effort, to resist the temptation of 
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falling prey to it. Our results indicate that “vaccinating” people by making them aware of 
their own habits and situational influences on behavior might be a way to constrain their 
negative effect. This is a new finding not found in the literature regarding habitual behavior 
change, and our study although not giving a clear and strong support to this, shed some lights 
regarding it. In other words, more research should be developed in order to assess the 
efficacy of a joint effect of implicit (e.g. goal suppression techniques) and explicit (e.g. 
implementation intentions) behavior change techniques, in behavior change efficacy. This is 
based on the view that consumers and decision makers in general are adaptive decision 
makers (Palma-Oliveira, 1995; Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993) and thus can follow 
different strategies depending on the context, personal characteristics and the decision target 
(e.g. type of product).  
Accordingly, people should be trained in order to develop “good” habits regarding their 
environmental and consumer choices, but at the same time they should be trained to become 
competent in their decisions and behaviors (Corral-Verdugo, 2002; Gaspar de Carvalho & 
Coutinho de Faria, 2003; Fraijo-Sing, Corral-Verdugo, Tapia-Fonllem & González-Lomelí, 
in press), in the sense that these “good habits” should resist contextual changes. Therefore, 
automatic processes should be involved in “good decisions” (determined by “good habits”) 
but at the same time a certain amount of deliberation and intentional goal attainment should 
also be involved. This could allow tuning these decisions if needed (i.e., make decisions the 
closest possible to the desired goal; as in Aarts et al., 1999), as in the case of contextual 
changes that can disrupt habits. This means that habits dynamism can work either in favor of 
“bad habits” or “good habits”, depending of the behavior change and maintenance techniques 
we use. 
This “vaccine” effect and other implications of our results still need further study 
regarding the conditions in which they take place. Nevertheless, we think that our studies, by 
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applying theories and concepts from Social Psychology in general and Social Cognition in 
particular to the domain of environmental and consumer behaviors, are a starting point in this 
regard. Accordingly, this can allow the development of new ways of increasing the success of 
intentional proenvironmental behaviors development and of people’s “vaccination” to resist 
the temptations of which influence they often are not aware. 
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